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Although non-state market-driven (NSMD) policies are increasingly promoted as 
more efficient and effective alternatives to state-based regulation, there have been few 
comparative studies of the two approaches, and none that focus on their relative 
reliability as a means of policy delivery. To facilitate comparison of state and non-state 
policy systems, I develop a two-part comparative framework that highlights key 
structural features expected to produce slippage (i.e., a divergence of principals' 
expectations and agents' actions). The first integrates new insights about principal-agent 
theory with formal network analysis, emphasizing internal structural factors that can be 
expected to impact communication between policymakers those to whom they delegate 
implementation responsibilities (i.e., structural complexity). The second focuses on 
exogenous factors; namely the tendency for communication errors to increase as people 
are separated by culture and experience (i.e., social distance). I apply this framework to 
compare state forest laws and two NSMD systems currently operating in Chile. Since 
NSMD authority – and persistence as market alternatives – are predicated on informed 
demand, I analyze media content throughout the global products chain, controlling for 
geography, culture, and epistemic community. I conclude that an important NSMD 
instrument (the chain-of-custody) weakens the reliability of such models as means of 
implementing public policy. Moreover, since the quality of communication about NSMD 
systems strongly declines with geographical distance, this suggests we may be replacing 
governmental systems of safeguarding public goods (however flawed) with alternatives 
that are likely to be less effective in the long run. 
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 1 
1 PRIVATE REGULATION AND PUBLIC GOODS 
Forest certification programs have presented the world of policy analysis 
with one of the most provocative and startling institutional designs since 
governments the world over first began addressing the impacts of human 
activity on the natural environment. 
 
Cashore et al., 2004, p 219 
 
One of the pivotal implications of the globalization of trade is the spatial 
and informational distancing of production and consumption. ... The 
informational distancing, in turn, affects the ability of the consumer to 
make environmentally and socially informed consumption decisions. 
 
Fuchs and Lorek 2002, p 16 
 
In June 2001, I was privileged to witness a meeting of well-respected forestry experts, 
representing two private-sector efforts to establish guidelines for sustainable forest 
management in the United States. During that meeting I learned a great deal about 
forestry and the forest industry, but I was especially struck by one exchange, concerning 
verification of compliance with their respective standards. One group felt that such 
claims would only be considered legitimate if monitoring were performed by parties with 
no potential conflicts of interest in the outcome. The other felt such oversight questioned 
the moral integrity of forest owners and their businesses. The disagreement inspired great 
passion, and even threatened to derail the meeting. Ultimately both “agreed to disagree,” 
and calmly resumed comparing their substantive standards. 
Several aspects of the experience led me to think deeper about the nature of public 
policymaking. First of all, the groups were able to discuss their substantive differences 
much more easily than the political elements of the respective systems. These differences 
could not easily be attributed to tangib le interests, as both included forest owners, 
managers, executives and consultants. Moreover, both systems had been developed in 
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collaboration with environmental and social advocates. But perhaps more interesting was 
the fact that although their substantive purpose was to assure the provision of public 
goods (e.g., environmental quality), each was developed and implemented exclusively by 
private-sector actors. 
As I soon learned, these non-state approaches to public policy were part of a 
growing trend across a range of industries (Haufler 2001; Cashore 2002). Expansion of 
global economic activity and trade over the past half-century has placed enormous 
pressures on natural resources and the environment, especially in the developing world 
(Linton 2003). These trends have been reinforced by changing norms about the “proper” 
role of state-based institutions, in particular, the neoliberal agenda of minimizing state 
intervention in national economic activity. Domestic and international regulatory regimes 
began shifting away from “command and control” instruments and started promoting 
voluntary, market-based regulatory systems (IISD 1996; Bernstein 2001; Potoski and 
Prakash 2002). By the late 1980s, civil society groups, frustrated with what they saw as a 
lack of progress in national and international policymaking, began to seek out 
commercial partners interested in developing independent regulatory approaches 
(Donovan 1996; Elliott 1999). One result was the emergence of forest certification – a 
non-state market-driven (NSMD) approach to governance – which derives policymaking 
authority not from the social contract that underlies state institutions, but from 
stakeholder involvement and market demand (Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2004b). Such approaches have often been presented as solutions to policy 
“gridlock,” inefficient or inappropriate state-based policies, and otherwise inadequate or 
inappropriate responsiveness to public concerns (e.g., de Bruijn and Norberg-Bohm 
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2001; Albrecht 2002; Council of Economic Advisors 2003). 
At least two critical (yet understudied) problems emerge from this process: 
regulatory responsibility is being devolved without knowing how these non-state 
implementation designs compare to state-based systems in as instruments of policy 
delivery; and market-based instruments have been applied with little understanding of 
how they might interact with global production and marketing systems. Political analysis 
of NSMD systems has largely been limited to policy formulation stages (e.g., Elliott 
1999; Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001; Lindahl 2001), expected socioeconomic (e.g., 
Markopoulos 2001; Ozinga 2001; Cerda and Lira 2002) and environmental effects (e.g., 
Washburn and Block 2001; CCIF 2002), and general shifts in the foundations of 
policymaking legitimacy (e.g., Cashore et al. 2001; Cashore 2002). By comparison, my 
approach emphasizes structural challenges inherent in the way these systems – and the 
state policies they may displace or replace – are designed and implemented. 
Inasmuch as NSMD systems mimic the regulatory functions of state-based 
institutions – especially when they directly or indirectly replace the state’s traditional 
regulatory role – it is important that we understand how these new relations of authority 
and delegation differ. Moreover, since non-state policymaking has tended to produce 
competing models in so many sectors (including forest products), a generalizable 
approach must be agnostic as to the particular foundations (i.e., state or market 
institutions) of policymaking or implementation authority. Second, inasmuch as it is 
axiomatic that whether a given NSMD approach will succeed or fail to achieve policy 
objectives depends on its salience in targeted markets, it is critical to understand the 
limits to information diffusion. Whether strategic or accidental, variation in the 
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availability of relevant information across market contexts is likely to play an important 
role in the ongoing focus of NSMD policies, or even their ultimate survival, as alternative 
models of policy provision. Since such approaches have often been promoted as 
alternatives to state-based policies1 (at least in a preemptive sense) (Sheppard 1999b; 
Arnold 2003), and since most focus on values traditionally defined as public goods, it is 
crucially important that we understand the ability of NSMDs to reliably achieve their 
stated purposes. Specifically, my goal in this dissertation is to estimate the capacity of 
alternative NSMD approaches to reliably achieve policy objectives (relative to state-
based regulation), with a case study of Chilean forestry. Chile, as I describe further in 
Section 1.3, in many ways presents an ideal environment for NSMD development: a 
strong example of the neoliberal model, with limited state involvement in the economy 
and an emphasis on primary resource exports. At the same time, Chile has made efforts to 
modernize their environmental laws to account for negative externalities. 
To accomplish this, I develop eight formal hypotheses, half of which facilitate 
comparison of state and non-state policy designs, and half of which focus on NSMD-
relevant content in the Chilean media, as well as that of the country’s principal forest 
products markets. First, I identify two minimal conditions for reliable oversight: formally 
defined delegation between principals and agents (determinacy), and the absence of clear 
conflicts-of- interest between such actors (political breadth). These conditions ensure that 
policies reflect the goals of policymakers, rather than those whose behavior the policies 
are intended to influence. All of the remaining hypotheses are based on one assumption – 
                                                 
1 Errol Meidinger describes these non-state policy systems as “parallel regulation,” with the potential to 
“augment, displace, or conflict” with state-based regulation (2000, p 232). 
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that all communication is imperfect. We can expect such error to be compounded as 
instances of communication increase in number (structural complexity), and when 
participants are separated by culture and experience (social distance). Regardless of their 
institutional basis (i.e., state, non-state, or hybrid), it should be possible to compare 
regulatory systems according to constitutive and internal structural properties, as targeted 
by the first four hypotheses. And since NSMDs depend on market demand to succeed, 
ceteris paribus, any evidence that social distance degrades communication should lead us 
to question whether such systems are capable of performing functions traditionally 
sought via (territorially bound) state regulation. 
I ultimately conclude that while the non-state policy systems considered here 
appear to offer dramatic improvements over state institutions in terms of internal 
structural complexity, such advantages are likely illusory, due to the necessity of 
maintaining label integrity throughout global market chains. Even if it were possible to 
easily resolve problems of indeterminacy and sequential complexity, my analysis shows 
that the availability of information about these particular NSMD systems is strongly 
influenced by geography (and to a lesser degree, culture). Regardless of whether it is the 
demand of end-consumers or intermediate firms which ultimately drive these systems, we 
should expect the scope and scale of global markets to make the task of connecting 
supply and demand more complicated than regulation at the national level. While it may 
be possible to combine the best of state and non-state regulatory approaches (e.g., by 
contracting monitoring to private firms and strengthening citizen oversight provisions), it 
seems that informed (and therefore reliable) market demand is principally a local 
phenomenon. Efforts to achieve sustainable resource use through ecolabeling are only 
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likely to succeed where it is possible to minimize or mitigate structural, geographic, and 
cultural distance between producers and consumers. 
By identifying structural factors (both formal and informal) that can be expected 
to impact communication in both organizations and markets, I emphasize passive aspects 
of institutional and market failure whose effects can be expected, regardless of the 
intentions or capacities of those involved. In other words, even if we choose to avoid 
(momentarily, at least) the common assumption that actors are egocentric utility 
maximizers (and thus prone to divergent goals and deception), a structural approach 
should allow us to compare policy systems by their expected ability to function as 
designed. As such, these approaches can facilitate comparison across policy contexts 
(e.g., actors, policy goals). Even if it is possible for some actors to mitigate the effects of 
some structural factors, this would necessarily require resources that could serve other 
purposes (e.g., lower prices). While variations in the capabilities and resources of 
individual actors may affect the degree to which informational asymmetries are 
problematic in markets or regulatory institutions, such additional costs present a latent 
competitive disadvantage. Systems with more complex delegation relationships, and 
market-based systems that must connect spatially and culturally distant producers and 
consumers face greater challenges than those which do not. Thus, if NSMD systems are 
to be truly market-driven, such structural factors may ultimately be more relevant (in 
terms of the success of a given policy system) than actual public demand. 
This project covers a lot of conceptual ground, and several overlapping literatures. 
Empirically, I focus on label-based forest certification as a strong test of the NSMD 
model, within the context of an export-oriented economy situated at some geographical 
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and cultural distance from its principal markets. This is perhaps most directly related to 
market environmentalism (e.g., Prakash 2000; Bernstein 2001; Prakash 2002), including 
questions of natural resource sustainability (e.g., Dovers 2001; Pirages and Cousins 2005) 
and sustainable consumption (e.g., Princen 1997, 1999; Fuchs and Lorek 2002; Kong et 
al. 2002). However, the lessons learned here should also inform us about market-related 
aspects of global environmental politics (e.g., Conca 2001; Sonnenfeld and Mol 2002; 
Conca 2005), and more generally contributes to the literature on international political 
economy (e.g., Strange 1985, 1996; Henderson et al. 2002). 
However, since I have attempted to integrate insights from several disparate 
literatures, this project is also theoretically broad. Most generally, this work addresses 
issues of state-market relations (e.g., Coase 1988; Pigou 2002) and regulation (e.g., 
Mitnick 1982; Moe 1984, 1987). While that literature has traditionally treated the public 
and private spheres as separate and antagonistic, over the past decade there has been 
growing interest in the role of private actors in disciplining market actors (e.g., Cutler, 
Haufler, and Porter 1999; Haufler 2001), which has also been raised within more general 
discussions of “governance” (e.g., Taylor 1999; Dragani and Flynn 2001; Kooiman 2002; 
Bernstein and Cashore 2004). 
In an attempt to address these empirical and theoretical questions, I have 
developed a framework that integrates insights from principal-agent theory (McCubbins 
and Schwartz 1984; Waterman and Meier 1998; Nielson and Tierney 2003) with those of 
elementary network analysis (e.g., Conway 2000; Kadushin 2004; Scott 2004). I use this 
framework to highlight the role of information in markets (e.g., Stiglitz 1988; Miller 
1992; Cason and Gangadharan 2002), which can be understood to be conditioned both by 
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serial reproduction (e.g., Williamson 1967; Bartlett 1997) and social distance (e.g., 
Bogardus 1925; Dickson and MacLachlan 1990; Ethington 1995). All but the last of these 
clearly fall under the heading of “new institutionalism” (March and Olsen 1984; Moe 
1984; Skocpol 1984, 1995), which has tended to focus on relatively narrow socio-
political contexts. To understand how non-state market-driven policy systems function at 
the global level, we must modify our conceptions both of the relevant actors and of the 
limitations inherent in their interactions. 
In the rest of this chapter, I briefly summarizing the critical controversies 
surrounding NSMD approaches, showing how these are reflected in norms about what 
constitutes an “ideal” non-state, market-driven policy system. After describing the claims 
and rationale of the most prominent advocates for “private regulation,” I then discuss the 
principal characteristics of public goods, as well as the major theoretical perspectives on 
the causes of bureaucratic and market failure – especially asymmetric information. I also 
briefly review several structural theories about how asymmetric information can emerge 
from both formal and informal institutions (discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2), 
before explaining why Chilean forestry – including both state-based regulation and 
voluntary forest certification – present a strong test for the NSMD in general. Finally, I 
describe how the remaining chapters of this dissertation are organized. 
 
1.1 Non-state market-driven policies 
Whether following from globalizing or liberalizing trends, non-state policy efforts are 
increasingly common today (Haufler 2001; Potoski and Prakash 2002). To date, political 
research into non-state regulation has focused almost exclusively on establishing that the 
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phenomenon exists and is  widespread and growing (Gunningham 1995; Caldwell 1998; 
Meidinger 2001a). It is now well-known that non-state regulation occurs – and has 
occurred for centuries – across a broad range of domains (Haufler 1998; Cutler, Haufler, 
and Porter 1999). From credit scoring to product safety and kosher food, the private 
sector has a long history of establishing and enforcing commercial standards (Yilmaz 
1998). Yet private regulation of environmental and labor standards is a relatively new 
phenomenon (Bartley 2003), which only began to emerge at the global scale after the 
enormous expansion of global economic activity – including trade – began producing 
noticeable negative impacts on regional and global public goods, and words like 
“sustainability” became common to both public and private rhetoric. A watershed 
moment was the Brundtland Commission’s publication of Our Common Future (World 
Commission on Environment and Development 1987), which touched off broad public 
discourse on the role of economic actors in environmental and social sustainability 
(Bernstein 2001). Over the past two decades, a responsible public image – especially 
towards the environment – has come to be seen as critical to developing, maintaining, and 
expanding marketshare (Diamantopoulos et al. 2003). Producers are increasingly relying 
on product labeling to signal such commitment to consumers (Teisl and Roe 1998; GEN 
2004). 
Yet the growing role of economic actors and market forces in the protection of the 
environment remains a hotly contested issue. Concerns include: the trustworthiness of 
producer and retailer claims (e.g., Wynne 1994; TESI 2000); access to meaningful 
participation in private-sector policymaking processes (e.g., Counsell 1999; Bass et al. 
2001); the appropriateness and effectiveness of substantive policy goals (Meridian 
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Institute 2001; Cerda and Lira 2002); the legitimacy of private-sector policymaking in 
general (e.g., Bernstein 2001; Cashore 2002; Bernstein and Cashore 2004); disparities of 
market access and market power (e.g., CGCAP 2002; Thornber 2003); and the ultimate 
reliability of the private sector as means of ensuring public goods (Counsell and Terje 
Lorass 2002; Meidinger 2002). 
Such concerns have been central to the development of non-state policymaking 
norms. Though few issues have been fully resolved, several policy elements have come 
to be seen as de facto requirements for legitimate NSMD policies. First, such systems 
must support goals that are in demand by actors downstream from producers, who are 
rewarded when their product is preferred over others. Second, participation must be 
entirely voluntary, occurring without state coercive power. Third, authority to develop 
and implement such systems is grounded in stakeholder participation. Fourth, compliance 
with policy standards must be independently verified (Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2003). Finally, to ensure that consumers are able to identify participating 
producers, product labeling and chain-of-custody systems have become standard 
instruments (RPPI 1996; Te isl and Roe 1998; Cason and Gangadharan 2002). 
Proponents of NSMD approaches often claim these systems are more efficient 
than “command and control” state regulation (Campbell 1997; Teisl and Roe 1998; 
Russell and Clark 2003). This is said to follow from the ability of producers and 
consumers to choose between alternative means of achieving policy goals, rather than 
having them prescribed, which tends to “lock in” a single approach and ignore the 
potential of innovation (Council of Economic Advisors 2003). Many have claimed that 
this greater flexibility even means that NSMD policies are ultimately more effective than 
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state regulation. Combined with the normative appeal of the greater freedom offered by 
their voluntary nature, these advocates have even suggested that public regulation – from 
resource management, to food and drug safety, airline safety, financial ratings, and 
medical licensing – be replaced by private sector, market-driven approaches (Campbell 
1997; Yilmaz 1998; Murphy and Bendell 1999; Schwarcz 2002b, a; Holcombe 2003). 
Lest we believe this represents only the radical fringe, even President Bush’s Council of 
Economic Advisors has promoted private regulation, albeit with somewhat more 
restraint 2 (2003). Similar dynamics can be observed in dialogue about forest certification. 
While few NGOs have gone so far as to promote such approaches as exclusive 
alternatives to state-based regulation, many have shifted resources from attempting to 
influence domestic and international policies, to actively participating in NSMD 
policymaking (Walter 2003; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). At the very least, this 
suggests the potential for such policies to preempt state-based regulatory approaches. 
Before transferring public means of providing or ensuring public goods to the private 
sector (in whole or in part), it is critical that we understand the relative capacity of public 
and private policy systems to reliably achieve their stated goals. Neither market nor 
institutional failures are likely to be meaningfully resolved by good intentions alone. 
 
1.2 Public and private goods in states and markets 
Public goods are formally defined as commodities or services which are neither rival nor 
excludable, such that they cannot be diminished by use, nor can access to them be 
                                                 
2 While suggesting that issues as sensitive as homeland security might rely (in part) on private regulation, 
the Council has also been careful to acknowledge some limits of private approaches, such as shallow 
markets. 
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restricted (Pearce 1992). The natural environment is generally considered a classic public 
good (Harris 2005), though the non-rival, non-excludable status of particular elements is 
often contingent on political and technological factors (Castle 1978). Thus, forests 
typically provide pure public goods (e.g., climate regulation, carbon fixation, 
biodiversity), and those of mixed public and private character (e.g., recreation, erosion 
protection), as well as fully private goods (e.g., wood, non-timber forest products) 
(Moran 2001; Stenger and Normandin 2003). Over the past two decades, it has been the 
more public values of forests that have most often been emphasized in international 
forestry dialogue (Humphreys 2004). When governments failed to establish a global 
convention on sustainable forestry in the late 1980s, NSMD approaches were created in 
an effort to internalize the cost of protecting such public goods into (private) marketed 
products (Dudley 1995; Elliott 1999). While using market forces as a means of ensuring 
public goods is not a new phenomenon, greater reliance on private sector actors does 
represent something of a departure from what we have come to consider traditional roles 
of both states and markets. 
The idea that government has a role to play in addressing the balance of private 
and public costs is most often attributed to Arthur Pigou3, whose Economics of Welfare 
prescribed taxation as a means of both deterring and mediating negative externalities 
(reprinted in 2002). From this perspective, state institutions have the ability (and 
responsibility) to correct such externalities by using “Pigouvian taxes” to match private 
and public costs (Cropper and Oates 1992). While this alone may not justify all forms of 
                                                 
3 Lowery suggests the idea of a divergence of net benefits can be traced to another British economist, 
Henry Sidgwick (writing in 1883), but argues that Pigou should be credited with formulating this as a 
government responsibility (1998). 
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state intervention, it was been an important rationale for much government regulation 
during the latter half of the 20th century. As we might expect, this approach has been 
quite contentious, as well. Some economists have argued that it is often difficult to 
determine the source of externalities (Harris 2005); others have pointed to second-order 
distortions of regulation that can reduce efficiency and effectiveness (Cropper and Oates 
1992). But the most persistent critique is based on the belief that it might be possible to 
balance public and private benefit through property rights alone. In 1960, Ronald Coase 
(reprinted in 1988) explained that while the problem of externalities might be resolved 
through taxation, in the absence of transaction costs, it could also be addressed by victims 
paying polluters to not pollute. It is the presence of significant transaction costs 
(produced by asymmetric information, among other things) and the necessity of 
maintaining clear property rights that justifies a role for government. While “victim pays” 
may not have the same normative appeal of the “polluter pays” principle, the two are 
equally efficient (Cropper and Oates 1992; Pearce 2002). Coase’s theorem (for which he 
was awarded a Nobel prize), has since become a cornerstone of arguments about non-
market or bureaucratic failure (Boadway 1997; Lowery 1998). 
Of course, transaction costs – especially those rooted in asymmetric information – 
are common to both bureaucracies and markets (Miller 1992; Milward 1998). Akerlof, 
Spence, and Stiglitz shared a Nobel for demonstrating how informational asymmetries 
can lead to inefficient markets (Stiglitz 2002), but Downs’ earlier Law of Diminishing 
Control also explained how administrative control is limited by informational costs, 
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which increase in-step with institutional scale4 (1966). When Williamson reinterpreted 
Downs’ approach (1967), he made explicit the structural element of hierarchy, which he 
argued led to the “control- loss” problem, in which informational asymmetry places limits 
on the optimal size of any organization. Like Downs, he believed this phenomenon 
reflected Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality” (1957). But to explain the importance 
of structure, he reintroduced Bartlett’s work on serial reproduction (1932, reprinted in 
1997), which revealed the effects of interpretation in human communication. 
Williamson’s hierarchies are “tree- like,” in that each subordinate answers to only 
one boss (Evans 1975). For decades, this linear understanding – and asymmetric 
information – have been central to another major theory of delegation: principal-agent 
theory (e.g., Ross 1973; Stiglitz 1987; Strausz 1997). While political scientists such as 
Terry Moe explained that separation of powers systems were actually designed quite 
differently (1984), only recently have scholars begun to study such structural features 
rigorously (e.g., Lyne and Tierney 2002; Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2003; Nielson and 
Tierney 2003). Accordingly, the potential importance of more complicated structures 
(e.g., multiple principals) has not been fully explored. Similarly, few scholars have 
questioned the role that serial reproduction and bounded rationality might play in 
increasingly global markets (Dickson and MacLachlan 1990; Princen 1997, 1999). If we 
are, in fact, transitioning to a greater reliance on NSMD policy systems to provide public 
goods, we should understand how such structural factors might impact those systems, and 
accordingly, how successful we may expect them to be as mechanisms of institutional 
                                                 
4 Tullock had similarly argued that control is inversely proportional to bureaucratic scale (1965, reprinted 
in 1987). 
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control and feedback between producers and consumers. 
 
1.3 Why this case study matters  
For more than half a century, foresters have argued that forests had the potential to be 
renewed indefinitely, given wise management (Tidmarsh 1951). Though it has been 
claimed that forestry has the potential to “become the first industrial system5 that can 
meet the need for food, raw materials and energy within sustainable systems” (Wergens 
1995), concern about the state of the world’s forests has been growing since at least the 
1970s. This followed from dramatic increases in the volume of global trade in forest 
products since the 1960s, and a growing awareness of threats to tropical forests in the 
developing world. Although initially most of this concern focused on the tropics, over the 
past two decades it turned towards temperate forests, as well (Elliott 1999). At the same 
time, the global nature of the forest products market, and institutional changes at the 
international level (e.g., trade agreements), have made forest companies less dependent 
on – and less constrained by – the policies of any single government (Palo, Uusivuori, 
and Mery 2001). In response, forestry was one of the earliest domains in which the newer 
non-state regulatory approaches were developed (Hoberg 1999); dozens now exist, 
ostensibly to provide incentives for producers to pursue more sustainable practices 
                                                 
5 Although it has often proven difficult to control access to forest resources (especially in developing 
regions where property rights are ill-defined) (Ljungman et al. 1999), other global-scale agro-industrial 
systems may face even greater challenges. An extreme example are pelagic (deep ocean) fisheries, such as 
tuna. While NSMD systems have been developed for some of these resources (e.g., Marine Stewardship 
Council, modeled on the FSC system), the combination of their non-territorial, migratory character and the 
utter absence of property rights in open ocean fisheries make their sustainable management much more 
challenging. The implications are that even “fully” non-state market-driven policies are therefore 
predicated on competent state (legal) institutions (Meidinger 2005), but also that where such institutions are 
weak, NSMD systems are also likely to be weaker. 
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(Viana et al. 1996). Such systems now account for hundreds of millions of acres of 
managed forests worldwide (UNECE/FAO 2001). 
Though NSMD approaches have been developed for a range of industries, 
forestry is particularly interesting because of its relatively longer history, and the variety 
of approaches competing for support (WRI 1996; Bass et al. 1997; Elliott 1999). They 
include state, market and civil society actors as principles, agents and targets (Meidinger 
2001b; Wenban Smith 2001). As market-driven systems, they derive rule-making 
authority not from state institutions, but from the voluntary participation of actors 
throughout the market chain – including end consumers (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004b). Forest certification has generally led the NSMD approach in terms of both 
innovation and lessons learned (Viana et al. 1996); in fact, the FSC system has been 
called the “most advanced example of NSMD governance worldwide” (Cashore and 
Lawson 2003, p 6). What we learn from forest certification may therefore tell us a great 
deal about the feasibility of NSMD approaches that are being developed in other areas, 
such as coffee, agriculture, and fisheries (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). 
In many ways, Chile provides a nearly test-tube environment to study the political 
economy of natural resources. For more than three decades, the country has been a 
leading example of neo- liberal economic reforms (Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997), and its 
civil service has been renowned for its low level of corruption (Maggi and Kern 2000). 
Furthermore, Chile’s ability to achieve impressive economic success while emphasizing 
natural resource exports has been noticed by those in both the developed and developing 
worlds (Nef 1995; Sustainable Chile 2002a). 
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Chileans are also immensely proud of their country’s natural beauty. Nearly a 
fifth of the country’s territory is now classified as protected, one of the highest rates in 
the world (Meacham 1997). Though almost all of Chile’s commercial wood is now 
produced on plantations (Husch 1982), as a major international producer of wood-based 
products, Chilean forestry has drawn a great deal of attention from civil society 
organizations, industrial interests, and academic and professional scientists, as well as 
politicians, state ministries, and international institutions (Kaimowitz 1996). This has led 
politicians to develop national approaches to environmental protection, even as they 
sought to expand forest exports. While Chile has hundreds of forest laws, two are 
considered especially relevant to commercial forestry today: Decree Law 701 and Law 
19300 (Katz, del Fávero, and Sierralta 1995; Arnold 2003). At the same time, the private 
sector has come to support forest certification as a means of providing more stringent 
standards and improving the competitiveness of Chilean products in international 
markets. This has resulted in two competing NSMD standards – the Forest Stewardship 
Council (FSC) and CertFor Chile – which have collectively certified more than half of 
Chile’s commercial forest estate (CONAF 2004; CertFor 2006; FSC 2006a). Forestry and 
forest certification is commonly discussed in the national media, which suggests a broad 
popular awareness of both state and non-state approaches (Rametsteiner 2000; Spanish 
Newswire Services 2000; Serrano 2001; Gonzalez 2002; Ministerio de Agricultura 2002; 
Montalbetti 2002). Since certification systems with independent oversight and a label-
based chain-of-custody are considered the “gold standard” of NSMD systems – 
characteristics shared by both non-state systems analyzed here – these provide a strong 
case for the non-state market-driven approach to public goods provision (Wartelle 2002; 
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Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). If they cannot be shown to be structurally 
equivalent to (or improvements upon) state regulation, we must question the general 
effectiveness of the NSMD model. Where this must be qualified by contextual factors 
(e.g., market structures, market strategies), we should similarly understand the limits of 
these systems as alternative means of ensuring public goods. 
 
1.4 What remains  
In the next chapter, I explain the foundations of the two-part framework I will use to 
compare state and non-state forestry regulation in Chile. The first is a generalizable 
formal network model of the delegatory and informational relationships which define the 
internal structure of any regulatory implementation system. The second is designed to 
identify the effects of three aspects of social distance (geography, culture, epistemic 
framing) on communication, especially at the global level. I develop four formal 
hypotheses for each (for a total of eight), which though focused on label-based 
certification (identified as the strongest NSMD policy design – see Wartelle 2002; 
Cashore et al. 2004), could easily be generalized to other state and non-state policy 
forms. After describing each, I finish by reviewing the overall logic of the comparison 
(see Figure 2.7), which poses the question: which policy design would we expect to 
produce the most reliable results? The limitations of state-based regulatory policy is well-
known, but while calls for the increased use of non-state, market-driven policies are 




In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, I describe the political and economic reality of Chilean 
forestry. The first focuses on state forest policy, interpreting the two major state 
regulations (D.L. 701/19.561 and D.L. 19.300/D.S. 30) in terms of the formal network 
model described in Chapter 2. In the second half of the chapter, I identify and describe 
the major stakeholders and issues in Chilean forest politics, to provide greater depth and 
context for the structural framework, and to acknowledge the important role of agency 
and choice in policy outcomes. The first part of Chapter 4 is similar, but focuses on the 
two NSMD approaches active in Chilean forestry (FSC and CertFor). After interpreting 
both systems as formal networks, I address the first four formal hypotheses (see Table 
2.1), and offer preliminary conclusions about the comparison of Chile’s state forest 
policy with those NSMD policies. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the role of social distance in communication about forest 
certification in publicly available media in Chile and the rest of the world – with special 
emphasis on its two principal export markets, the United States and Europe. After briefly 
reviewing content analysis as an analytical approach, I describe the specific technique 
and concepts that I used to assess message content throughout the global forest products 
market chain. I then present the results of the last four formal hypotheses (see Table 2.1), 
and go on to describe content patterns that help us to understand which market-driven 
systems are more likely to be successful in their own terms, and where. 
In the conclusion (Chapter 6), I revisit all of these results and attempt to place 
them in context, focusing on the implications of the structural limitations I identify in 
Chapters 3-5, the possibility for agents to mitigate these factors, and what this suggests 
for the reliability of both state and NSMD policies in Chilean forestry. Given the 
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challenges associated with NSMD systems (both endogenous and exogenous), I then 
offer some tentative alternative explanations for their popularity for both civil society 
organizations and industry. After describing a number of directions I would like to extend 
this research, I close by benchmarking my framework in the political science and public 
policy literature, and suggesting how the lessons of Chilean forestry might inform a 
broader debate about “appropriate” roles for both public and private sector actors. 
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2 GOVERNANCE, STATES AND MARKETS 
A common misconception is that government is the only source of 
regulation. In fact, trade associations and other private organizations also 
administer regulation. Private regulation may arise in response to the 
threat of government regulation or as a spontaneous private solution to a 
market imperfection. For example, private organizations are often 
effective at providing regulation to overcome informational problems 
through standard setting, certification, monitoring, brand approval, 
warranties, product evaluations, and arbitration. 
 
Council of Economic Advisors 2003, p 145 
 
We refer to these new institutions as ‘non-state market-driven’ governance 
systems because rule-making clout does not come from traditional 
Westphalian state-centered sovereign authority but rather from companies 
along the market’s supply chain, who make their own individual 
evaluations as to whether to comply to the rules and procedures of these 
private governance systems. 
 
Cashore et al., 2004, p 4 
 
Writing over a half century ago, Dahl and Lindblom described the proliferation of means 
for achieving public policy goals as “perhaps the greatest political revolution of our 
times” (1953, p 8). Such changes have only accelerated since. While non-state actors 
have long cooperated (or colluded) to pursue shared objectives, the emergence of the 
fully private formulation and implementation of social regulation (e.g., consumer or 
environmental protections) has emerged only in the past fifteen years or so (McNichol 
1999). Such approaches are usually justified in terms of market forces, with proponents 
arguing their superiority to state-based regulation in both normative and functional terms 
(e.g., Yilmaz 1998; Murphy and Bendell 1999; Holcombe 2003). Again, the logic of 
these non-state, market-driven (NSMD) systems derives from a belief that a given public 
policy goal is demanded by consumers, who are in turn willing (and able) to “reward” 
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producers by preferring their product over others6. To ensure that consumers are 
appropriately informed, the suppliers of NSMD governance not only provide means of 
guaranteeing that compliance with the policy provisions has occurred (i.e., certification), 
but also a way to signal this fact to consumers (i.e., product labeling) (RPPI 1996; Teisl 
and Roe 1998). Yet while the underlying logic may be fairly simple, there is substantial 
variation in the institutional forms associated with individual NSMD systems (Garcia-
Johnson, Gereffi, and Sasser 2000). Such diversity has made comparisons of alternative 
approaches (including state-based regulation) especially challenging. 
Comparative policy studies are also hampered by the lack of a tractable 
framework, capable of describing subtle political differences (Schneider and Ingram 
1997). It has long been argued that disaggregating policy systems according to their 
functional “parts” facilitates comparative analysis (Salamon 1981; Soltan 1993). In fact, 
describing policies in instrumental terms (the means by which policy goals are 
implemented) has been a common practice for over thirty years (Lowi 1972; Salamon 
1981; Howlett 1991; Vedung 1998; Hoberg 2001). Unfortunately, these typologies often 
miss important subtleties – either they focus simply on the degree of “coerciveness” (e.g., 
Lowi 1972; Etzioni 1975), or they project policymakers’ intentions onto the means 
chosen to achieve policy aims (McDonnell and Elmore 1987). Rather than focusing on 
the perceptions of principals and targets, instrumental analyses would be better served by 
focusing on the actors and actions associated with various policy processes (Woodside 
1986). 
                                                 
6 In fact, many label-based systems have been promoted (at least to producers) as if they would one day 
also provide a “price-premium” (i.e., higher sale price) to certified producers (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 
2000; FERN 2001; Bray, Sanchez, and Murphy 2002). 
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As competing NSMD systems have been developed over the past 10-15 years, the 
most common comparative strategy has been to contrast the substantive standards7 of 
each (e.g., mitigation or remediation requirements) (Meidinger 2002). While this 
approach appears to be preferred by program supporters (e.g., Cerda and Lira 2001; 
Meridian Institute 2001), it usually ignores the question of effectiveness – whether a 
given set of standards (or instrumental approach) is better able to achieve a common goal 
(e.g., improved environmental quality). In part, this is due to the relative youth of these 
approaches – for many years, any effects that could be observed were simply insufficient 
to support valid comparisons. However, in recent years, a few performance-based 
analyses have appeared (e.g., ERM 2003; GreenBiz.com 2004), a trend that could be 
expected to grow in step with the age of individual NSMD policy approaches. 
Another common approach has been to consider more normative aspects8 (e.g., 
sources of authority, legitimacy, credibility), although these are more often generalized 
attempts to understand the nature of non-state policymaking rather than genuinely 
comparative studies. However, a few have attempted to more firmly ground their 
analyses empirically, mapping specific patterns of stakeholder participation and 
attitudes9. These studies appear to have been intended to either critique the 
“representativeness” of particular systems (e.g., Dragani and Flynn 2001), or to argue for 
                                                 
7 For example, see:  Friedman 1999, CEPI 2000, Griffiths 2000, Bass et al. 2001, Cerda and Lira 2001, 
Meridian Institute 2001, Ozinga 2001, Washburn and Block 2001, Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b, 
CEPI 2004, CPET 2004, or FERN 2004. 
8 For instance, see Bass and Simula 1999, Meidinger 2000, Borregaard et al. 2002, Cashore 2002, and 
FERN 2004. 
9 See:  Costa and Ibanez 2000, Cadman 2001a, b, Simula et al. 2001, or Auld, Cashore, and Newsom 2003 
for examples of such approaches. 
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the potential strength or weakness (Hansen, Forsyth, and Juslin 2000; Brennan and 
Johnson 2004) of various alternative approaches (or indeed, even of NSMD approaches 
in general). 
While policy analysts, past and present, tend to focus on state-based processes, 
NSMD systems have also been compared according to their general institutional 
features10 (e.g., monitoring or accreditation provisions). Though certification systems are 
increasingly common, there are broad differences in the way these policies have been 
designed and implemented. For some, authority is retained solely by the firms themselves 
(1st-parties); for others, industrial associations take the lead (2nd-parties). A few derive 
their authority from more traditional sources, such as states and international regimes 
(4th-parties) (Garcia-Johnson, Gereffi, and Sasser 2000). However, as certification 
systems have competed for consumer support, there has been a general trend towards the 
use of independent, non-state agents (3rd-parties) to certify compliance (Centeno 1996; 
Garcia-Johnson, Sasser, and Gereffi 2001), though the importance of this feature has 
been hotly debated (Okubo 1999; SAF 1999). Moreover, there is still significant variation 
to other aspects of NSMD implementation systems, such as the accreditation of auditors, 
or stakeholder consultation (Cadman 2001a; Dragani and Flynn 2001). 
Clearly, the rising importance of non-state and market-based policymaking 
requires that we reassess our theories and methodologies. The shift from state to non-state 
(or para-statal11) institutions only adds to this challenge, since any general instrumental 
                                                 
10 For a broad sampling of such approaches, see:  Bass and Simula 1999, SAF 1999, Markopoulos 2000, 
Rickenbach, Fletcher, and Hansen 2000, Cashore 2002, Auld, Cashore, and Newsom 2003, Bartley 2003, 
CPET 2004, or Metafore 2006. 
11 The past several decades has also seen dramatic growth in the variety of “quasi-autonomous non-
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framework must remain agnostic as to the organization of power (Woodside 1986), 
allowing for the possibility of pluralist processes and the use of regulatory power wholly 
(or partially) outside of state institutions. Shifting focus to include NSMD policy systems 
thus has two major implications : the absence of a sovereign means that policies may be 
implemented by a broader range of actors than traditional, state-based regulation; and that 
to be successful as a policy alternative (i.e., persist), these systems must find ways to 
reliably connect consumers to producers. To understand the relative advantage of pursing 
public policy goals through state institutions or NSMD approaches, we must consider the 
impact of both factors (Fiorino 2001). 
Since policymaking authority in NSMD systems is rooted not in state institutions, 
but in the actions of producers and consumers throughout the supply chain (Cashore, 
Auld, and Newsom 2003), assessing the links between private-sector policymakers, their 
implementing “agents,” and their “constituents” (e.g., consumers) is also a critical task. 
In Western democratic systems, elections – the essential relationship between lawmaker 
and citizen – are formally institutionalized, along with the rights and obligations of each12 
(Held 1996). For market-driven systems, these connections are more ambiguous and 
open-ended, especially if markets are considered as a means of demanding and delivering 
public goods. While informed consumers may indeed reward producers who voluntarily 
                                                                                                                                                 
governmental” (QUANGO) institutions, which are increasingly chosen to implement public policies (Hood 
1986). Occupying a grey zone between the public and the private, these hybrid organizations have a variety 
of origins – some have been devolved from the public sector, others are “private” agencies founded by the 
public sector. The purpose of this special legal status is to set them apart, in fiscal or authoritative terms, 
from state institutions (Bernstein and Cashore 2004). QUANGOs have become especially common in 
Commonwealth and other English diaspora countries (Koppell 2003). 
12 Of course, even within these institutions, there is a great diversity of form (e.g., majoritarian, consensual, 
participatory, republican) (Lijphart 1999). 
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adopt “more responsible” practices13 (Stisser 1994), the means of communicating such 
compliance to buyers is usually taken for granted, the natural result of maintaining label 
integrity throughout the supply chain (OECD 1997). While beliefs about democratic 
responsiveness often rely on similar assumptions, the greater territorial reach of global 
markets may present greater complications. Therefore, the degree to which assumptions 
about market chain communications are supported by observation will help to ground the 
debate over the effectiveness of global markets as sources of policymaking authority14. 
In this chapter, I first offer brief overviews of the regulatory and principal-agent 
literatures, clarifying some concepts that have been under-theorized in the latter. I then 
develop two theoretical approaches to shed light on key aspects of state-based and 
NSMD governance: a formal network framework designed to emphasize structural 
relationships between actors tasked with policy implementation; and a “social distance” 
framework designed to determine whether geography, culture, or expertise affect the 
communication of NSMD-related information throughout global supply chains. These 
discussions are followed by an explanation of the comparative approaches I apply in 
Chapters 3, 4 (implementation networks) and 5 (social distance in markets). 
 
                                                 
13 Certification systems may emphasize one of two aspects of producer activities:  management systems or 
actual performance. The first concerns a firm’s ability to monitor and document their employee actions 
(Bass and Simula 1999), while the second focuses on observed impacts (e.g., social or environmental) of a 
firms operations (FERN 2001). While certification systems that focus exclusively on management systems 
exist (e.g., ISO 14001), none of these include product labeling as a feature (Bass and Simula 1999), 
weakening our ability to honestly characterize them as “market-based.” However, since management 
system and performance approaches are complementary, most label-based certification schemes include 
elements of both (Bass et al. 2001; FERN 2001). 
14 While entire libraries have been written on the challenges facing democratic systems, few scholars have 
focused on the efficacy of markets as a means of delivering public policy. Instead, most proponents of 
market-based approaches have simply assumed their greater effectiveness, based on relatively narrow 
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2.1 Regulatory institutions  
If we are to understand the merits of “private regulation” (and NSMDs in particular) 
relative to state-based regulatory approaches, it is important to first establish what is 
meant by these terms. In one sense, to regulate is to “make regular,” to establish 
commonalties that facilitate commerce (Yilmaz 1998, p 1). Yet this definition is too 
narrow, limited to mere standardization – the range of activities commonly understood as 
regulatory is clearly much broader. Until the late 1980s, European scholars (and most 
economists) tended to define regulation as any state intervention in the economic sphere, 
or other means of social control (e.g., Doern and Wilks 1998). The looseness of these 
definitions betrays their political nature – a broad criticism of state institutions (Jordana 
and Levi-Faur 2004b). 
Similarly, most American political scientists (and legal scholars) have 
traditionally seen regulatory power as the exclusive purview of state institutions. 
Theodore Lowi has described regulatory policies as rules “formulated by some 
governmental authority expressing an intention to influence the behavior of citizens, 
individually or collectively, by use of positive and negative sanctions” (Lowi 1985, p 70). 
Similarly, Evert Vedung has characterized regulation as “measures undertaken by 
governmental units to influence people by means of formulated rules and directives 
which mandate receivers to act in accordance” (Vedung 1998, p 31). Yet this “technical” 
definition is still too restrictive, as it limits our focus to state institutions alone (Haufler 
2001). 
                                                                                                                                                 
efficiency analyses and normative beliefs. 
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Over the past two decades however, some scholars have come to agree that such 
approaches fail to account for the full range of “regulatory” actions and institutions, and 
have developed new definitions. These range from the very broad – “targeted rules” 
(Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004a) – to those in which regulation is defined as an 
authoritative relationship where “controlled persons or groups are obligated to act in the 
way stated by the controllers” (Vedung 1998, p 31). Clarifying this point, Lowi (1985) 
has emphasized that regulation focuses on observable conduct, where “questions of 
compliance and noncompliance must be involved” (p 73). In his 1980 classic on 
regulatory theory, Barry Mitnick offered a general definition: “Regulation is a process 
consisting of the intentional restriction of a subject's choice of activity, by an entity not 
directly party to or involved in that activity” (p 9). By remaining agnostic as to the 
institutional basis of such authority, such an understanding remains open to the 
possibility that non-state actors may promulgate and implement regulation. It also 
emphasizes the necessity for separation between regulator and regulatee, and allows us to 
determine what sort of acts are not regulatory in nature: unintentional acts; those which 
fail to restrict a subject’s choice15; and those performed by 1st-party actors (ibid.). 
Though we might agree that any theory of regulation must be broad enough to 
include both state and non-state approaches, it is important to remember that the 
proponents of private regulation are more often concerned with reducing state 
intervention than in providing an equivalent service to the public. It has been claimed that 
private sector actors face greater incentives (than state agents) to provide high-quality 
                                                 
15 Non-regulatory actions include statements of mere sentiment, which may “express a desired end but 
embod(y) no rule" (Lowi 1985, p 70). 
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goods and services (Holcombe 2003), including the reduction of informational 
asymmetries and production externalities (Gerber and Teske 2000). Such (alleged) 
incentives are said to derive from the market, such that firms producing dangerous or 
harmful products would be driven out of business (Holcombe 2003). Of course, this 
cannot account for the enormous popularity of dangerous and harmful products, nor for 
the often-observed link between increased competition and cost externalization (Princen 
1997). 
Still, where sanctions are combined with enforceable cont racts, private 
approaches may effectively contribute to broader social goals (Council of Economic 
Advisors 2003). But this fact alone does not make them regulatory, inasmuch as 
regulators, by definition, cannot be directly involved in the activity targeted by 
regulation. Indeed, so-called “self-regulation” often fails because such separation is not 
maintained (Mitnick 1980). This is the main reason why successful private systems often 
rely on third-parties – to maintain a distance between the regulators and the targets of 
such rules (Council of Economic Advisors 2003). Where such distance disappears, the 
potential for collusion and corruption arises (known in the regulatory literature as 
“capture”), and the agreement between policy goals and outcomes come into question 
(Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001). 
Civil society actors (i.e., NGOs) also often play important supporting roles for 
both public and private policy systems, pressuring economic actors directly (e.g., 
shareholder activism) or indirectly (e.g., market campaigns) to comply with broader 
social objectives (Bartley 2003). Yet unless such “monitoring” is internalized within 
policy implementation – unless there are explicit provisions for such oversight – the 
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effectiveness of such activism may be unreliable. This uncertainty should make us wary 
of such “ambivalent engagement” as a substitute for formal implementation systems, 
public or private. Therefore, when comparing regulatory systems, we may learn more by 
focusing less on the normative or substantive goals of each, or the informal support (or 
opposition) associated with them, than by considering the types of organizations formally 
participating in each, and the sorts of relationships between such organizations (Knott 
1993). 
 
2.2 Principals and agents, slippage and slack 
Another fundamental way to consider regulation is as a relationship between a principal 
and an agent in which the latter is encouraged (through incentives and/or sanctions) to act 
to support the goals of the former (Mitnick 1980). Such relationships exists wherever 
demands of time, knowledge, or expertise lead individuals or organizations to designate 
others to act on their behalf, as when employers hire employees, legislatures assign 
implementation duties to executive agencies, or standards-setting bodies require that 
auditors verify compliance. The necessity for principals to delegate – to agents who 
possess information unavailable to those principals – is considered one of the 
fundamental dynamics in political life (Lowi 1985; Eisenhardt 1989). Regardless of 
whether these actors are associated with the public or private sector, the challenge is the 
same – principals attempt to move agents to act on their behalf (Ross 1973; Laffont 
1994). 
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Though its oldest roots are in fiduciary theory16 (Munro 1999), Barry Mitnick has 
argued (1992) that principal-agent theory has three main strands: decision theory17 (e.g., 
Arya, Glover, and Sivaramakrishnan 1997), the economic theory of the firm (e.g., Laffont 
1994), and organization theory (e.g., Miller 1992). Each has adopted the terms (and 
assumptions) of its parent discipline – but has also drawn liberally from other sources 
(e.g., moral hazard and adverse selection, borrowed from the insurance industry) (Knott 
1993). In the early 1980s, Mitnick and Terry Moe published seminal works that brought 
these concepts into the mainstream of political science (see Mitnick 1980, 1982; Moe 
1984). Mitnick, in particular, is credited for first interpreting regulatory theory in the 
language of principals and agents (Worsham 2003). Scholars of American politics were 
quickest to adopt these models, attempting to explain the relationships between 
legislators and bureaucracies (e.g., McCubbins 1985; Banks and Weingast 1992), or 
regulators and targeted firms (e.g., Baron 1995). In recent years, comparative politics and 
international relations researchers have also begun experimenting with principal-agent 
concepts (e.g., Pollack 1997; Cooley and Ron 2002; Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2003; 
Nielson and Tierney 2003). 
With such diverse origins, defining what constitutes a “principal-agent theory” 
(aside from a shared terminology) can be problematic. Terry Moe has called it “less a 
unified neoclassical theory than a large family of diverse theories” sharing a few essential 
features: methodological individualism, an assumption of rational utility maximization, 
                                                 
16 The fiduciary relationship is typically one in which an agent (with greater knowledge and expertise) acts 
on behalf of an investor, the principal (Kay and Yates 1972). 
17 However, Kim (1995) disputes this point, arguing that while both are concerned with choice under 
conditions of uncertainty, decision theory typically applies to challenges facing single actors, while 
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and preference for formal models18 (Moe 1984, p 741). By identifying such relationships 
between those who rule and those who implement, agency theorists have attempted to 
explain how authority and accountability have been institutionalized across a broad range 
of contexts (Eisenhardt 1989; Sinclair 1999). It is not terribly surprising, then, that the 
approach is controversial. Perhaps the strongest criticism is that despite its popularity, the 
“conceptual foundations of this approach remain unnecessarily weak” (Lyne and Tierney 
2002, p 1). Indeed, a casual reading of the literature can be quite confusing – fundamental 
terms are often confused or ill-defined, and it can be difficult to validate what are often 
simplistic models against empirical experience (e.g., dyadic depictions of complex 
political landscapes) (e.g., Cook 1989; Gerber and Teske 2000). In the course of 
developing an alternative to such approaches, I will attempt to clarify the central terms of 
this literature, integrating them into a synthesis framework that I believe plays on the 
greatest strength of the principal-agent framework (i.e., formal modeling), while 
remaining neutral on the normative assumptions of many of its proponents (e.g., selfish 
utility maximization). 
Clearly, the most fundamental feature of the principal-agent relationship is the act 
of delegation – without it, such a relationship cannot be said to exist (Lyne and Tierney 
2002). Delegation is also an inevitable necessity, regardless of the nature (e.g., political, 
economic) or scale of a social system (Lowi 1985). It occurs because no individual can 
possess all the skills, knowledge, or time to directly realize all her goals (Bergman, 
Müller, and Strøm 2000). Wherever social organizations exist, we find delegation: 
                                                                                                                                                 
principal-agent theory usually focuses on strategic interactions between at least two actors. 
18 In this sense, most principal-agent approaches could be considered part of the broader rational choice 
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employers hire workers, and both legislatures and private standard-setting bodies enact 
policies that must be implemented by others. The act of delegating introduces the element 
of hierarchy – the “asymmetric and incompletely defined authority of one actor to direct 
the activities of another within certain bounds” (Miller 1992, p 16). Such relationships 
are usually seen as contractual19 in nature, with obligations for both principals and agents 
(Jensen and Meckling 1976; Waterman, Rouse, and Wright 1998). By clarifying the 
responsibilities of both actors, contracts offer some guarantee that each benefits from the 
relationship (e.g., implemented policies, wages) (Richardson 1986). However, regardless 
of the degree of “mutuality,” principals retain authority, as they determining the 
procedural (and often substantive) elements of a given contract. 
Although agents tasked with implementation remain subordinate (Schneider and 
Ingram 1997), this does not make them powerless. Responsibility is not the only thing 
delegated – often, agents are also given some measure of discretion (e.g., experts who 
interpret broad policies within local contexts). Though some theorists20 confound 
discretion and slippage (defined below), I argue that discretion is best understood as a 
form of distributed decisionmaking. The freedom allowed to agents by the institution(s) 
within which delegation takes place is known as slack – a structural factor that facilitates 
                                                                                                                                                 
tradition (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001). 
19 Of course, such “contracts” are often more metaphorical than formal (e.g., the social contract). While the 
voluntariness of contracts in more rigidly hierarchical systems (e.g., autarchies) is debatable, the approach 
still provides some theoretical leverage – since all actors are resource-constrained, even dictators face 
tradeoffs between control and acceptable outcomes (Moe 1984). 
20 See especially Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast (1989), who define discretion as an agent choosing 
self-serving policies that differ from what principals expected at the moment of delegation. 
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their ability to exercise discretion21 (Hawkins and Jacoby 2002). Though such latitude 
may often lead to outcomes unforeseen by principals, this does not automatically mean 
that their preferences have been subverted. In fact, many policies22 have been designed in 
this way in order to maximize an agent’s ability to respond to local circumstances (Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1991). 
Indeed, one of the main reasons that delegation is so important is that agents often 
possess information that is unavailable to principals (Stiglitz 1988). This is known as 
information asymmetry, another key concept in principal-agent theory (Waterman and 
Meier 1998). By contrast, slippage describes differences between the preferences of 
principals and the actions of agents, regardless of cause23 (Hawkins and Jacoby 2002). 
Slippage may be caused by information asymmetry, but can also happen because 
principals and agents have different preferences24 (known as shirking) (McCubbins 
1985). Such goal conflict (also known as divergent preferences) is usually assumed to be 
an outgrowth of rational utility maximization25. These three factors (delegation, 
                                                 
21 Slack is another concept that is often poorly theorized in the principal-agent literature. Most often, 
theorists use terms  like slack and slippage interchangeably, generally ignoring the possibility that 
differences between agents’ actions and principals’ preferences could have any cause beyond an agent’s 
motivations (e.g., Goldstein and Lenway 1989). 
22 Indeed, that this characteristic lies at the heart of classical arguments for the superiority of markets over 
centralized decisionmaking systems (e.g., Hayek 1944). 
23 Both McCubbins (1985) and Goldstein and Lenway (1989) have argued for limiting the definition of 
slippage to problems induced by institutional design (e.g., decisionmaking instability). However, I feel it is 
more accurate to consider slippage as a general effect, caused by both institutional and personal (e.g., 
deception) factors. 
24 By contrast, Hawkins and Jacoby (2003) defined slippage as “pursuing different goals under cover” (i.e., 
deception), and shirking as “sleeping on the job,” but offered no explanation why the latter should not be 
considered merely a form of deception (p 16). 
25 On the other hand, Waterman and Meier (1998) have persuasively argued that assumptions of goal 
conflict and asymmetric information should be treated as variables, rather than be merely assumed. 
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informational asymmetry, and goal conflict) form the core of the principal-agent 
framework, “the spark plugs that power the theory” (Waterman and Meier 1998, p 177). 
Since actor preferences are generally assumed in institutional theory26, scholars 
tend to focus on identifying effective and efficient solutions to informational asymmetry, 
typically understood to have two forms: adverse selection and moral hazard (Knott 
1993). The first results from an inability to observe the “information, beliefs, and values 
on which the decisions of others are based” (Moe 1984, p 754). In this sense, adverse 
selection is an informational asymmetry about agent preferences, as when employers hire 
without knowing their employees’ motivations. By contrast, moral hazard27 results from 
an inability to observe an agent’s actual behavior (i.e., “when the cat’s away…”) (ibid.). 
Of course, these factors are likely to be strongly interrelated. Since either may lead to 
sub-optimal outcomes (i.e., slippage), principals have developed a variety of strategies to 
limit their impact. To minimize adverse selection, principals often “screen” agents to 
ensure they choose (e.g., enter contracts with) only those who share their policy 
preferences (Nielson and Tierney 2003). Remaining aware of agents’ actions throughout 
the life of a contract (or contract period) is a much more complicated problem. Since 
monitoring can be costly, principals usually face tradeoffs between the harm caused by 
slippage, and the expense of increased oversight (Eisenhardt 1989). 
                                                 
26 Social science (and rational choice in particular) still lacks a positive theory of preference formation 
(Friedman and Hechter 1988; Hawkins and Jacoby 2003). 
27 In the insurance industry, moral hazard describes an incentive for greater risk-taking, based on the 
certainty of reimbursement (Knott 1993). The problem can be extended to the inability of consumers to 
directly observe the quality of certain goods (e.g., “credence” or “reputation” goods) prior to purchase 
(Cason and Gangadharan 2002). Since compensation occurs before quality is observed (if indeed, it can be 
observed at all), producer incentives are less than they would be conditions of perfect information (Caswell 
and Mojduszka 1996; Engel 2001). 
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Therefore, a central task of institutional design is developing monitoring systems 
capable of reducing informational asymmetries with minimal effort (Moe 1984). The 
simplest oversight model is the observation of agent behavior by the principals 
themselves (see Figure 2.1). Known as “police-patrol” oversight, such monitoring is 
“centralized28, active, and direct” (McCubbins and Schwartz 1984, p 166). Since agents 
know that any deceptive behavior would likely be discovered, shirking is reduced; greater 
awareness of implementation processes in general is also likely to reduce other forms of 
slippage. However, while this method can be very effective, it is also the most costly 
(Pollack 1997). 
 
Figure 2.1: Delegation and Oversight 
 
The alternative is to rely on third-parties (e.g., stakeholders) to monitor and report 
on agents’ actions (e.g., “whistleblower” or citizen-oversight provisions). This so-called 
“fire-alarm” oversight is less centralized and active than police-patrol monitoring 
(McCubbins and Schwartz 1984). Although agents face sanctions only if these third-
parties report slippage to the principals (Moe 1987), McCubbins and Schwartz have 
argued that the distributed nature of fire-alarm oversight means that the level of 
                                                 
28 Ogul and Rockman distinguish between active and reactive monitoring, arguing that “police-patrol” 
oversight may occur with (e.g., decentralized implementation) or without delegation. Their point is that 
oversight is ongoing in each instance – contrasted with “fire alarm” oversight, which they argue is 
decentralized and reactive (1990). 
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monitoring is greater than with more resource-constrained police-patrol models, and is 
therefore likely to be more effective (1984). 
By acknowledging the importance of third-party participation in principal-agent 
models, we open the door to a more empirically grounded understanding of delegation 
and control (Nielson and Tierney 2003). While most principal-agent theories are based on 
simple dyads (Laffont 1994), hierarchies usually consist of many more actors, and often 
multiple chains of command (Evans 1975; Spaeth 1985). Scholars have long been aware 
of the potential for these longer delegation chains to produce slippage (e.g., O'Donnell 
1952; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984); these ubiquitous organizational features (see 
Figure 2.2) can be found in political, economic, and military institutions throughout 
history. While coordinating multiple actors is a fundamental political challenge (Olson 
1965; Downs 1997), the problem increases dramatically when collective action 
challenges must be resolved at each point in the chain. Yet even when all actors willingly 
cooperate, the potential for structural slippage persists. The cause can be found in the 
limits of communication – error can be expected to increase as the number of actors 
grows29, as any child who has played the game Telephone knows30. Even if we were to 
assume perfect goal agreement among actors, and even if principals take care to elicit the 
                                                 
29 Social psychologist Frederic Bartlett called this dynamic “serial reproduction,” and attributed it to 
psycho-cultural factors, by which actors interpret communication in terms that are the most familiar to 
themselves (1997). Network theorist Barry Wellman has generalized this effect as what he calls “transfer” 
or “brokerage” costs (1988, p 42). 
30 This game is known by quite a few names (e.g., “Chinese Whispers,” “Post Office,” “Share the Secret”). 
Children sit in a circle, and one whispers a story in the ear of her neighbor, who whispers it to his neighbor 
and so on, until the story passes around the circle. The first and last stories never match (Krauss, Nake, and 
Grabowski 2001). There are surprisingly few scientific studies of this effect (e.g., Talland 1956; Bartlett 
1997; Kashima 2000; Lyons and Kashima 2003), though it is very common to see the concept referenced as 
a potential weakness of communications (e.g., Rodenstein and Donath 2000; Macnamara 2004) and 
management systems (e.g., Baker et al. 2002; Barner-Rasmussen and Bor 2005). 
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“right” forms of information from agents, we may still find slippage between the 
preferences of the ultimate principal and the actions of the ultimate agent (i.e., policy 
target)31 (Baber, Houghton, and Cowton 1999; Goodin 2003). Of course, once we 
introduce more “realistic” assumptions about actors’ motives, problems of deception – 
and thus slippage – can only be expected to increase. 
 
Figure 2.2: Delegation Chains  
 
Such sequential complexity is not the only way that organizational forms can 
complicate matters. Recently, principal-agent theorists have begun to pay more attention 
to the problem of “common agency,” where principals (e.g., bureaucracies) face internal 
collective action problems, in addition to the issue of slippage. A single layer of 
delegation may include multiple principals (e.g., balance of powers systems32), or 
principals may be “corporate” or collective entities (i.e., composed of more than one 
actor) (see Figure 2.3). Collective principals have resolved their internal collective action 
problems (and thus form a single contract with the agents to whom they delegate), but 
multiple principals produce multiple contracts (Lyne and Tierney 2002; Nielson and 
Tierney 2003). While most theorists now recognize the potential for principals to 
                                                 
31 Indeed, this dynamic is identical to the classic “control-loss” challenge, as originally defined by 
Williamson (1967), though his approach focuses on intra-firm dynamics. 
32 This point is raised by Moe:  “…in a separation of powers system, competitive multiple principal 
arrangements are actually built into the system by design” (1984, p 768). 
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compete for influence over agents (Cooley and Ron 2002; Worsham 2003), few have 
acknowledged the potential of such “parallel complexity” to produce slippage, even in 
the absence of power politics. As with delegation chains, we could also expect some 
degree of “noise” when multiple principals communicate “simultaneously” with agents. 
Even if multiple principals have identical preferences, information loss should still be 
expected across each contractual “link” (as with delegation chaining), due to variations in 
how (and what) each principal communicates to the agent (Krauss, Nake, and Grabowski 
2001). Whether parallel or sequential complexity is more likely to generate error is a 
separate question – the point is that slippage can appear, even when preference alignment 
(across all actors) is assumed. If preferences diverge, the problem only worsens, making 
it difficult to know whether any observed “slippage” is indeed an instance of delegation 
failure, or simply the product of collective action failure between multiple principals 
(Lyne and Tierney 2002). 
 




2.3 Implementation networks 
Thus, the principal-agent framework is clearly able to account for several potential 
sources of slippage, even when we relax assumptions about preference divergence33 
(Waterman and Meier 1998). By adopting more complex models of principal-agent 
relationships34, we may come to better understand the structural origins of slippage, 
without needing to make normative claims about actor motivation (Lyne and Tierney 
2002). Such complexity cannot be deduced from the perspective of methodological 
individualism (Friedman and Hechter 1988; Wellman 1988), nor can it be observed in 
simple dyadic models (Munro 1999). When our goal is to compare policy systems – 
especially where there is a diversity of institutional features – an empirically grounded, 
inductive approach is required (Skocpol 1984, 1995). While simple delegation systems 
(i.e., those with shorter chains of unitary actors) can be expected to face “restrictive” 
principal-agent challenges (e.g., adverse selection, moral hazard) (Lyne and Tierney 
2002), more complex systems (i.e., those characterized by some combination of longer 
delegation chains and multiple principals) are still prone to slippage. This is because 
complexity produces additional limitations, due to information losses (i.e., noise), that 
can be expected to increase along with the number of agents in general (Nielson and 
Tierney 2003). Such limitations may be understood to operate sequentially (i.e., chains of 
delegation) or in parallel (i.e., multiple principals). 
                                                 
33 In fact, such an assumption can be quite unrealistic – the existence of “iron triangles,” or collusion 
between regulators and regulated interests, is a common feature of large, dispersed bureaucracies (Laumann 
and Knoke 1987). 
34 For perspective, Bendor , Glazer, and Hammond have described principal-agent models with more than 
two actors as “excess baggage” (2001, p 236). 
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While modeling such complexity would be extremely difficult using conventional 
econometric approaches, it is a relatively easy task to map structural relationships using 
graph theory or social network methods35 (Wasserman and Faust 1999; Scott 2004). 
Authority (or perhaps more accurately, delegation) can be understood as a directional 
relation between two actors, as can the information transfers mandated within a given 
policy system36 (Wellman 1988). Consider for instance, the hypothetical delegation 
system represented in Figure 2.4. Since a is connected through delegation to other actors, 
but is not itself the “recipient” of any such relation, it can be considered the ultimate 
principal. Similarly, since e receives, but does not originate any delegation relations, it 
can be considered the ultimate agent or target37 (Moe 1984). Actors b, c, and d are 
intermediate principals, serving dual roles as both the recipients and sources of delegation 
relationships. Since f is a source of information, but not party to any delegation relation, 
it represents an instance of fire-alarm oversight. Notice also that a delegates directly to 









                                                 
35 In Appendix Ia, I provide a detailed discussion of how I operationalize (e.g., data sources, units of 
measure) the implementation networks discussed in Chapters 3 and 4. 
36 This interpretation is somewhat problematic, since communication is also implicit in the act of delegation 
(i.e., the demands of the principal). Despite this, I believe this formulation is still capable of highlighting 
critical dynamics in implementation networks (see especially Chapters 4 and 6). 
37 Ironically, in graph theoretic terms these two positions are known as root and leaf, respectively (Black 
1998). 
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Figure 2.4: Systemic Delegation 
 
Until very recently, social network theory has been developed and applied almost 
exclusively by sociologists and mathematicians (Freeman 2004). While it is common for 
scholars of comparative politics and public policy to use the term “network” (e.g., van 
Waarden 1992; Bressers and O'Toole 1998; Cashore and Vertinsky 2000), as objects of 
study these are almost always 38 defined qualitatively, a metaphor for loosely organized 
coalitions. By explicitly identifying structural relations between actors, formal 
approaches as represented in Figure 2.4 facilitate greater transparency, and allow us to 
compare systems without a priori assumptions about agents’ propensity to deceive39, or 
the relative merits of the specific substantive standards associated with alternative 
systems. In fact, variations in the structural characteristics of implementation systems 
may enable us to assess the relative likelihood of each achieving its stated aims. If NSMD 
systems are to be contrasted with state-based policies and one another, it seems critical 
                                                 
38 Exceptions include “advocacy coalitions,” which have been identified empirically from stakeholder 
surveys (Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith 1993). Of course, such affiliation networks (Everton 2004) are of a 
fundamentally different nature than the imple mentation networks developed here. 
39 Indeed, principal-agent theory “can be coupled with any assumptions about human nature” (Petersen 
1995, p 190) and show how delegation structures may still produce sub-optimal outcomes, as I show here. 
 43 
that we consider any structural limitations inherent in the formal roles and obligations 
they have assigned to the agents tasked with implementing their policies. 
 
2.3.1 Network hypotheses 
The first (and most critical) hypothesis concerns the issue of determinacy. Policies that 
fail to clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of each implementing agent are 
unlikely to achieve their nominal objectives (Schneider 1987; Calvert, McCubbins, and 
Weingast 1989; Wood and Waterman 1991). While shared norms and goals may provide 
a basis for consensus and informal policies (Schneider and Ingram 1997; Sinclair 1999), 
voluntary actions become governance systems only through obligation. Such 
“commitment rules” guarantee that short-term self- interest does not exclude shared 
interests (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999, p 368). Voluntary acts, while possibly 
contributing to policy effectiveness overall, cannot be said to be prescribed by a given 
policy. Since there can be no regulatory relationship without delegation (Mitnick 1980; 
Lyne and Tierney 2002), such roles must be describable in terms of principals and agents. 
Therefore, for a policy to be expected to produce consistent and reliable outcomes, 
all implementation roles must be describable in principal-agent terms 40. 
In the introduction to this chapter, I used a common convention to distinguish 
agents or “parties” according to their economic or political relationship to the policy 
target. Analysts often identify actors as 1st-party (i.e., policy targets), 2nd-party (e.g., 
industrial associations or others directly affiliated with 1st-party actors). Those without 
                                                 
40 Such roles are often stipulated within the relevant policy mandate or contracts, but some pre-existing 
relationships between actors are implicit (e.g., Executive branch hierarchies are not explained in each law 
passed by Congress). 
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such potential “conflicts of interest” are known as 3rd-parties. Finally, state sector actors 
are sometimes41 identified as 4th-parties (state actors) (Garcia-Johnson, Sasser, and 
Gereffi 2001). This “nth-party framework,” loosely grounded in the theory of common 
law, is widely known and used by both state and non-state policymakers (e.g., Cabarle 
and de Freitas 1995; Darby 1998; Bourke and Wijewardana 1999; Mater et al. 1999). 
Embedding this taxonomy within a network framework (see Figure 2.5) provides 
a richer picture of the relationships between principals and agents, and suggests 
additional sources of structural slippage. Where the political breadth between a principal 
and an agent is small – understood here as a dyad between 1st and 2nd-parties – we can 
expect the possibility of collusion to be greater. Indeed, this is one of the classic 
criticisms levied against 2nd-party certification systems (Taylor 1958). Accordingly, for a 
policy to be expected to produce consistent and reliable outcomes, there can be no 
direct delegation between 1st and 2nd parties. 
                                                 
41 While attention to 1st, 2nd, and 3rd party actors is commonplace in the literature, few have drawn attention 
to the role of 4th party actors in policy implementation. This is likely due to the habit of analyzing non-state 
and state-based policies in isolation, as if the two were fundamentally incommensurate. The work of 
Ronnie Garcia-Johnson, Erika Sasser and Gary Gereffi is the exception, though it has tended to be more 
normative than strictly comparative (see Garcia-Johnson, Gereffi, and Sasser 2000; Garcia -Johnson 2001; 
Garcia-Johnson, Sasser, and Gereffi 2001). 
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Figure 2.5: Delegation System with nth Actors 
 
Ceteris paribus, structural slippage is likely to increase with the number of 
delegation relationships (Lyne and Tierney 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003). This 
phenomenon occurs regardless of the magnitude of goal conflict or informational 
asymmetry. As delegation chains grow longer (i.e., sequential complexity) or multiple 
principals delegate to the same agent (i.e., parallel complexity), informational constraints 
can only compound other factors (i.e., shirking). If two or more implementation systems 
share such characteristics, it is difficult to attribute differences in their performance to 
structurally induced slippage. Similarly, we might assume that variations in the structure 
of implementation networks allow us to rank alternative policies according to their 
likelihood to produce consistent and reliable outcomes. 
Such structural properties are easily calculated from graphical representations of 
implementation networks. To determine the level of sequential complexity, we simply 
count the number of links in the longest path between any ultimate principal and ultimate 
agent42. Other paths may exist between the same actors, but our goal is to compare 
                                                 
42 Since hierarchies are directed networks, paths are defined by (and limited to) the directional flow of a 
given relation (Wasserman and Faust 1999). As described earlier, Figure 2.4 has two paths (i.e., delegation 
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policies in their entirety, instead of just single instruments within policies. Unless a given 
policy includes multiple, redundant instruments (a feature absent in the systems 
considered here), the longest path is the most relevant measure of sequential complexity. 
Thus, the maximum sequential complexity of Figure 2.4 is three (abde). Ceteris paribus, 
a policy is as likely to produce consistent and reliable outcomes as a given 
alternative, if and only if its sequential complexity is no greater than that of the 
alternative system. 
Parallel complexity is similarly easy to determine. Since the most elemental unit 
of delegation is a dyad between principal and agent, wherever multiple principals 
produce multiple contracts with the same agent (i.e., agents receiving more than one 
delegation link), we simply sum the total number of additional delegation links received 
by such agents. Thus, Figure 2.4 demons trates a parallel complexity of one (both c and d 
delegate to e). Ceteris paribus, a policy is as likely to produce consistent and reliable 
outcomes as a given alternative, if and only if its parallel complexity is no greater 
than that of the other policy system. 
The structural features represented in Hypotheses 1-4 apply to any sort of 
regulatory (i.e., oversight) system – they matter regardless of the intentions or capacities 
of participants. While some actors may be able to mitigate some the constraints identified 
in Hypotheses 3 and 4, since this would require effort that could serve other purposes, we 
should be able to meaningfully “rank” implementation designs according to their degree 
of structural complexity. As such, this approach allows comparison of policy systems 
                                                                                                                                                 
chains), one of three links (abde) and another of two (ace). In graph theory, this metric is known as the 
diameter or height (Black 1998). 
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with different institutional bases, participants, or nominal goals. The remaining 
hypotheses focus on market-driven systems – in particular, on the availability of NSMD-
relevant information in source and destination markets. Here, the comparison with state-
based regulatory systems is implicit – since states are territorially bound, the effects of 
social distancing can be expected to be less, at least in comparison to NSMD systems 
designed to compete in global markets. 
 
2.4 Information in globa l markets 
[C]onsumer decisions based on incomplete information about the 
conditions of production are not likely to account for their long-term and 
environmental impacts, including both the use of the resource and the 
disposal of the end products. ... [P]roduction patterns that separate 
consumers from the consequences of their behavior are likely to weight 
consumption decisions toward narrowly self- interested consumption and 
away from long-term, intergenerational, and non-human concerns.” 
 
Princen 1997, p 243 
 
The literature on information in markets underscores the “role of reputations to improve 
efficiency” (Cason and Gangadharan 2002, p 114). Some hold that competitive markets 
are “an outstanding mechanism for conveying information and disciplining individual 
behavior” (Miller 1992). Others emphasize the importance of information transfers 
between market participants as a basis for efficient outcomes (Teisl and Roe 1998; 
Kennedy 2001). Indeed, this is the key reason why product labeling exists (Vedung 
1998). However, “producer marks” alone are often insufficient means for convincing 
consumers of a product’s quality (INTA 2004). It is in this context that certification is 
often promoted – as a means of providing reliable information about quality and producer 
reputations (Miller 1992; Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000; Strausz 2003). Indeed, the 
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ultimate success (of failure) of any given NSMD system may depend on its ability to 
communicate relevant information to consumers (Teisl, Peavey, and O’Brien 2001). As 
market-driven systems, NSMDs are predicated on the informed consumer’s ability to 
influence producers through their purchasing behavior (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004b); accordingly, informed consumers are a necessary condition for functional 
market-driven systems (Teisl and Roe 1998; Teisl, Roe, and Levy 1999). This requires 
that consumers be exposed to information about one of two things : the firms themselves, 
or the labeling systems in which they participate. 
Thus, factors that influence information quality and availability can also be 
expected to impact the effectiveness and ultimate success of NSMD systems (Teisl, 
Peavey, and O’Brien 2001). They may also present the greatest potential for global-scale, 
market-based public policy approaches to fail to work as hoped43. If consumers possess 
incomplete information about market choices, they will be “unlikely to account for their 
long-term and environmental impacts” (Princen 1997, p 243). Uninformed consumers are 
unlikely to reward “good” producers any more often than “bad” ones, reducing the 
incentives for any producer to act responsibly. However, such information has to be 
readily available – most consumers are not likely to research every purchase decision 
(Dragani and Flynn 2001). Consider for instance, Figure 2.6. Which of these labels apply 
only to forest and wood-based products? Which ones are used by Chilean forest 
companies? What distinguishes the systems these labels represent?44 It can be very, very 
                                                 
43 Indeed, Espach has recently argued that market demand for ecolabeling is weakest for commodities (e.g., 
timber, wood pulp) (Espach 2005). 
44 Labels (a) Scandinavia’s Swan and (f) Taiwain’s Greenmark  are general ecolabeling programs; all others 
are forest-related. Labels (b), (c), (d) and (i) are associated with Chilean forest products, however (b) is 
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difficult for even well-meaning consumers to remain well- informed about the range of 
available options (Teisl and Roe 2000). 
 
Figure 2.6: Labels 
 
Assume for a moment that we ignore the potential of sequential or parallel 
complexity to reduce the ability of a policy system to communicate relevant detail to 
consumers. While it seems quite reasonable to assume that “telephone” (i.e., person-to-
person) communication approaches are quite prone to error at a global scale, we also 
need to allow for more open “broadcast” strategies (e.g., newspapers, journals). It may be 
possible to circumvent some limitations by “skipping ahead” – communicating relevant 
                                                                                                                                                 
merely a commercial logo (Forestal MININCO), as are (e) Boise Cascade and (g) Weyerhaeuser. Labels 
(d) PEFC, (i) CertFor Chile, and (h) Sustainable Forestry Initiative are industry-dominated NSMD 
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details to consumers through more broad-based strategies. Thus, consumers and other 
actors in the production chain may learn of alternative policy systems indirectly, as news 
of these systems is reported in the newspapers or journals they read in an attempt to be 
well- informed. Yet, while this strategy may sound plausible, there are reasons why we 
might suspect informational dynamics to be more complicated in reality. Although the 
role of media as shapers of public opinion is widely acknowledged (Bendix and Liebler 
2003), less well-known is the impact of communications infrastructure on the media itself 
(Barnett and Choi 1995), as well as the effects of geographical and cultural distance 
(Princen 1997; Conca 2001; Bendix and Liebler 2003). 
 
2.5 Social distancing and information 
Since communication is conditioned by patterns of social interaction (Burt 1987), any 
factor that influences such interchange potentially complicates the spread of information. 
Such factors might include class, culture, language, differences of knowledge or norms, 
and geography (Sastry and Rao 1952; Muttagi 1975; Dickson and MacLachlan 1990). 
Together, these are often referred to as “social distance,” one of social science’s oldest 
and most durable concepts. In The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1976, published 
originally in 1759), Adam Smith emphasized the limits of sympathy (e.g., familial bonds) 
to argue for the merits of self- interest over governmental paternalism. Francis Edgeworth 
operationalized this idea in 1881, proposing that the utility of persons far removed from 
an individual – who is nonetheless concerned for their welfare – is fractionally less than 
that of those nearer, whose utility he also considers (cited in Collard 1975). During the 
                                                                                                                                                 
systems, while (c) FSC has broader stakeholder involvement. 
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same period, Georg Simmel was developing his theory of the “geometry of social life” 
(cited in Ethington 1995), which eventually led to Tarde’s formulation of class difference 
(1900), and Bogardus’ Social Distance Scale (perceived ethnic difference) (Bogardus 
1925). Although the Bogardus scale has been criticized for being both too narrow and too 
general (Poole Jr 1927; Martin 1963; Payne 1976), variations on his approach persist 
(Dickson and MacLachlan 1990; Ethington 1995). 
In the decades since the 1920s, researchers gradually expanded the formulation of 
social distance to include language, religion, culture, gender, age, economic status, 
educational achievement, occupation, power (e.g., Sastry and Rao 1952; Rummel 1975; 
Dickson and MacLachlan 1990; McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). It is still 
broadly applied as an explanatory variable, from altruism (e.g., Fontaine 2000) to 
differential rates of technological change (Niab 2001), to social group formation 
(McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). Today, this broad concept can be 
deconstructed into several subtypes: hierarchical (i.e., authority, delegation), functional 
(activities), economic (e.g., class, income), cultural (e.g., language, religion), and 
relational (e.g., participation, intimacy), among others (Black 2000). A notion of social 
distance is implicit in concerns about delegation relationships between 1st and 2nd party 
actors, as well as with the challenges of longer delegation chains45. Despite the great 
diversity of these interpretations, at the heart of every social distance formulation is the 
idea that human beings find it easier to relate to some people over others, based on either 
                                                 
45 The interesting thing is that social distance plays exactly opposite roles in each – while hierarchical 
distance is likely to reduce accountability and complicate communication within an policy system 
(Wellman 1988; Princen 1997), relational distance between principals and agents may deter the possibility 
of the regulatory capture (Mitnick 1982). 
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propinquity (physical proximity) or homophily (common characteristics) (McPherson, 
Smith-Lovin, and Cook 2001). 
This also means that people will find it more difficult to relate to others when 
social distance (however understood) is greater. While scholars have generally relied on 
survey and interview methodologies to test this proposition (Ethington 1995), such 
effects have also been documented in media coverage (Bendix and Liebler 2003) and 
shopping behavior (Dickson and MacLachlan 1990). In general, research has shown 
strong relations between social distance and the information available to consumers 
(Johnstone 1995; Princen 1999). Ceteris paribus, as social distance increases, we can 
expect the availability and quality of origin-specific information to decline (Princen 
1997). Therefore, a careful study of such effects may provide significant insight into the 
function of global markets (Dickson and MacLachlan 1990). Inasmuch as the essence of 
the NSMD paradigm is to connect producers and consumers, we should expect any 
observed effects to strongly condition their effectiveness as markets extend to the global 
scale. 
 
2.5.1 Social distance hypotheses 
For global- level NSMDs that attempt to function in large and disparate markets, news 
media serve as critical means of communicating such information, and thus of shaping 
attitudes and behavior (Bendix and Liebler 2003). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of 
how a global-scale NSMD could work without leaving significant evidence of its 
activities in the mass media. Whether or not the NSMD model is a preferable or even 
realistic alternative to state-based regulation depends on the magnitude of such 
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asymmetries. If they can be demonstrated to be negligible, then NSMDs may indeed be 
an effective means of providing public goods. Therefore, our task is to identify any 
effects of the various forms of social distance on the communication of information about 
Chilean NSMDs and their stakeholders throughout the global market chain for forest 
products. Although I describe my approach to content analysis in detail in Chapter 5 and 
Appendix IIa, it is useful to provide a rough outline here, in order to make sense of the 
way I have laid out the hypotheses in this section. 
How information is communicated can be understood in many ways. To avoid 
some of the problems associated with more subjective approaches, I chose the relatively 
simple (but consistent) thematic or “dictionary-based” method of content analysis, in 
which the researcher identifies the occurrence of words and phrases, organized by 
theoretically relevant categories. While this approach has been criticized as 
“linguistically unsophisticated,” it is still widely used today (Evans 2002), due to its 
reliability (i.e., consistency) and ability to be applied to indefinitely large text corpuses 
(Bernard and Ryan 1998). Using a combination of LexisNexis’ Academic Universe46 and 
a manual survey of the Chilean print media, I was able to identify 1,899 articles that 
mention forest certification between the years 1993 and 2004. Ideally, to assess the 
relative incidence of a given concept across these texts, a researcher would first 
determine whether or not the terms associated with that idea were present in each text. To 
test whether social distance factors are correlated with the presence (or absence) of that 
concept, she would then regress these as independent variables against the target concept 
                                                 
46 LexisNexis indexes over 5,600 newspapers, magazines, journals, newsletters, news wires, and news 
transcripts worldwide, including 77 in the Spanish language (2005). 
 54 
(i.e., category), looking for statistical significance and directionality in the beta 
coefficient. However, for a variety of reasons, this option was unrealistic. Instead, I used 
the approach suggested by Tankard Jr., Hendrickson, and Lee (1994), in which the 
“Search Within Results” feature of Academic Universe to identify the number of articles 
within a given search that contain terms from the target category. Since Academic 
Universe allows users to search individual publications, I was able to control for location, 
language, and target audience. While this approach provides less statistical leverage 
(since data are aggregated by search level), it is much less costly to implement 47. 
Thematic content analysis is based on three premises. First, that the amount of 
news coverage can influence public opinion, an assumption that has been repeatedly 
supported in media research (e.g., Graham and Dziuban 1996; Bengston and Fan 1999). 
Second, that the “amount” of issue coverage can be estimated from a lexical analysis – 
that is, by looking for specific terms in texts available within a given media environment 
– also a well-established research technique (Bernard and Ryan 1998; Bendix and Liebler 
2003). Third, that the relevant issues, actors, and concepts have been accurately and 
sufficiently represented in the terms and categories used for the analysis. There is no 
simple response to this last challenge, as the appropriateness of any analytical approach is 
ultimately a subjective judgment, albeit one we might hope is well- informed. 
Accordingly, I describe the coding themes and methods used to populate those categories 
in detail in Chapter 5. 
                                                 
47 To perform article-level coding, a researcher needs local copies of every article. While software tools can 
be written to facilitate the download process, I currently lack that skill. 
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Again, one of the simplest formulations of social distance is geographical 
distance. Media researchers and geographers have studied the effects of physical distance 
on news coverage for decades (e.g., Molotch and Lester 1974). This original 
interpretation of social distance assumes an indeterminate “social proximity,” in which 
people having shared experiences also tend to have similar attitudes, knowledge, and 
sympathies (Burt 1987; Akerlof 1997; Bendix and Liebler 2003). This means that the 
information available to neighbors of a given forest or farm is likely to be different than 
that of those far away. Since proximity presents the possibility of direct monitoring, 
producers are likely to be more concerned with the concerns of local stakeholders than 
distant consumers (Princen 1997). It also suggests that long supply chains – the sort we 
expect in global markets – may exhibit strong informational asymmetries between 
producers and consumers. Since state regulation is (by definition) a local phenomenon48, 
national media coverage could be expected to establish a baseline of information 
available to individuals, as both citizens and consumers. In competitive markets, NSMDs 
must connect producers and consumers in order to persist – those operating at extra-
national scales may face challenges beyond those of state-based regulatory systems. 
Therefore, ceteris paribus, a given NSMD could be said to be at least as reliable as 
state-based regulation only if publicly available information about that system is as 
common in the media of critical export markets as in the producer country. 
However, it is possible that the effects of distance may vary by “target audience,” such 
that the information available to foresters varies differently by location than that 
                                                 
48 To the degree that the modern nation-state retains its territorial nature (Caporaso 1997). Though 
geographically expansive or culturally diverse countries (e.g., the United States, Indonesia) may exhibit 
distancing effects within their borders, this should still be less than what might be observed at global scales. 
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published for the general public. The absence of a geographical distancing effect will be 
proven only if the proportion of articles mentioning particular categories fail to decline 
(attenuate) across distance, across all media segments. 
Calculating the actual physical distance of media sources from Chile is 
problematic 49, something which is discussed in detail in Chapter 5. For this reason, it is 
also useful to apply two- and three-step tests, resulting in two general geographical 
hypotheses; controlling for “target audience” (discussed below) produces seven separate 
tests. Ceteris paribus, NSMD policy approaches will be at least as reliable as state-
based regulation only if the proportion of published information about that system 
(identified as the presence of words or phrases the coding dictionary) is as common 
in critical export markets as in the producer country, across: all media segments 
combined; across forestry, manufacturing, and retail segments; and across general 
public sources. 
Also important is the possible impact of cultural distance on communication, 
which may be caused by “psychological proximity” (e.g., the ability to identify with 
others) (Carter and Mitofsky 1961), or more general cultural characteristics, such as 
language (Black 2000). These factors – especially language – have been found to be 
highly correlated with physical communications infrastructure (Barnett and Choi 1995). 
Though culture and language often correlate with geography (Akerlof 1997), the match is 
not exact, as both span borders (Barnett and Choi 1995), and multicultural, multilingual 
                                                 
49 Briefly, while it is a relatively simple matter to control for media sources at the national level using 
Academic Universe, this is only a rough proxy for physical distance, and difficult to strictly rank. Thus, I’ve 
chosen to place the United States in the intermediate location between Chile and its other export markets 
for a three-step test, but also apply simpler two-step controls, aggregating the US with the rest of the world 
outside of Chile’s borders. 
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societies are found worldwide (especially in the United States and Europe). For markets, 
the effect is the same: producers and consumers may fail to understand one another50, 
thus introducing another potential source of slippage. Given the dominance of Spanish in 
Chile, and English in the United States (plus the availability of media in both languages 
worldwide), we can establish a two-step test of the cultural- linguistic social distance 
hypothesis in Chapter 2: ceteris paribus, a given NSMD could be said to be at least as 
reliable as state-based regulation only if the proportion of NSMD and other 
certification-relevant information does not decline (attenuate) from media written in 
the source country’s dominant language, to sources written in the languages of its 
primary export destinations . To control for geographic effects, this hypothesis can be 
tested two ways: with, and without including Chilean media sources. 
Social distance effects originating in occupational and class differences have also 
been empirically observed (Laumann 1965). It is also common to similarly segment 
market chains (e.g., foresters, manufacturers, retailers, consumers) (Forsyth, Haley, and 
Kozak 1999). Such distinctions may be justified in terms of “functional distance” (i.e., 
occupation) (Black 2000), but they may also reflect shared norms about the relevance or 
appropriateness of information (i.e., cognitive framing), instilled through professional 
training and socialization (Shannon, Meidinger, and Clark 1996; Bendix and Liebler 
2003). Since framing has been shown to affect perceptions and attitudes about outcomes 
and causes (e.g., Craig, Gadgil, and Koomey 2002), it has the potential to impact NSMD 
system effectiveness. Variations in content that can be isolated by market segment (e.g., 
                                                 
50 Tom Princen argues that “cultural distance provides opportunities for some producers to ignore or avoid 
or misrepresent certain information” (1997, p 245). 
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forestry, manufacturing and retail, general public) thus present another potentially 
important social distancing effect – which I refer to here as epistemic distance. Thus, an 
NSMD could be said to be at least as reliable as state-based regulation only if 
NSMD-relevant content does not attenuate across specialized (e.g., professional 
journals) and general media (e.g., newspapers) segments. 
 
2.6 Summary 
NSMD systems are increasingly proposed as alternatives to state-based regulation, with 
proponents claiming that such private regulatory approaches are more flexible, 
responsive or effective (e.g., Yilmaz 1998; Council of Economic Advisors 2003; 
Holcombe 2003). Yet despite the increasing popularity of these approaches, comparative 
analyses of state-based and market-based are scarce. This is partly due to preconceptions 
about the “essential incomparability” of such systems (Cheit 1990), but also because 
policy analysis lacks a tractable framework of sufficient complexity (Schneider and 
Ingram 1997). 
In this chapter, I developed two methods to assess the functional capacity of 
NSMDs as alternatives to state-based regulation. The first, formal implementation 
networks, highlights structural features that can be expected to affect implementation 
systems, regardless of their institutional origins (see Figure 2.7). By definition, for an 
implementation design to be capable of producing reliable regulatory outcomes, it must 
have clear lines of delegation and responsibility (i.e., be describable in terms of principals 
and agents). Moreover, to avoid the most basic form of “regulatory capture,” there should 
be no instances of direct delegation between 1st-party and 2nd-party actors. 
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Implementation designs that do not satisfy these requirements cannot be considered 
reliable means of ensuring public goods. 
 
Figure 2.7: Comparing State and Market-Driven Implementation Systems  
 
 
Modeling complex implementation systems in formal network terms facilitates 
the identification of two structural features (sequential and parallel complexity) that can 
be expected to produce slippage (variance between principals’ expectations and agents’ 
actions), even when perfect goal agreement is assumed (e.g., in the absence of deceptive 
behavior). Again, since problems of informational asymmetry and slippage are generally 
understood to increase with goal divergence and deception, any potential structural 
problems would only be compounded by more “realistic” assumptions about actors’ 
motives. The degree to which these features occur in state-based or NSMD systems 
should qualify our support for either approach. In other words, for an implementation 
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design to be considered functional equivalents (or improvements) to other approaches, it 
must satisfy each of the first four hypotheses detailed in this chapter (see Table 2.1). 
Table 2.1: All Hypotheses 
Ceteris paribus, implementation systems could be said to be equivalent (in terms of 
reliability):  
DELEGATION  











IF: a policy’s sequential complexity is no greater than 




IF: a policy’s parallel complexity is no greater than other 
alternatives 
H4 
Ceteris paribus, an NSMD could be said to be equivalent or better than state-based 
regulation:  
SOCIAL DISTANCE  
Geographic 
(physical) 
IF: certification-relevant information is at least as 
common in the media of critical export markets as in the 
producer country (three-step test) 
H5 
 
 IF: certification-relevant information is at least as 





IF: The proportion of certification-relevant information is 
at least as common in media written in the dominant 
language of importing nations as in sources using the 




IF: The proportion of certification-relevant information is 
at least as common in general media (e.g., newspapers) as 




The second method, content analysis of social distancing effects, focuses on the 
information available throughout the global market chain, with special emphasis on the 
United States as Chile’s most important export market. Since the NSMD systems 
analyzed here are intended to function at the global level, evidence of social distancing 
effects should qualify our faith in the ability of these systems to connect consumers and 
producers in a meaningful way, at that scale.51 In other words, because they are market-
driven, even if NSMDs are seen as functional equivalents (or improvements) to state-
based policy, relevant information about those market-driven systems (or their 
participants) must also be readily available throughout the market chain (especially in 
critical markets), satisfying each of the last four hypotheses detailed in Table 2.1. 
Of these eight hypotheses, all but the first two focus on the limits to the transfer of 
information, irrespective of actors’ motives. The first four may be applied to both state-
based and NSMD systems – regardless of their political foundations or substantive 
purpose – but the last four hypotheses are designed specifically to test some of the 







                                                 
51 Again, social distance may also condition the effectiveness of state-based regulation, but since modern 
nation-states are territorially bound, we would expect the significance of such effects to be relatively less 
than when they play out in global markets. See Footnote 43, this chapter. 
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3 POLICY AND POLITICS IN CHILEAN FORESTRY 
Great forests make these inaccessible areas like a tunnel through which 
our journey was secret and forbidden, with only the faintest signs to show 
us the way. There were no tracks and no paths, and I and my four 
companions, riding on horseback, pressed forward on our tortuous way, 
avoiding the obstacles set by huge trees, impassable rivers, immense cliffs 
and desolate expanses of snow … Each of us made his way forward filled 
with this limitless solitude, with the green and white silence of trees and 
huge trailing plants and layers of soil laid down over centuries, among 
half- fallen tree trunks which suddenly appeared as fresh obstacles to bar 
our progress. 
 
From the official translation of Pablo Neruda’s acceptance speech 
for the Nobel Prize in Literature, October 21, 1971. 
 
 
Wood is Chile's new copper. 
 
Joaquin Lavín 1988, p 60. 
 
Chile is a land defined by extremes. Though more than 2,700 miles from north to south, it 
is less than 150 miles across at its widest point. Its borders include the world’s driest 
desert and one of the world’s few remaining temperate rainforests, nestled between the 
Andes mountains and the Pacific Ocean. It is the home of both Neruda and Pinochet, the 
first country in the world to elect a Marxist president, and the first Latin American nation 
to embrace a neoliberal political economy (Muñoz 1997). The evident success of such 
policies has led many both within and outside Chile to promote the country as a model 
for other nations to emulate (e.g., Tanzi and Schuknecht 1997; Mullin et al. 1999; 
Council of Economic Advisors 2003). It has been called the “economic tiger” of the 
Americas (Collins and Lear 1995, p 4), in no small part due to the dramatic expansion of 
the forest industry, one of Chile’s fastest growing sectors (Nef 1995), and among the 
most dynamic in the world today today (O'Ryan and Fierro 2000; Cartwright 2002). 
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Yet Chile’s growing importance in forest products markets is based not on vast 
natural forests, but on a conscious effort by the country’s leaders to expand the plantation 
estate (Clapp 1995b). In 1930, the forest industry exported only 28,800 cubic meters 
(Wisecarver and Tardones 1989); by 2004, that had risen to more than 10,500,00 cubic 
meters, almost all of which came from plantation sources (INFOR 2004). Between 1974 
and 2000, the value of Chilean forest exports grew more than seventeen-fold (Christian 
1988; Quiroga 1996). Chile’s forest industry is now one of the most dynamic and 
successful in the world – it was among the world’s top ten net exporters in 1996 (Mery 
1996), and is projected to lead the world as soon as 2010 (Timber and Wood Products 
1998b). At more than US$2 billion per year, Chile is Latin America’s second-most 
important net exporter (behind Brazil) (Mery, Kengen, and Lujan 2001). Over the next 
two decades, the Chilean wood supply is projected to nearly double, from 21.7 million 
cubic meters (in 2001), to over 38 million cubic meters (CORFO 2001). 
In this chapter, I present an overview of Chilean forestry, its political and 
regulatory context, as well as the major actors and issues associated with the sector. I 
begin by describing the dramatic political and economic changes that have remade 
Chilean politics in the past few decades, from the pre-Allende era to the reestablishment 
of democratic institutions. I then offer an overview of the major state regulations of 
Chilean forestry, and map the principal-agent dyads (i.e., roles and responsibilities of 
implementation) stipulated in those laws52. I then describe the 4th party (state) agencies 
and institutions tasked with implementation of state policy goals. To provide context for 
the conflicts and challenges that characterize Chilean forest politics, I also present 
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background information for key 1st party (forest management firms), 2nd party (industrial 
associations) and 3rd party (NGOs, expert services, general public) actors and 
organizations. I end the chapter with a brief overview of the major issues that have driven 
debate over forest management in Chile over the past few decades. 
 
3.1 Shifting the role of the state 
The Chilean approach to ensuring public goods – especially environment and natural 
resources – has undergone wide-ranging and dramatic changes over the past century. In 
the 1930s, the country’s economic policies were generally protectionist and 
interventionist, a strategy which often worked against development of the forest industry 
(e.g., import barriers for harvest equipment) (Wisecarver and Tardones 1989; Collins and 
Lear 1995). This began to change in 1966, when President Frei declared that 
development of the forestry sector would be a state priority. Expanding the forest estate, 
he argued, would enable Chile to achieve a “prominent position” in international markets 
(Camus and Hajek 1998, p 2). Over the next few years, Chile created an official 
Reforestation Plan and a national corporation to implement it (COREF, founded in 1969), 
establishing a number of wood and pulp processing companies as well, including the 
original facilities of what is now Chile’s largest forest products firm, Arauco (ibid.). 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
52 These will be compared to NSMD policies in Chapter 4. 
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In 1970, Salvador Allende was elected53 in a tightly contested presidential race. 
Over the following three years, state intervention in the economy deepened (Wilson 
1991). To centralize forest sector planning, Allende established the National Forest 
Corporation (CONAF) as a department within the Ministry of Agriculture (Mery 1996). 
In addition to assuming the functions of the Reforestation Corporation (started in 1969), 
CONAF began to absorb the responsibilities of other forestry and rural development 
institutions (Camus and Hajek 1998). 
The 1973 military takeover changed everything – public policy was developed 
without democratic input, most Allende-era policies were suspended, unions were 
outlawed. State-based reforestation initiatives of the 1960s were replaced by D.L. 701 
(detailed below), which used state funds and tax holidays to encourage the development 
of private forest plantations. From 1975 to 1979, the Central Bank offered loans to 
encourage tree planting by the private sector (Camus and Hajek 1998), even as the junta 
imposed reforms to limit the role of the government in the economy. These policies 
included the privatization of state-owned companies and many government services, 
reduced barriers to trade and foreign investment, and the effective destruction of 
organized labor (Collins and Lear 1995). Yet, as the Bank’s lending program suggests, 
reformers were not blind to the significance of continued state involvement in a few key 
economic sectors (Kurtz 2001). State forest policy, in particular, was heavily influenced 
by political considerations (Gwynne 1993; Carrere and Lohmann 1996). Not only had the 
                                                 
53 Allende was a candidate of the Unidad Popular, a reform coalition of Marxists and radical le ftists. The 
election was nearly evenly split between Christian Democrats, the right-wing Partido Nacional , and the 
UP, with Allende slightly ahead. Following a failed attempt by right-wing extremists to kidnap Chile’s 
highest ranking General (the blame was to be placed on leftists such as the UP), the Congress named 
Allende the victor (Loveman 1988). 
 66 
major forestry companies been strong opponents of Allende, but Pinochet’s economists 
also recognized that earlier state investments had created a comparative advantage that 
would allow Chile to play an increasingly important role in world forest products markets 
(Collins and Lear 1995). Once considered a “non-traditional” export, forest products soon 
became a key sector in the country’s economy, jumping from 3.1 to 10 percent of all 
exports from 1973 to 1990 (Gwynne 1993). In addition to the incentives of D.L. 701 and 
other state policies (Maggi and Kern 2000), industry’s bottom line (at least in the short-
term) benefited from the junta’s apparent disinterest in the environmental impacts of its 
development model (Muñoz 1997; Silva 1997b, c). 
Given the results of the 1988 plebiscite54, which showed strong residual support 
for the junta, the return to democratic elections required the cooperation of powerful 
interests. To ensure a successful transition, the Christian Democrats bargained with both 
the armed forces and business elites (Silva 1996). These powerful interests required 
assurances that an elected government would remain committed to the neo- liberal model 
as a way to sustain the country’s high rate of economic growth (Silva 1994). To achieve  
credibility with these groups, the government agreed to always include business 
representatives in policymaking – though Chile’s political parties are clearly aware of 
other social interests, such concerns have remained subordinate to those of business 
(Silva 2002). 
 
                                                 
54 Even though a majority of Chileans voted for a return of democratic government, forty-three percent still 
supported the junta (Barton and Murray 2002). The plebiscite was widely perceived as a “bluff” by 
Pinochet, who was reportedly shocked that so many Chileans preferred the uncertainty of democracy (Silva 
2002). 
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3.2 State forestry regulations  
In ecological terms, Chile is an island, isolated by mountains, ocean, and the driest desert 
in the world, the Atacama. Since natural plant and animal migration is so challenging, the 
country has a very high incidence of endemic species (Wilcox 1996; Espinoza and 
Arqueros 2000). Prior to conquest, forests covered nearly a quarter of the country’s 
surface area. Much was burned by the Spanish, in hopes of quelling resistance by 
indigenous groups (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002); even more was cleared to 
grow wheat for export during the California Gold Rush (Kellison 1994). Pine and 
eucalyptus plantations were established in the 1890s to supply structural timbers for coal 
mines (Timber and Wood Products 1998a), but industrial-scale forestry did not begin 
until after the turn of the century (Hartwig 1991). Natural forests remained the dominant 
source for the forest industry until the mid-20th century, but today most Chilean wood 
originates from plantations (Clapp 1995a; Cartwright 2002). Fast growing exotic species 
(pinus radiata55 and eucalyptus) have become the “backbone” of the Chilean forestry 
industry (Husch 1982), enabling the country to steadily increase forest product exports, 
even as it attempts to preserve natural forests. Nearly a fifth of Chile’s territory is 
classified as protected56 (IUCN 1996), one the highest proportions in the world 
(Corcuera, Sepúlveda, and Geisse 2002). 
While the rugged beauty of Chile’s natural environment has always been a point 
of national pride (Nef 1995), the country’s regulatory climate emphasizes reduced state 
                                                 
55 The most widely planted tree species in the world (Clapp 1995a), p. radiata is also known as the 
Monterey or Insignis pine (Krebs 1976). 
56 Over 14 million hectares are protected, mostly in the southern Regions XI and XII, home to most of 
Chile’s endemic species (Pauchard 2002). 
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involvement and reliance on private sector initiative (Silva 1997a; Ruthenberg 2001). In 
serving the common good, the government is expected to “ensure and promote the 
responsible management of ecosystems and natural resources ... with a long-range view” 
(Morales 2003b, p 23), yet efforts to regulate forest management have been severely 
limited by constitutional protections of private property (Arnold 2003, citing del Favero 
1996). The government’s weak capacity for environmental protection is well documented 
(Bradbury 1993; Rojas 1994; Silva 1997b); Mery, Kengen and Lujan (2001) claim that 
Chile lacks “long-term, well-planned and structured” policies for the country’s forest 
resources. 
If regulations to protect individual species and locales are included, Chile has 
hundreds of forest laws57 (Gallardo 2000). However, only three are considered potentially 
relevant to commercial forestry: D.S. 4363 (established in 1931, known as the “Forest 
Law”); D.L. 701 (from 1974, reformed in 1998 as D.L. 19561); and Law 19300 (Chile’s 
version of NEPA, enacted in 1994) and associated bylaw D.S. 30 (Arnold 2003). Of 
these, D.L. 701 (and its latter modifications and reforms) is by far the most important 58 in 
terms of forest management practices (Silva 1997b; Fierro and O'Ryan 2001). 
 
3.2.1 Ley de Bosques – D.S. 4363 (1931) 
Chile’s first efforts to regulate forest management grew from President Alesandri’s hope 
that such resources might stimulate development in the remote south. In 1925, his 
                                                 
57 Chilean law is hierarchical, with certain documents, laws and regulations having priority over others. In 
order of importance, these are:  the Constitución; Leyes Orgánicas (Framework Laws); Códigos (Systemic 
Codes); Leyes (Laws); Decretos Supremos (Supreme Decrees); Decretos Reglamentarios (Regulatory 
Decrees); Decretos Simples (Simple Decrees); and Resoluciónes (Resolutions) (CCAEC 1996). 
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government issued two laws: D.L. 656 and Decree 416 (Sandoval 2003b, a). D.L. 656, 
also known as the “Second General Forest Law,” was essentially a compilation of earlier 
rules for commercial forests, including reforestation requirements and tax exemptions 
(Hartwig 1991). Decree 416 established an auctioned permit system for logging in 
government forests (Republica de Chile 1925), but there is little evidence that this system 
was ever implemented59. These laws were originally justified according to the economic 
importance of forestry, as well as its impact on agriculture (Sandoval 2003a). The 
provisions of D.L. 656 were later strengthened when it was incorporated into “The Forest 
Law” D.L. 4363 (Republica de Chile 1931), a law that is still legally extant, though rarely 
(if ever) enforced (Silva 1999). 
In part, this is due to its preemption60 by D.L. 701 (Republica de Chile 1976, 
Articles 2 and 5)61; but also partly because the law itself was designed for an era when 
publicly owned and managed forests were expected to play a significant role in the 
country’s forest industry. Apart from explicit penalties for clearing land through the use 
of fire62 (Article 17), the law is largely limited to restrictions on cutting trees in state-
owned forests and plantations (Article 14), and a minor (apparently moribund) effort to 
                                                                                                                                                 
58 Stakeholders repeatedly emphasized this point during my interviews in Chile. 
59 1924-25 was an especially politically turbulent period in Chile. President Alessandri resigned under 
military pressure on September 9th 1924, eventually moving to exile in Italy. When another faction 
overthrew the Junta, Alessandri was asked to finish his term of office. He returned on March 20th, but the 
remainder of his presidency was absorbed with implementing a constitutional transition from a 
Parliamentary to a congressional system, with the intent of strengthening the Presidency at the cost of the 
traditional political parties (Collier and Sater 1996). 
60 The current text of the law is unclear as to when the law was amended, though it likely occurred in 1974. 
61 All remaining legal references in this paragraph are to the text of D.S. 4363. 
62 This practice is also regulated by D.S. 276 (Republica de Chile 1980). 
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establish municipal tree nurseries (Article 12). Concessions to harvest state commercial 
forests are to be granted by the state Agricultural Service (SAG) (Article 14). Monitoring 
and enforcement of this law in state forests is the duty of the Carabineros, the national 
police (Article 20). Since most state-owned forests are now managed under the National 
System of State-owned Wildlife Areas (Republica de Chile 1984), and so few 
commercial forests remain in the hands of the state (Morales 2003b), D.S. 4363 is 
effectively irrelevant to the commercial management of Chilean forests today. 
 
3.2.2 D.L. 701 (1974) / D.L. 19561 (1998) 
By far, the most significant state policy affecting Chile’s forest sector is D.L. 701 and 
associated63 laws, regulations, and amendments (Hartwig 1991). Designed primarily as 
an incentive system to expand the country’s forest estate, D.L. 701 also established 
guidelines for the management of both native forests and plantations (Silva 1997b). 
Originally enacted on October 28th, 1974, one of D.L. 701’s most immediate effects was 
to offer protection against land redistribution. Yet in the long run, the law’s fiscal 
provisions were more significant – tax holidays and reimbursement for the costs of 
establishing and maintaining planted forests (Amacher et al. 1998). Although the law has 
never specified which species should be planted (Morales 2003b), economic concerns led 
most foresters to plant those which mature faster (Gwynne 1993; Silva 1997b). As a 
result, commercial forestry shifted almost exclusively to plantations of exotic species 
                                                 
63 It is common practice in Chile to refer to subsequent reforms by the name of the original law. Thus, the 
1998 reforms are still referred to as D.L. 701. However, this leads to a disconcerting grammatical shift – 
the early version of D.L. 701 is properly described in the past tense, but post-1998 reforms are clearly 
present-tense. To improve the readability of this section, I will refer to the reforms as D.L. 19561, although 
elsewhere I adopt the more common practice of referring to both laws jointly as D.L. 701. 
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(Husch 1982). Initially, the reimbursements covered 70 percent of costs; after 1982, these 
were increased to 90 percent, ostensibly to provide seasonal employment opportunities 
for rural workers (Sanfuentes 1987). 
Although D.L. 701 was critical in making Chile’s forest industry competitive at 
the international level, and reducing commercial pressures on the country’s native 
forests64, the law also had several (possibly) unintended consequences. The fact that 
decades usually pass between planting and harvest means that large-scale forestry is 
capital- intensive; since the law reimbursed landowners a full year after planting, well-
capitalized (i.e., larger) companies tended to benefit much more than others (Mery 1996; 
Quiroga 1996). Rapid expansion of the forest estate made suitable land more scarce, 
leading to higher land prices and further consolidation (Wisecarver and Tardones 1989; 
Quiroga 1996). By 1988, one company (Forestal Arauco) owned nearly twenty percent of 
all land planted under D.L. 701 (Collins and Lear 1995). When the law expired in 1994, 
Chilean lawmakers began developing reforms to address many of these problems; the 
result was D.L. 19561, signed into law in 1998. 
These 1998 reforms extended the subsidies through 2011, though these are now 
directed towards small and mid-scale landowners (Quiroga 1996). Properties that 
received funds under the earlier version of the law are not eligible for additional 
subsidies. Management activities eligible for reimbursement include: tree planting (at any 
scale) for the purpose of soil rehabilitation, to establish windbreaks, and otherwise 
control soil erosion; plantings by small-scale landowners on soils of any quality, for full-  
or mixed-forestry systems; and silvicultural management associated with such plantings 
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(e.g., pruning). Smallholders may have up to 90 percent of costs reimbursed for the first 
15 hectares affected, and 75 percent of that remaining. Such payments are traunched, 
with a three year waiting period for the last 15 percent of costs, dependent on proof that 
the initial plantings have become established. All such reimbursements are made through 
the Ministry of Agriculture. The Institute of Agricultural Development (INDAP, a public 
organization directed by the Ministry of Agriculture) is to offer loans to enable 
smallholders to incur such management costs. 
D.L. 19561 also exempts reforested land from taxes levied on agricultural lands 
for a period extending two years beyond the first harvest; to receive this designation, 
landowners must solicit CONAF, which has up to 60 days to deny such requests, and 
notify the Tax Service (SII) of its decision. Otherwise, the tax exempt status is 
automatically conferred, and applied by SII. Such “latent approval” processes are 
common to many of Chile’s post-Pinochet regulations (see below). 
Table 3.1: D.L. 701 / 19561 
* D.L. 701 / 19561 Source 
A MINAGRI reimburses landowners for reforestation costs Article 12 
B INDAP offers loans to smallholders to cover management 
costs 
Article 12 
C Landowners solicit CONAF for tax exemption Article 13 
D CONAF may deny requests for tax exempt status Article 13 
E CONAF informs SII of decisions on exemption requests Article 13 
F SII exempts selected landowners from agricultural taxes Article 25 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 This point is extremely contentious, and is discussed further in the the closing section of this chapter. 
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* D.L. 701 / 19561 Source 
D CONAF assesses forest management plans prior to cutting Articles 10, 21 
G Landowners may appeal CONAF decisions to local civil 
courts 
Articles 5, 21 
D CONAF identifies soils “preferred for forestry” Article 4 
C Landowners ask CONAF to declare lands “preferred for 
forestry” 
Article 4 
D CONAF may revoke “preferred” status and all attending 
benefits 
Article 13 
D Ignoring management plans may result in fines or seized 
harvests 
Article 17 
H Local police may be required by CONAF to halt harvest 
activities 
Article 21 
C CONAF must have landowner’s permission to enter private 
land 
Articles 21, 22 
I CONAF may appeal to local courts Article 24 
I CONAF informs local courts of infractions Article 24 
J Local courts impose any fines or sanctions Article 24 
K Carabineros inform local courts of infractions Article 24 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in the following graph (Figure 3.1) 
 
D.L. 19561 requires that a management plan be prepared by a licensed forester 
(for properties over 10 hectares) and approved by CONAF prior to cutting in either native 
forests or plantations established on lands identified as “preferred for forestry.” CONAF 
has the authority and responsibility to identify soils that are considered to be “preferred,” 
a status also used to determine planning requirements, reimbursement rates, and tax 
status. Anyone wishing to have their lands classified “preferred for forestry” sends a 
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formal request to CONAF, who then has sixty days 65 to respond – otherwise, the land is 
automatically given that preferred status. Similarly, CONAF has up to 120 days to 
comment on management plans, otherwise these are automatically approved. All benefits 
and obligations following from D.L. 701 are attached to the specific lands under 
management, and may be transferred with property titles. 
Those cutting forests on land classified as “preferred for forestry” are required to 
reforest an area of at least equal size. On other soil types, landowners are only obligated 
to reforest if the trees cut are native species. Non-compliance with replanting 
requirements is punishable by double fines. Should CONAF reject a submitted request or 
plan within the specified period, those decisions may be appealed to local civil courts. 
CONAF has the authority to revoke such status in “exceptional” cases and with “proper 
justification.” In such cases, landowners are required to refund any monies which had 
been received based on the preferred status, including tax exemptions and interest on 
such payments, as determined by Chile’s national tax service. However, such changes in 
land use designations may also be appealed to local civil courts, according to the 
provisions in Article 5. 
Anyone who cuts natural timber66 not included in an approved management plan 
must submit a corrected plan (prepared by a licensed forester) to CONAF within sixty 
days. Such plans must include provisions for replanting to be completed within a two-
year period. Landowners that “intentionally” fail to complete the details of a management 
                                                 
65 This period may be extended up to 120 days, where difficult terrain or weather conditions prohibit an 
assessment (Article 4). 
66 With some limits based on soil type (i.e., preferred for forestry), tree plantations are not regulated as 
forests (Article 21). 
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plan are to be fined, based on the area of land under the plan, severity of the failure67, or 
value of the harvested products. Any products seized will be sold by CONAF, which may 
ask local police to halt harvest activities on the property, subject to prior review by a local 
judge within 48-hours. 
Although some have argued that D.L. 701 extends enforcement power to CONAF 
(Fredes 2002), its personnel must ask permission before entering private property. If this 
is refused, CONAF may appeal to local judges. Enforcement of any sanctions and fines 
following from this law is the responsibility of local judicial tribunals, following formal 
notification of infractions by regional CONAF directors or Carabinero officers. Where 
mitigating circumstances68 are evident (e.g., a first offense), penalties may be reduced or 
even waived. Where CONAF has already published technical or management studies for 
a particular forest type, small-scale landowners are exempted from the requirement to 
submit a forester-prepared management plan. Areas planted without state subsidies (i.e., 
all large-scale plantations after 1996) are treated as agricultural crops; no management 
plans will be required for these properties (Morales 2003b). 
                                                 
67 However, the law does not specify how such discover would occur (CONAF does not have an ongoing 
monitoring role), nor whether such decisions could be appealed. 
68 Enforcement of D.L. 701 (indeed, any forestry laws) has been anemic, at best. A study of forest 
management violations between 1989 and 1993 showed charges were dropped in over 60 percent of cases 
(Lowy 1995). 
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Figure 3.1: D.L. 701 / 19561 
 
 
3.2.3 Ley de Bases – D.L. 19300 (1994) / D.S. 30 (1997) 
The success of the United States in pressuring Mexico to negotiate environmental side 
agreements before the 1993 passage of the North American Free Trade Agreement “sent 
a clear message to other Latin America nations” (Silva 1994). It was partly in response to 
such pressures that Chile’s Comprehensive Environmental Law 19300 was adopted the 
following year (LALBR 1997). Based loosely on the United States’ NEPA, the Ley de 
Bases (“Framework Law”) established a national environmental coordinating committee 
(CONAMA), and similar regional committees (COREMAs) in each of Chile’s thirteen 
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political jurisdictions (Republica de Chile 1997)69. The authority to issue new regulations 
(e.g., industry-specific requirements) remains with the legislature and the ten constituent 
ministries70 of the CONAMA directing council. As a framework law, D.L. 19300 was 
designed to address a broad range of environmental problems, making it somewhat 
difficult to interpret in isolation. D.S. 30 (Republica de Chile 1997) provides greater 
specificity on many such questions. 
Most of D.L. 19300 builds on the principles of prevention, economic efficiency, 
and “polluter pays” (Silva 1996; O'Ryan and Fierro 2000). Although the law emphasizes 
pollution prevention and remediation, it also intends to safeguard the “quality and 
quantity” of renewable natural resources. Because the law consolidates permitting 
processes (known as the “single window”), it is said to streamline project development 
and implementation (Castillo 1994), though this point is sometimes disputed (Sheppard 
1999b). 
The central instruments of the Framework Law are environmental impact studies 
(EIS) or similar declarations (EIDs), conducted by the project proponents (or 
environmental consultants). The more stringent EIS is required of all projects expected to 
produce “significant impacts;” however, unless a coordinating committee fails an EID, 
the interpretation of which to submit (a study or declaration) is left to the project 
proponent71. As with D.L. 701, approval is automatic if coordinating councils do not 
                                                 
69 Unless otherwise identified, all remaining legal references in this  section are to the text of D.S. 19300. 
70 As stipulated in Article 71, these are the Ministries of the Economy, Reconstruction and Development, 
Public Works, Agriculture, Public Assets, Health, Mining, Housing and Urban Development, Transport 
and Telecommunication, and Planning and Cooperation. 
71 This aspect of the law has been widely critiqued (Sheppard 1999b). 
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respond (or request an extension) within specified periods. Those submitting an 
indemnity against potential damages along with their proposals receive provisional 
approval. 
Any commercial projects in native forests or on “fragile” soils are required to 
submit a study or declaration to the local COREMA72. Article 3.m of D.S. 30 defines 
these conditions further, based on size and location, and requires such projects to replant 
an area equal to that harvested. D.L. 19300 also requires firms to locally publish public 
summaries of their EIAs, which initiates a seventy day public comment period. 
COREMAs are required only to “ponder” any stakeholder input. While the Framework 
Law requires projects to submit baseline data, it only loosely suggests a monitoring role 
for the coordinating councils. Should illegal or malicious acts cause “environmental 
damages” to third-parties, these individuals may ask local (or national) officials73 to issue 
warnings, levy fines, or even injunctions against the offending projects. Article 54 also 
allows specified individuals (project proponents, the state, and those directly harmed) to 
demand compensation – again suggesting an implicit monitoring role for such actors. 
Other stakeholders must ask local mayors to intervene on their behalf, who appear to 




                                                 
72 Projects expected to have large-scale (i.e., extra -regional) impacts are required to submit an EIS to the 
national coordinating committee (CONAMA). However, given that both forests and soils are highly 
localized phenomena, almost all foresters will deal only with their local COREMA. 
73 This provision also allows local and national officials to act where the state itself is seen to be harmed, 
although it provides no explanation for how this might be established. 
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Table 3.2: D.L. 19300 / D.S. 30 
* D.L. 19300 / D.S. 30 Source 
L Legislature has authority to issue new regulations Article 12 
M CONAMA ministries have authority to issue new regulations Article 12 
N CONAMA or regional COREMAs assess EIS/EIDs Article 18 
O Landowners submit EIS/EID to local COREMA Article 9 
P Landowners must publish summary EIAs in local media Article 27 
Q Local stakeholders may submit comments on EIAs Articles 28-29 
R Third-parties ask local officials to warn or punish landowners Article 54 
S Third-parties ask national officials to warn or punish landowners  Articles 51, 56 
T Local officials may warn or penalize landowners Articles 51, 56 
N National officials may warn or penalize landowners Articles 51, 56 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in the following graph (Figure 3.2) 
 
Figure 3.2: D.L. 19300 / D.S. 30 
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While exotic trees planted on “non-fragile” soils are considered agricultural crops, 
and not subject to D.L. 19300 requirements (Morales 2003b), such projects may still be 
regulated by D.L. 701. Accordingly, the Framework Law is relatively insignificant to 
most of Chile’s forest estate74. However, given that local FSC standards are being 
developed for native forests (described in the following chapter), the potential exists for 
D.L. 19300 to become more relevant in the future. 
 
3.2.4 Other state regulations and international agreements 
The public summaries of FSC and CertforChile certificates identify other environmental 
regulations of lesser significance to forest managers: D.S. 276 (1980) regulating the use 
of fire to clear land; D.S. 351 (1993) concerning the residues of such fires; D.S. 94 (1995) 
on the transport of forest products; D.L. 3557 (1981) general agricultural regulations; Ley 
3133 (1996) prohibiting industrial waste dumping in waterways; D.S. 105 (1998) 
regulating the use of household pesticides; and Resolución 290 (2000) on agrochemical 
safety standards. These are generally narrowly focused laws, whose intent (at least as 
concerns forest management) has been subsumed within either D.L. 701 or the 
Framework Law. In addition, these public reports reference laws applied to a broad range 
of industries: Ley 16744 (1968) and D.S. 594 (2000) both concerning workplace health 
and safety; Ley 19253 (1993) on protection and development of indigenous communities; 
and Ley 18695 (1988) establishing the rights and obligations of local municipalities. 
Since these are not specific to forestry, they are unlikely to be displaced by NSMD 
                                                 




Chile is a signatory to at least seventeen international environmental agreements 
(Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002; CONAF 2005; CONAMA 2006), as well as 
several ILO (International Labor Organization) conventions (Cerda and Lira 2001). Most 
are not especially (e.g., the Convention on Desertification) or uniquely (e.g., the ILO 
Conventions) relevant to the country’s forest industry. However, Chile has signed at least 
four agreements which are clearly related: the Convention on International Trade in 
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); the Convention on Biological 
Diversity (CBD); United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change; and The 
Santiago Declaration (from the Montreal Process, described briefly below). Like many 
other countries, Chile has engaged these treaties to varying degrees. After ratifying 
CITES in 1975, Chile placed three tree species listed in the Convention’s prohibited list 
(i.e., Appendix I): Alerce (Fitzroya cupressoides), Guaitecas cypress (Pilgerodendron 
uviferum), and Araucaria (Araucaria araucana) (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002). 
Although Chile ratified the CBD over a decade ago, it has not yet defined a national 
conservation strategy. The government has pursued a similar strategy towards the 
Framework Convention on Climate Change, which it signed in 1994, but for which it has 
yet to develop specific policies (ibid.). 
The Santiago Declaration is a non-binding agreement that emerged from the 
Montreal Process, an ad-hoc process by non-European countries to develop criteria and 
indicators for the sustainable management of temperate and boreal forests (Crossley 
1996). Signed in 1995, the Declaration includes a set of universal criteria and indicators, 
and the expectation that signatories adopt additional national standards under that 
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framework. Chile has yet to produce such standards (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 
2002); although forest certification might be seen as a step in this direction, the stated 
intent of the signatories was to assess forest sustainability at the national level, rather than 
by individual management unit (Elliott 1999). 
 
3.3 Stakeholders in Chilean forests and forestry 
As environmental issues have gained saliency in Chilean society, politicians, state 
ministries, industry, scientists, citizen groups, environmental non-governmental 
organizations (ENGOs), and international institutions have all sought to influence how 
the country’s environmental conditions are defined (Kaimowitz 1996). Observers and 
participants tend to identify the following actors in Chile’s forest policy debates: 
government authorities, timber extraction and processing companies, industrial 
associations, NGOs, and other civil society groups (Maggi and Kern 2000; Verscheure 
2002). The historical relationships between these varied groups, their principal concerns 
and the means of advancing those interests, as well as their public or private-sector nature 
will provide context necessary to understand the political and economic dynamics 
surround forest politics in Chile. 
 
3.3.1 Fourth-parties: state institutions and quangos 
Chile’s public service is renowned for its efficiency and low levels of corruption (Maggi 
and Kern 2000). However, the legacy of over fifteen years of a neoliberal dictatorship has 
left the country’s bureaucracy unable or unwilling to play a strong role in regulating the 
use of natural resources (Silva 1997b). Instead, the government’s strategy has been to act 
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as convener, mediator, or to offer technical expertise and “moral support” to private 
sector efforts. 
As part of Chile’s ongoing experiment in neoliberal reform, many government 
entities have been fully or partially privatized, even though some remain legally obliged 
to implement some aspect of government regulation or law. While assumptions about 
what is understood as the purview of the state become problematic in cross-national 
comparisons, the characterization of the variety of quasi-autonomous organizational 
(QUANGO) forms as “a zoo containing many animals” (Hood 1986, p 188) is especially 
apt in the Chilean political context. These organizations occupy an often complicated 
space between public and private sectors. Some state- founded organizations have moved 
sufficiently towards the private sector to be considered truly independent agents (e.g., 
Fundación Chile). Others, exclusively tasked with implementing state policies, or 
offering services demanded only by state institutions, are less easily understood as 
separate from the state. Despite such institutional diversity, all QUANGOs possess (albeit 
to varying degrees) relationships to the state that set them apart from purely commercial 
or civil society organizations (Koppell 2003). Often, this is expressed as a subtle form of 








Figure 3.3: QUANGOs 
 
Chile’s national forest service was established in 1970 as a department of the 
Ministry of Agriculture (Mery 1996), which is itself tasked with “promoting, guiding and 
coordinating forestry, livestock and agricultural activities in the country” (D.F.L. 294 
1960, cited in Centro de Derecho Ambiental 2002, p 7). Under the Allende government, 
CONAF75 was expected to assume the functions of the Reforestation Corporation 
(founded a year earlier), as well as other state-based forestry and rural development 
institutions (Camus and Hajek 1998). Following the coup, D.L. 701 established the 
agency’s regulatory powers, giving CONAF officials76 the tasks of approving (or 
rejecting) management plans submitted under that law, and monitoring compliance with 
such plans and other provisions (i.e., reforestation requirements) of the law (Fredes 
                                                 
75 CONAF’s full name is the Corporación Nacional Forestal. 
76 It is interesting to note that one of CONAF’s first directors under Pinochet was his then son-in-law, 
Ponce Lerou, who had only recently received a degree in forestry science. Lerou went on to head the 
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2002). Since the Pinochet government privatized the companies that CONAF had 
managed, the agency’s role was changed to monitoring and enforcing the country’s forest 
laws, coordinating and promoting the forest industry (Camus and Hajek 1998; Neira, 
Verscheure, and Revenga 2002). After the national park system (SNASPE) was formed 
under Law 18,362 (Republica de Chile 1984), CONAF was given management 
responsibility for that system. 
There is some confusion as to CONAF’s formal standing as a state institution 
(Olander 1999). Though the agency was given nominal QUANGO status in 1984 (Law 
18,348), that law requires the government to first terminate its status as a private 
corporation, which has yet to occur. In the strictest legal sense, the agency is a private 
entity regulated by its own bylaws and Chile’s Civil Code (Centro de Derecho Ambiental 
2002), but is directed by the Ministry of Agriculture (Silva 1996; Neira, Verscheure, and 
Revenga 2002), and retains the obligations of a state agency, including the design, 
monitoring and enforcement of forestry regulations (Centro de Derecho Ambiental 2002). 
Under the 1984 law, it also operates under strict staffing and budget limits (Collins and 
Lear 1995). Given such constraints, it is easy to see why, despite its fairly broad 
responsibilities, it is not considered a powerful department (Silva 1997c; Clapp 1998). 
CONAF’s “dual mandate” (Clapp 1998, p 14) to promote both economic 
development and environmental preservation has been a persistent point of criticism of 
the agency’s portfolio (Cartwright 2002). Many of the country’s persistent forest 
problems have been blamed on this conflict, as well as the incongruity of its broad 
obligations and limited institutional and economic resources (Meller, O'Ryan, and 
                                                                                                                                                 
junta’s privatization program, and was later accused of corruption (O'Brien and Rohter 2004). 
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Solimano 1996; Leslie 1997). CONAF’s challenges of managing the national park system 
has been established (Olander 1999), as have its difficulty monitoring and enforcing 
forestry regulations (Clapp 1998). Anyone wanting to establish a new plantation or cut in 
native forests must submit a management plan for CONAF’s approval, but a 1993 study 
revealed that fewer than a third of all registered management plans were carried out 
(Chile Forestal 1995). It has been estimated that in the Lakes Region, only one of five 
management plans were fully implemented (Chile Forestal 1995). CONAF professionals 
include committed conservationists as well as strong advocates for the forest industry. 
Some of its apparent inability to fully enact forest laws may be attributed to reluctance 
(Fredes 2002). It has been suggested that strengthening the agency’s authority (e.g., 
giving forestry officials the same powers as the police) would be more effective than any 
other reform (CONAF manager Carlos Noton, interviewed in Leslie 1997). 
The Chilean Development Corporation77 (CORFO) was established under the 
Ministry of the Economy in 1939, tasked with deepening and diversifying the country’s 
industrial development (Collins and Lear 1995). Though its capacities were initially 
limited to finance (e.g., credit, favorable interest and foreign exchange rates) and 
brokerage (e.g., guaranteeing markets for private investors), in the 1960s CORFO began 
investing directly in target sectors (including resource extraction78) (Clapp 1995b). 
Today, as the official state investment agency, CORFO remains an important 
player in Chile’s forest industry, providing grants to research in academia and other 
                                                 
77 The Spanish name is the Corporación de Fomento de la Producción. 
78 Celulosa Arauco and Forestal Arauco were both originally established as public-private partnerships in 
the late 1960s (CORFO assumed full ownership in 1972). In the years following the coup, both were 
purchased by COPEC (Compañía de Petroleos de Chile), part of the Angelini Group (Carrere and 
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public institutions (e.g., INFOR, described below), as well as private-sector projects (e.g., 
CertForChile) (van Hensbergen 2001; Centro de Derecho Ambiental 2002; Morales 
2003b). Following D.F.L. 211 (1960) and later amendments, the Corporation has been 
managed by an administrative council headed by the Minister of the Economy (Republica 
de Chile 1960). CORFO has not received a direct budget appropriate since 1996, but is 
instead expected to raise funds through “performance contracts” with government 
ministries (for the provision of public goods, such as research), and goods and services 
contracts with private-sector agents (Mullin et al. 1999). The Corporation currently has 
an endowment of US$3 billion, with assets of US$3.2 billion (US$1.5 billion from its 
remaining joint investments” (CORFO 2005). 
In 1965, S.D. 1416 formally established the Forestry Institute79 (INFOR) to serve 
the technical needs of Chile’s forest industry. The idea of such an entity had evolved 
from a 1961 project between the Chilean government, the Food and Agriculture 
Organization (FAO), and the United Nations Special Fund (INFOR 1997). INFOR’s 
mission is to “support public institutions and private economic agents of the forestry 
sector,” largely through technical assistance and research on the sustainable use of forest 
resources (Centro de Derecho Ambiental 2002, p 11). It is considered the authoritative 
source of analysis and statistical data (Cartwright 2002; Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 
2002). While the institute is formally constituted as a private corporation, and its 
Executive Council is independent of government (INFOR 2002), it depends heavily on 
grants from CORFO, giving that corporation substantial control over its activities 
                                                                                                                                                 
Lohmann 1996). 
79 In Spanish, it is known as the Instituto Forestal . 
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(Morales 2003b). Accordingly, INFOR may be better understood as a QUANGO than a 
fully private organization. 
The National Standards Institute80 (INN) was created to improve the quality of 
goods and services in the Chilean economy, by promulgating and overseeing technical 
standards, quality control, and accurate systems of weights and measures (INN-Chile 
2003). Its predecessor, the Institute of Technical Research and Standardization 
(INDITECNOR) had been established in 1944 as a joint public-private non-profit 
corporation. By the early 1970s, it was funded almost entirely by CORFO, which 
founded INN in 1973. Until 1981, INN was funded entirely through CORFO, which 
remains a significant source of income for the institute81 (ibid.). While INN’s directorate 
is nominally separate from the government, such financial dependency – and the 
government’s exclusive reliance on the institute for many services – suggests that INN is 
not only likely to follow state policies closely, but also be perceived as a semi-
authoritative body by most Chileans. As Chile’s official delegate to the International 
Organization for Standardization (ISO), INN participated in the development of the ISO 
14001 standards, and is responsible for translating those standards should be translated 
and applied in Chile (ibid.). As I show in Chapter 4, INN is also an important actor in the 
implementation of the non-state forest management standard, CertforChile. 
Although Fundación Chile’s current institut ional form means it is likely better 
understood as a private-sector 3rd-party expert service, its public-private origins lead me 
                                                 
80 In Spanish, INN is known as the Instituto Nacional de Normalización. 
81 According to INN’s 2002 Annual Report, CORFO contracts amounted to 11 percent of the Institute’s 
annual income. However, that report also states that over 50 percent of their income in that year followed 
from contracts with the Ministry of the Economy (which heads CORFO’s Board of Directors). Taken 
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to discuss its institutional characteristics here, rather than grouping the Foundation with 
other consulting bodies and academic experts82. In 1974, Pinochet’s Economic Minister 
approached the US-based International Telephone and Telegraph Corporation (ITT) with 
the idea of founding a research and development agency to increase the adoption of 
advanced technologies by Chilean companies (Fundación Chile 2002b). Nearly two years 
later, D.L. 1528 established Fundación Chile and its original bylaws, which tasked the 
institution with identifying new and emerging commercial possibilities, initiating and 
promoting businesses to exploit those opportunities, and otherwise providing technical 
assistance to Chilean businesses (Republica de Chile 1976). By 1999, Fundación Chile 
had started thirty-six such companies, six of which had generated more revenue than the 
total operating costs of the Foundation over its lifetime (Mullin et al. 1999). Although 
ITT continued to provide funds until 1986, the Fundación Chile has been able to cover 
operating costs from investments (including companies started by the Foundation), and 
the sale of technical services83 (Cordua 1994). 
 
3.3.2 First parties: forest management firms 
As a major source of export revenue (US$2.37 billion in 2000), Chile’s forest industry 
enjoys enormous economic power (Christian 1988). Over the past three decades, this has 
translated to significant political power, as the leading companies have consistently found 
                                                                                                                                                 
together, government revenues accounted for over 60 percent of INN’s budget in 2002 (INN-Chile 2003). 
82 In fact, most of those I interviewed in Chile described the Foundation in semi-authoritative terms , 
generally emphasizing its semi -public origins and the Foundation’s strong relationship with Chile’s 
political elite. 
83 A unpublished proportion of which are contracts with government ministries. 
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common cause with the country’s conservative political parties and ruling elite (Silva 
1997b; Fundación Terram 1999). Indeed, for all their success at producing rapid and 
substantial economic growth, many of the forest policies of the Pinochet regime have 
been criticized as serving to consolidate that industry, serving Chile’s wealthy before the 
needs of the majority of landowners (Clapp 1995b; Quiroga 1996). As discussed earlier, 
D.L. 701 subsidies (US$131 million through 1993) tended to benefit large companies 
(Mery 1996; Quiroga 1996). Since the rapid rate of reforestation and aforestation84 also 
made suitable land scarce, subsidies also tended to increase land prices, deepening 
industry consolidation (Wisecarver and Tardones 1989). Today, over half the country’s 
tree plantation estate is owned by just two corporations, Forestal Arauco and Forestal 
Mininco (Cerda et al. 2002). 
D.L. 701 subsidies and privatization of state-owned enterprises enabled the largest 
grupos85 to acquire enormous plantation and forest estates, as well as the industrial 
infrastructure (e.g., pulp, paper and timber mills) to create gigantic, vertically integrated 
forest conglomerates (Carrere and Lohmann 1996; Cartwright 1998). Consolidation and 
the capital- intensive nature of contemporary Chilean forestry means that the industry 
provides relatively few jobs, given the income generated by the sector (Mery, Kengen, 
and Lujan 2001). In 1999, INFOR estimated that only 57,000 people were directly 
employed in forestry (including transportation and other services) (Lignum 2001d). The 
majority of Chile’s forest exports are either unprocessed or semi-processed goods (e.g., 
                                                 
84 Aforestation is the practice of establishing trees in areas which were not previously forested. 
85 Chile’s wealthy elite have been described as a “small, tight-knit group with interlocking interests and 
holdings, with alliances cemented by marriages” (Clapp 1995b), p 282). Known as “grupos,” these families 
dominate the Chilean economy (Monckeberg 2001). 
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pulp, chips, lumber) (Carrere and Lohmann 1996); since these have little added value, 
most of these are low-skill, low-wage jobs (Mery, Kengen, and Lujan 2001). 
Despite the explosive growth of the sector, domestic forest product markets 
remain inconsequential (Mery 1996). Since the collapse of Chile’s Asian markets in 1998 
(Becker and Rohter 2002), the United States has become the industry’s largest market 
(US$622 million), a trend facilitated by their 2002 trade agreement (see Figure 3.4). This 
amounts to thirty-seven percent of all Chilean forest products exports (Lignum 2003c). 
Pulp and paper are the largest subsector within the industry (Morales 2003b), but trends 
suggest that the industry is beginning to invest in more value-added production (Lignum 
2002e). Since the major markets for these higher-priced products are in North America 
and Europe (which tend to demand greater environmental safeguards), incentives to 
demonstrate environmental sustainability (i.e., certification) are increasing, as well (Otero 
and Maluenda 1998; Lignum 2001a). Over the past fifteen years, the largest forestry 
companies have attempted to project a “green” public image at home and abroad, 
emphasizing concern for the environment, even as they have worked tirelessly to increase 
their political leverage and minimize state regulatory requirements (Silva 1997b). 
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Figure 3.4: Export Markets 
 
“Arauco” is the common nickname of the group of industrial, forestry and 
commercial companies owned by Celulosa Arauco y Constitución SA, which is itself 
owned by the Chilean conglomerate Grupo Angelini (Carrere and Lohmann 1996). 
Celulosa Arauco was founded by the state development corporation (CORFO) with a 
sixty percent share86 in 1967; similar investments established Celulosa Constitución 
(Clapp 1995b) and Forestal Arauco (a subsidiary of Celulosa Arauco) two years later 
(Arauco 2003). CORFO acquired the remaining shares in 1972, but the companies were 
purchased by the conglomerate Compañía de Petroleos de Chile87 (COPEC) in the first 
wave of privatizations following the coup (Carrere and Lohmann 1996). The companies 
were formally merged in 1979 (Arauco 2003). 
                                                 
86 The private investor was US-based Parsons & Whittemore (Carrere and Lohmann 1996). 
87 Established as a state oil company in 1934, COPEC later formed the core business of grupo Angelini, 
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Although Arauco owned only 64,000 hectares in 1976 (Carrere and Lohmann 
1996), today the company is Chile’s largest forest landowner (over 630 thousand 
hectares) (Arauco 2003). In 2001, the conglomerate’s gross sales were US$1,139 million 
(US$140 million net) (Celulosa Arauco y Constitución SA 2001). Arauco is actively 
developing new markets; in the last decade, it established subsidiaries in both the United 
States and Europe (Arauco 2001). Given the generally high environmental concern of 
these consumers (Otero and Maluenda 1998), Arauco has also worked hard to cultivate a 
“green” image, acquiring ISO 14.001 certification in 2001, and contributing significant 
resources (both financial and technical) to the development of the CertforChile forest 
management standard (Arauco 2001). 
Chile’s second-largest forest products conglomerate, CMPC88, was established in 
1920 (CMPC 2005b). Its current holdings include Forestal Mininco, which manages a 
forest estate of more than 420 thousand hectares (mostly radiata and eucalyptus 
plantations). In 2003, CMPC’s gross sales were US$846 million, though Mininco 
reported a loss of US$460 thousand that same year (CMPC 2005a) Forestal Mininco 
2003). Mininco has been keenly interested in protecting and expanding its foreign 
markets, opening a US office in 2003 (Lignum 2003c). They have also been one of the 
most active private firms in Chile’s certification efforts, working closely with Fundación 
Chile staff throughout CertFor’s development. 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
Chile’s largest conglomerate (Clapp 1995b; Carrere and Lohmann 1996). 
88 CMPC’s full name is Compañía Manufacturera de Papeles y Cartones. 
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As of December 2005, seventeen89 other Chilean forest firms have been certified 
to FSC, CertFor or both standards (see Figure 3.5). Forestal Monteáguila SA (FAMASA) 
is the only Chilean forest company certified under both systems; it also manages the 
largest FSC-certified property. Another important certified firm is Terranova, which 
manufactures doors and moldings, selling directly to retailers (earning US$296 million in 
2002) (Business Wire 2004). Over 2,036,000 hectares are now certified in Chile, 
amounting to over 13 percent of the total forest estate (and at least 60 percent of the more 
economically important plantation estate) (CertFor 2004; FSC 2006; CONAF 2006). 
 
Figure 3.5: Certified FMUs in Chile 90 
 
                                                 
89 Both Forestal Celco and Forestal Valdivia SA are managed by Bosques Arauco SA (Arauco 2003). 
90 This graphic excludes FMUs with less than 1,000 hectares certified to either system. See Appendix VI 
for a complete listing of FSC and CertFor-certified firms in Chile. 
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3.3.3 Second parties: industrial associations, manufacturing, retail 
Founded in 1955, the Chilean Wood Corporation91 (CORMA) is the principal industrial 
association of forest owners. Its mission is to represent its members’ interests and 
promote the development of the country’s forest industry (CORMA 2005). It serves as 
the industry’s principal liaison to government, and given the enormous economic 
importance of the sector, wields “considerable” political power (Neira, Verscheure, and 
Revenga 2002). 
As I describe in the next chapter, the principal means of connecting producers and 
consumers in NSMD systems is the so-called “chain-of-custody,” which is essentially a 
monitored tracking system to ensure that only materials produced under the standards of 
a given system bear its label. Without the  chain-of-custody, forest products consumers 
would have no guarantee that the products they purchase originate from well-managed 
forests (Kant 2001; Archer, Kozak, and Balsillie 2005). As of January 2006, FSC and 
CertFor websites list thirty-five chain-of-custody companies in Chile (see Appendix VI), 
though others92 also operate in Chile (e.g., Anderson Windows, Tembec) (El Mercurio 
2003; Herbert 2003). Currently, there are nine CertFor-certified chain-of-custody 
companies; almost half produce higher-value goods through some form of 
manufacturing, but a majority focus on low value-added products (e.g., lumber, 
roundwood93, wood chips and pulp) (see Figure 3.6). This difference is important for at 
                                                 
91 In Spanish, CORMA’s full name is the Corporación Nacional de la Madera . 
92 Identifying all such companies working in a given country is exceptionally difficult, since both systems 
identify certificate holders only by the national standards under which they were originally audited, and 
many of the most active chain-of-custody companies operate in multiple countries. 
93 Roundwood  is the forest industry term for raw logs, while lumber has been milled (Dykstra and Heinrich 
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least two reasons : first, since producers are more likely to sell higher-valued goods 
directly to consumers or retailers, the chains-of-custody for such products are likely to be 
somewhat shorter. Second, if we assume that auditing costs are similar regardless of the 
goods produced, it is easier to internalize such costs in higher-value goods, since the 
same increase would be a smaller proportion of the sale price. With this in mind, it is also 
interesting to note that only one of CertFor-certified company produces high value-added 
goods (PROMOSA) (see Appendix VI). 
 
Figure 3.6: Value-added by Chile’s Chain-of-custody Companies 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                 
1997). 
 97 
3.3.4 Third parties: civil society groups, expert services 
Despite claims that “there are few NGOs in Chile” (Morales 2003b, p 9), Chile has a 
vibrant environmental movement that dates back to the 1960s (though most organizations 
were founded within the last two decades). Though the movement as a whole represents a 
range of interests, it is generally not perceived as especially radical (Rojas 1994). During 
military rule, environmental groups were a safe way for citizens to challenge government 
policies, since protecting Chile’s environment was seen as essentially patriotic and not a 
direct threat to the regime (ibid.). Such groups have been an important means of 
communicating civil society’s concerns (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002), and 
improving government responsiveness to perceived environmental problems (Price 
1994). Chilean ENGOs are concerned with a range of forest issues, from protecting and 
conserving rare species and ecosystems, to improving the management of commercial 
forests. To achieve these goals, they pursue a variety of strategies, from public education 
campaigns and capacity building for small-scale landowners, to implementing and 
monitoring state-based and non-state forest policies (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 
2002). 
Chile’s oldest environmental organization, founded in 1968, is the Committee for 
the Defense of Flora and Fauna94 (CODEFF 2005). As its name implies, CODEFF is 
principally concerned with problems that emerge from the exploitation of Chile’s natural 
resources. Through decades of original research, policy advocacy, and public awareness 
campaigns, the group has become one of Chile’s most important ENGOs (Silva 1996; 
Camus and Hajek 1998). Combining respected scientific expertise with political 
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moderation, CODEFF has been particularly effective in pursuing its agenda, even during 
the years of military rule (Clapp 1998). CODEFF has taken a leading role in the 
development of local FSC standards, initiating and serving as convener for those 
processes (Verscheure 2002). 
The National Ecological Action Network95 (RENACE) was created following a 
1988 meeting of Chilean anti-nuclear and human rights NGOs in Mar del Plata, 
Argentina. As an umbrella organization for 140 ENGOs based throughout Chile (the 
smallest of which may have only 2-3 members), the Network provides a means of sharing 
information and resources, as well as coordination (RENACE 2003). Since its member 
organizations are both dispersed and diverse, the Network is more difficult to 
characterize (in terms of goals and strategies) than a single, unified organization. In the 
past, RENACE has been singled out for criticism by the native forest industry, and has 
been somewhat less successful than other ENGOs in influencing state policy (Clapp 
1998). 
Defenders of the Chilean Forest96 was founded in 1993 by biologist Adriana 
Hoffman (former Director of CONAMA) and several other famous Chileans 97 (Clapp 
1998). Its mission is to educate the public about Chile’s native forests, to mobilize 
support to protect the country’s old-growth forests, end the export of wood chips from 
                                                                                                                                                 
94 The Spanish translation is the Comité de Defensa de Flora y Fauna. 
95 In Spanish, RENACE stands for the Red Nacional de Accion Eco1ógica . 
96 Translated, this becomes the Defensores del Bosque Chileno . 
97 Other founders include outgoing Chilean President Ricardo Lagos, and many famous writers and artists. 
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natural forests, and to restore Chile’s secondary forests98 (Brownie 2002). A highly active 
and high-profile organization, Defensores catalogues and analyzes examples of “best 
practices” of sustainable management in secondary forests, value-added strategies for the 
products of native forests, and runs a training program and technical support network for 
the owners of small-scale native forests (ibid.). 
While international environmental groups have actively sought to influence 
Chile’s environmental agenda since the return to democracy, relatively few have 
established local offices (e.g., Greenpeace). Others have supported local organizations by 
focusing international attention on environmental problems within Chile, sometimes in 
tandem with local groups. Those known to have an interest in Chilean NSMD policies are 
Greenpeace-Chile, Global Forestry Watch, the World Wildlife Fund and ForestEthics. 
Although these groups have been less significant players in the development of NSMD 
systems in Chile, ForestEthics’ market campaign99 in 2002 was a direct effort to promote 
awareness of the FSC system in both Chile and the United States. 
Chile also has a thriving market for “environmental services” firms, which are 
often hired to help companies reduce their environmental impacts and otherwise fulfill 
regulatory requirements (Maggi and Kern 2000). As I explain in the following chapter, 
                                                 
98 “Secondary forests” are those which re-grow (or are re-established) after “old growth” forests are 
destroyed (through harvest or natural disturbance) (Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002). 
99 In late July, 2002 ForestEthics announced a campaign to promote FSC certification in Chile (El Diario 
2002); it was immediately attacked as a boycott on all Chilean producers by CORMA (MINAGRI 2002). 
Three months later, ForestEthics purchased a full-page ad in the New York Times (with a picture of a 
suburban home amid a Chilean “clearcut”) to encourage consumers to purchase only wood with the FSC 
label (ForestEthics 2002a, b). The ad appeared only in the paper’s Eastern edition (González 2002; La 
Nacion 2002a), but since Chile was in the final stages of negotiating a free trade agreement with the United 
States, the Chilean government and CORMA were especially sensitive to its possible impact (Nixon 
2004b). 
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this is especially true for the growing use of NSMD policy systems, for which expert 
services are expected to perform critical tasks (EPA 1998). There are currently six firms 
in Chile that are FSC or CertFor-accredited to certify forest management or chain-of-
custody firms: QMI, SGS, SmartWood, SCS, Woodmark, and IMO. QMI (Quality 
Management Institute), has certified the most forestland of any auditor in Chile (an area 
more than twice the size of Rhode Island) (CertFor 2006), and is also a major certifier for 
industry-designed certification standards in Canada and the United States (FERN 2001). 
SGS QUALIFOR100 has certified over 15 million hectares and 190 forestry operations 
worldwide, and more than 1,000 chain-of-custody certificates in sixty-plus countries 
(SGS QUALIFOR 2006). Worldwide, SGS QUALIFOR has certified more land than any 
other auditing service (Thornber 1999); in Chile it is second only to QMI. It is also the 
only company in Chile accredited by both FSC and CertFor Chile. 
SmartWood (founded in 1989 by the Rainforest Alliance) developed the world’s 
first sustainable forestry certification scheme, and was instrumental in establishing the 
FSC in 1993 (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). Based in Vermont, it is now the 
leading non-profit certifier, with the highest number of certificates issued worldwide 
(Thornber 1999; Rainforest Alliance 2006). California-based Scientific Certification 
Systems (SCS) also developed its own forest certification program in the early 90s (the 
SCS Forest Conservation Program), and was soon accredited as an FSC-certifier (SCS 
2006). In 2004, SCS again began to provide its own “non-aligned” forest management 
certification (SCS Independent), intended as an alternative to other “potentially 
                                                 
100 Incorporated in South Africa, SGS began as the French grain inspection service Société Générale de 
Surveillance (SGS 2006). 
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polarizing” certification systems (SCS 2006). SCS has currently certified only one forest 
company in Chile, the subsidiary of a company it had previously certified in New 
Zealand (SCS 2003; FSC 2006a). Woodmark is the forest management and chain-of-
custody certifier of the UK Soil Association, an NGO founded in 1946 around the issues 
of environmental and human health as they relate to farming practices (Soil Association 
2005). Accredited by the FSC in 1994, Woodmark is managed by EcoSylva Ltd., a UK-
based international environmental consultancy that specializes in sustainable forestry 
(Soil Association 2003). Finally, the Switzerland-based IMO (Institute for 
Marketecology), with a twenty-year history of certifying organic agriculture at the 
international level (IMO 2005), has certified the largest number of forest management 
units of all certifiers working in Chile (FSC 2006b). 
 
3.4 Major issues in Chilean forestry 
Like many societies in the developing world, concern for environmental issues in Chile is 
a relatively recent phenomenon; most of this awareness has developed around issues 
directly affecting the majority of Chilean citizens, such as air and water pollution. 
Forestry issues have often been the topic of national debate101, but some in the forest 
industry have claimed that many citizens believe environmental damage is “exaggerated, 
or claimed to be self-corrective, either by market forces or by natural processes over 
time” (Caldwell 1997). In fact, industry support for forest certification has been self-
                                                 
101 In 1997, the Televisión Nacional network (TVN) broadcast the very popular Oro Verde (“Green Gold”), 
a soap opera about a conflict between a fictional logging company (portrayed as greedy and insensitive to 
Chile’s natural beauty) and a small band of environmentalists. The show helped raise TVN’s ratings to 
nearly double that of its nearest competitors (La Tercera 1997). 
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described as a response to the “environmental sensibilities” of Chileans who want to see 
the country on a par with developed countries (Guillermo Geisse, quoted in Lignum 
2001c, p 41). 
There are a number of historical and ongoing fault lines dividing those most 
concerned with Chile’s forests and forest industry. Among the oldest of these is the 
question of balancing native forests and expansion of the tree plantation estate. By law, 
natural forests cannot be cut without a CONAF-approved management plan (Brownie 
2002), but in reality few native forests are managed this well (Cloues 1990; Timber and 
Wood Products 1998). Reforestation has long been framed in terms of soil conservation 
(e.g., recovering “exhausted” agricultural soils) (Sandoval 2003b), but the practice of 
establishing monocultural plantations has led even forest industry supporters to raise 
concerns about the risk of disease outbreaks (Morales 2003b). While many 
environmentalists are concerned with lower biodiversity in these plantations, more often 
disputes center on the dominance of exotic species (e.g., pine, eucalyptus) in repla nting 
efforts (Altieri and Rojas 1998; Flynn 2002), or perhaps most often, the decline of native 
forests (and the associated biodiversity) throughout Chile (Corcuera, Sepúlveda, and 
Geisse 2002; Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002). 
From the late 1980s through the mid-1990s, most concern about native forest 
protection focused on the exploding wood chip industry, which grew more than 150 
percent each year between 1989 and 1995 (Canihuante 1997). The industry’s expansion 
was facilitated by a 1985 law (No 18.480), which offered a ten-percent subsidy for “non-
traditional” exports (Republica de Chile 1985; Lowy 1995). Most wood chips were 
exported to supply Japan’s papermaking industry; since plantation species do not produce 
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high-quality paper (both pine and eucalyptus are softwoods), the industry was 
overwhelmingly supplied by hardwoods (i.e., native forests) (Crawford 1990). Since 
commercial use of native forests requires an approved management plan, applications for 
these grew more than fifteen-fold over the same period, far outstripping CONAF’s 
limited monitoring and enforcement capacity (Collins and Lear 1995). To cover the 
mushrooming enforcement costs, in 1990 CONAF began levying a US$1 per ton tax on 
sawmills (ibid.). 
Although concern about the effects of such explosive growth has been critiqued 
by the forest industry as an example of European and American “imperialism,” 
(Guillermo Güell, president of CORMA, quoted in Crawford 1990), by 1994, concerns 
about long-term sustainability led the World Bank to fund an environmental audit by the 
Chilean Central Bank (Fundación Terram 1999). The study found that “given the 
primitive methods of forest management still common in Chile – wholesale cutting and 
burning, without reforestation – there might be no trees left worth felling within 25-30 
years” (Economist 1996). The study was strongly attacked by both the government and 
the forest industry (Woods 2001), but a second study (this time by the French State 
Forestry Agency) largely confirmed the initial report (Economist 1996). It was not until a 
national forest inventory was completed in 1997 that the industry was able to directly 
counter claims that native forests were in dangerous decline102 (O'Ryan and Fierro 2000; 
Ministerio de Agricultura 2002). 
 
                                                 
102 Though this comprehensive survey appears to have been rigorously conducted, many Chilean 
environmentalists discount the results, arguing that “improvements” are merely an artifact of changes to the 
definition of what constitutes a “viable” native forest (interviews with author). 
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All of this controversy over the management of Chile’s native forests has led to 
considerable interest in state regulation of native forests. However, disagreement about 
what this should entail (with ENGOs favoring strict rules, and forest industry interests 
typically resisting such efforts) has made it impossible for legislators to pass such a law. 
Alternative proposals for a “Native Forest Law” emerged periodically throughout the 
1990s, but the passion and political power on both sides of the debate kept each from 
being passed and signed into law (Clapp 1998). Concerns about the distributional and 
equity effects of such a law (native forests are important resources for Chile’s rural poor 
and are culturally significant to the country’s indigenous communities) have complicated 
this process even further. It is in part in reaction to this impasse that forest certification 
was embraced by both ENGO and industry interests in Chile (discussed in Section 4.1 of 
the following chapter). 
While issues of land ownership are more systemic in nature (and thus not limited 
to forestry), they have often been exacerbated by Chile’s forest policies, as well as by the 
attitudes and actions of forest industry actors. The most dramatic of these (in terms of 
area) is the extreme concentration of reforested lands: half of all tree plantations are 
owned by just two companies, Arauco and Mininco (Carrere and Lohmann 1996; Arnold 
2003). Such concentration has been justified as a necessary means of ensuring consistent 
supplies (Collins and Lear 1995), but it is also a contentious byproduct of D.L. 701. Just 
three companies received more than half of all subsidies (Cloues 1990); Arauco alone 
owns nearly twenty percent of the land planted under D.L. 701 (Collins and Lear 1995). 
By comparison, fewer than five percent of smallholders (those owning less than 50 
hectares) were able to benefit from the subsidies. Large tree planters have also been 
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accused of pressuring smallholders to sell their land, restricting right-of-ways and 
employment opportunities (Quiroga 1996). Concentration of forest lands has thus made 
rural Chileans dependent on these large companies, even though the increased exports 
have not been matched by a growth in forest industry jobs. The military government’s 
animosity to organized labor effectively destroyed forestry unions; today, most forest 
labor is part-time, or contracted to third-parties (Collins and Lear 1995). 
Again, Chile has a problematic history with its indigenous peoples. Today, about 
three percent of Chileans (approximately 900,000) have native heritage (mostly 
Araucanian or Mapuche), and as is true throughout the hemisphere, indigenous people 
suffer from widespread discrimination and poverty (Silva 2002). Those who continue to 
live in or near their ancestral lands have had ongoing – and sometimes violent – conflicts 
with forestry companies and non- indigenous smallholders over tenure claims (Mery 
1996; Neira, Verscheure, and Revenga 2002). While the Pinochet’s government’s 
emphasis on private property rights and free markets directly conflicted with Mapuche 
cultural values, democratic governments have since implemented policies that attempt to 
redress indigenous grievances, including purchasing ancestral lands from forest 
companies (Silva 2002) and protecting species of particular cultural significance (Clapp 
1998). 
Having laid out the political and economic context of Chilean forestry and state-
based forest regulation, I now turn to the emergence of two alternative NSMD forest 
policy models in Chile. After relating the origins of forest certification at the international 
level, I will offer detailed descriptions of the accreditation, auditing and certification 
procedures of both FSC and CertFor, interpreting both systems as formal networks of 
 106 
delegation and information, as I have done in this chapter. I then formally contrast both 
state and NSMD policy designs in Chilean forestry, and offer preliminary suggestions 
about what these results might mean in terms of the expected reliability of each as a 
means of policy delivery. 
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4 FOREST CERTIFICATION IN CHILE 
[I]n this moment we face the possibility of leaving behind decades of 
degradation of our forests, and the related environmental and social 
conflicts. What is more interesting is that this will not be due to the force 
of one institution or person, but to the effort of all actors linked to the 
forest sector, articulated around a tool that permits economic activity, 
while protecting the environment in a context of social justice and 
efficient production. 
 
Hernán Verscheure, CODEFF Forest Program Director, 
ICEFI Working Group Coordinator, 
from Verscheure 2002, p 8 
 
We are anticipating a requirement that will soon appear across all external 
markets for forest products. ... Certification is also a response to the 
environmental sensibilities of those Chileans who have pushed to become 
equals to developed nations. 
 
Guillermo Geisse, Director of CIPMA, 
President of the CertFor Superior Council, 
quoted in Lignum 2001, p 41 
 
In the mid-1970s, concern about the state of the world’s forests (especially in the tropics, 
but temperate and boreal forests, as well) began to spur activism on a global scale. 
Governments and international organizations responded to these pressures by attempting 
to draft agreements on the trade of forest resources, and emphasizing “sustainable” 
development assistance to tropical countries (Murphy and Bendell 1999). In 1983, the 
first ever international commodity agreement to include conservation measures – the 
International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) – was signed at the UN Conference on 
Tropical Timber (Sizer 1994). 
Non-state actors were active in these processes as well. In 1985, the World 
Resources Institute joined FAO, UNDP, and the World Bank in establishing the Tropical 
Forestry Action Program (TFAP), an effort to coordinate funding for the development of 
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National Forestry Action Plans (Rice, Sugal, and Bowles 1999). It is widely believed that 
the poor record of the ITTA and TFAP – as well as the failure to reach a binding global 
forest treaty at the 1992 Earth Summit – were the driving factors behind the rise of active 
NGO and industrial involvement in the development of market-based alternatives to such 
international agreements (Dudley 1995; Elliott 1999). 
In 1988103, Friends of the Earth UK published the Good Wood Guide to promote 
“environmentally or socially sensitive” forest products (Donovan 1996). Unfortunately, 
the organization had no way of guaranteeing that suppliers were following sustainable 
practices. Then, British craftsman Hubert Kwisthout set upon the idea of independently 
certifying forest companies to rigorous standards (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). 
Kwisthout promoted his idea to environmental NGOs, who in 1989 (along with the 
British government) asked the ITTO to study the plausibility of labeling tropical woods 
(Elliott 1999), and established a certification working group with the retail giant B&Q104 
(Jones 2001). In 1990, the Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood program issued the word’s 
first forest management certificate, to a company in Indonesia (Donovan 1996). A year 
later, Home Depot began selling SmartWood-certified non-timber forest products (Eisen 
1996). 
In the spring of 1991, the idea of a Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) was 
proposed at a meeting of wood consumers, traders, environmentalists, and human rights 
organizations in California. An organizational charter was written within a month, and by 
                                                 
103 A detailed timeline of the development of forest certification (with special emphasis on Chile) can be 
found in Appendix III. 
104 B&Q is one of Britain’s largest retail chains, akin to Home Depot in the United States (Thomson 2005). 
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July, a first draft of the FSC’s Principles and Criteria was finished (FSC 2003). The 
following spring, an interim board was elected in Washington, DC and began organizing 
a founding assembly (Elliott and Donovan 1996), which convened in Toronto in the first 
days of October, 1993. Over 130 participants from 25 countries attended, electing a 
Board of Directors that was tasked with developing rules and procedures for the 
organization, and pursuing extensive stakeholder consultations (Upton and Bass 1996). 
After a Secretariat was established in Oaxaca the following August, the membership 
approved the FSC’s original statutes105, principles and criteria (FSC 2003). 
Although NGOs have always been key players in FSC’s development, forest 
products companies have also been important. The FSC is a membership organization, 
with a three-chamber governance structure (environmental, social, and economic), each 
of which is further divided into northern and southern hemisphere groupings. The system 
follows an essentially corporatist model106, with each sub-section and chamber having 
equal voting shares, regardless of the number of members in each (FSC 2002a). Thus, the 
relatively fewer forest company members from the global south have the same voting 
power as northern companies, as well as environmental or social chamber members from 
either hemisphere (FSC 2002b). 
As the first global-scale NSMD governance system, the FSC has led the 
movement for stakeholder-based standards, with compliance verified by third-party 
assessors (Counsell 1999). As a label-based system, the FSC system was designed to 
                                                 
105 FSC’s implementation system is detailed later in this chapter. 
106 Marina Ottaway, who appears to be the first person to make this observation, argues that 
institutionalized cooperation between industry and civil society organizations threatens to weaken the best 
capabilities of each (Ottaway 2001). 
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achieve market premiums 107 for compliant forestry firms; label integrity is guaranteed 
through a “chain of custody,” where both harvester and processor firms are certified to 
system standards (FSC 1999c). These three features – stakeholder involvement, third-
party monitoring, and “forest-to-store” tracking – have come to be seen as cornerstones 
of any trusted NSMD system (Frostbauer and Parker 1996; Archer, Kozak, and Balsillie 
2005). 
Since 1993, a number of alternative NSMD approaches have been developed to 
influence the management of temperate forests. These include the Canadian Standards 
Association and Sustainable Forest Initiative (SFI), as well as the Europe’s Programme 
for the Endorsement of Forest Certification108 (PEFC), each founded by forest industry 
interests as alternatives to the FSC system (Simula et al. 2001; Anderson and Hansen 
2003). Though most have been country-level responses (and thus less relevant to Chilean 
producers), the PEFC was established as an international alternative (Gulbrandsen 2004). 
Designed as a “mutual-recognition” framework, the PEFC allows for national- level 
variations on its general standards, and offers a common label to those certified under 
recognized member systems (PEFC 2005). 
In the rest of this chapter, I describe the early history of forest certification in 
Chile, and the establishment of working groups for the FSC and the Chilean industry’s 
alternative system, CertFor. As with the major state-based forestry regulations of the 
previous chapter, I provide detailed overviews of both NSMD policies, and map the 
                                                 
107 However, higher prices and larger markets are goals, not institutional features (CCIF 2002). 
108 Until the PEFC expanded its membership to non-European producers in 2003, it was known as Pan-
European Forest Certification  (Gulbrandsen 2004). 
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principal-agent relationships stipulated in the implementation designs of both these 
systems. Having established formal models of the relevant state and non-state systems 
currently operating in Chile, I then address the four structural hypotheses proposed in 
Chapter 2: determinacy, political breadth, and both sequential and parallel complexity. 
After revisiting one critical instrumental element of both NSMD systems (the chain-of-
custody), I offer preliminary conclusions about the expected impact of these structural 
variables on the ability of each policy design to produce reliable outcomes. 
 
4.1 The emergence of forest certification in Chile 
Chilean forestry has drawn the attention of local and international civil society 
organizations, industrial interests, academic and professional scientists, as well as 
politicians, state ministries, and international institutions (Kaimowitz 1996). Chile’s 
export-oriented economic strategy, in the context of growing environmental concern in 
destination markets (principally Europe and North-America) has meant that producers 
have begun to seek means of demonstrating their commitment to sustainable management 
in ways that can be communicated to those distant consumers (Lignum 2001f; CertFor 
2002b). Because of Chile’s high profile in policymaking circles, these efforts have the 
potential to affect areas far beyond the country’s physical boundaries; both developed and 
developing nations are carefully watching the Chilean experience (Nef 1995; Maggi and 
Kern 2000). 
Certification was first mentioned in Chilean public media in April 1994, just over 
six months after FSC’s founding. Initially, interest primarily focused on state-based 
certification of forest management (Estrategia 1994b, a), though that summer ProChile 
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and the German Development Institute held a seminar on sustainable forestry and 
ecolabeling (Lagos T 1994). Both INFOR and Fundación Chile are said to have been 
interested in the topic as early as 1996 (Elliott and Donovan 1996), but I have found no 
other evidence suggesting certification-related activity in Chile during the following three 
years. 
In June of 1997, CONAF and INFOR formed the Working Group for Sustainable 
Forest Management, which included CORMA, CONAMA, and the Foreign Relations 
Ministry. After extensive debate, NGOs such as Defensores del Bosque Chileno, 
CODEFF, Agrupación de Ingenieros Forestales por el Bosque Nativo (Association of 
Foresters for the Native Forest), and CIFAG (the Chilean Forester Association) were later 
asked to participate (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Schlegel and Echeverria 2001b). Funded 
by a European Community grant (Cerda and Lira 2001), the group sought consensus 
about “the meaning of sustainable forest management in the Chilean context” (Arnold 
2003, p 323). While this group was not explicitly focused on certification or market-
based solutions, lessons learned from this process later informed the development of 
CertFor’s standards (CertFor 2001b). 
That November, the Director of SmartWood was invited to Chile to present a 
seminar on certification and the sustainable management of native forests (Chile Forestal 
1997, 1998). Within six months, CODEFF had organized a Working Group to develop 
national FSC standards (FSC 1999b). Known as the Iniciativa Chilena de Certificacion 
Forestal Independiente (ICEFI), the founders included more than thirty Chilean NGOs, 
institutions and businesses (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Schlegel and Echeverria 2001a). 
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Initially, Chilean industrial leaders resisted the idea of forest certification, 
believing that any demand for certified products was limited to a few environmental 
groups, an insignificant consumer block (Gayoso 2002). However, after Home Depot 
established Chilean offices and declared a “no old-growth timber” policy in 1999 (Bond 
1999; Miranda 2002b), industry’s position softened. Certification (in the general sense) 
came to be seen as a means of protecting or expanding Chilean marketshare in North 
American and European markets109 (Lignum 2001c; CertFor 2002d). By late 1999, the 
forest industry was publicly promoting the idea of certification (Estrategia  2000; El Sur 
de Concepción 2002). Perhaps not coincidentally, Chile and the United States entered 
bilateral trade talks the following month (USTR 2002). 
The Chilean industry’s solution – following the lead of their counterparts in 
Northern countries – was to develop and promote an alternative program, to compete 
directly with the FSC. In the first days of 2001, the CertFor Working Group was 
officially formed (CertFor 2001b). There are currently two NSMD approaches competing 
for “marketshare” within the Chilean forest industry: FSC and CertFor Chile (each 
described in detail below). The relative merits of these programs is an issue of great 
contention in the Chilean forestry industry, and is regularly discussed within the popular 
media (Montalbetti 2002; Sus tainable Chile 2002b). It has been claimed – similar to what 
had occurred with the failure to reach international agreements – that both emerged as 
alternatives to persistent impasses in state-based policy processes. Rather than face a 
                                                 
109 Again, the United States is Chile’s largest single market, thirty-seven percent (US$622 million) of the 
country’s forest exports (Lignum 2003c). 
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perpetual stalemate in public fora110, it was agreed that forestry “should be regulated by 
private agreements between resource owners and social interest groups, without 
additional legal restrictions of property rights” (Arnold 2003, p 323, citing interviews 
with Fernando Raga and Hernán Verscheure)111. Today, Chile is among the world’s 
leading countries, in terms of the proportion of productive forests under some form of 
certification (Raga 2002b), with more than 13 percent of all forests (and at least 60 
percent of tree plantations) certified under either the FSC or CertFor systems (CertFor 
2004; FSC 2006; CONAF 2006). 
 
4.2 ICEFI: the Chilean FSC Working Group 
The FSC system was developed at the global level, but it is also designed to allow for 
standards developed by local stakeholders112 (Nilson 2001). These “working groups” 
must reflect FSC’s approach to governance (with separate social, economic and 
environmental chambers), and be democratic, transparent and open to all interested 
stakeholders (FSC 1998). The directorate of Chile’s FSC Working Group thus includes 
representatives of forestry companies, unions, academics, and a number of NGOs113, 
elected for two-year terms (Verscheure 2002; Lignum 2003b). The ICEFI directorate is 
responsible for overseeing the process of developing local standards, ensuring these 
                                                 
110 See the discussion on recurring efforts to develop and enact a Native Forest Law, in Section 3.8 of the 
preceding chapter. 
111 Raga is the Development Manager for Forestal Mininco and Vice President of CORMA, both of which 
have been strong supporters of the CertFor process. 
112 Until local standards are approved, FSC allows certifiers to apply pre-approved “interim” standards, 
based on local ecological and social contexts (FSC 1998, Part 3.2 Sec. 2.2.3). 
113 See Appendix V for a full listing of the ICEFI directorate members. 
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comply with FSC’s Principles and Criteria, and serving as the main liaison with the FSC 
secretariat, which reserves final authority to recognize local standards (FSC 1998). 
In Chile, the task of developing local FSC forest management standards has been 
divided into two technical committees: one focused on plantation management, and 
another on native forests (a third is concerned with public outreach and communications) 
(FSC 1999b). These committees began work in September of 1999 (Voces del Bosque 
2002), a year after the Working Group was elected, and six months after the group had 
voted to apply to FSC for recognition as a national initiative (FSC 1999b). The technical 
committees developed draft standards, which were then subject to public review, field 
tests, and a vote by the full ICEFI membership, prior to being presented to the FSC 
secretariat for recognition (Lignum 2003b). The democratic nature of the process can be 
contentious 114 and quite time consuming – ICEFI opened the draft standards for public 
review in May of 2004, but only recently finished the second period of public 
consultation, over four years after the process began (ICEFI 2005). Similarly, ICEFI was 
only officially recognized as a national initiative at FSC’s 10th anniversary, held in Bonn 
in September 2004 (ICEFI 2004a). 
Fortunately, FSC also permits forests to be certified under pre-approved “interim” 
standards until local standards are approved (FSC 1998). SGS issued Chile’s first FSC 
certificate to Forestal Monteáguila (FAMASA) on January 5, 2001 (SGS QUALIFOR 
2000). As of May 2005, over fifteen Chilean FMUs had been FSC-certified, for a total of 
                                                 
114 The Chilean environmental community has not uniformly supported the local standards. Disputes center 
on whether plantations should be called forests, how spontaneous regrowth of native trees should be 
accounted for within plantation management systems, and the fact that even-aged management (i.e., clear-
cutting) is being discussed as an acceptable management technique within the Working Group. This last 
issue has led Defensores del Bosque Chileno to resign from the plantation standards committee, though not 
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423,553 hectares (FSC 2006a). 
 
4.2.1 The FSC System 
FSC implementation has three basic components: certifier accreditation; forest 
management unit (FMU) certification; and chain-of-custody (COC) certification. The 
accreditation and FMU certification systems are each designed to guarantee that forest 
managers follow FSC Standards, through monitoring by licensed third-party auditors 
(Crossley 1996). In this section, I describe and graph the authority and informational 
relationships between principals and agents for each sub-system in turn. 
The FSC accreditation process (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1) begins when a firm 
wishing to become an FSC certifier applies to the secretariat. FSC representatives first 
visit the offices of the applicant firm to assess their management systems and consult 
with stakeholders, after which the evaluation team leader prepares a preliminary audit 
report. This is reviewed by FSC executives, who identify any non-conformities with FSC 
policy and develop measures for verifying compliance. 
Once such requirements are satisfied, the applicant and FSC assessors visit a 
number of firms already FMU- and COC-certified, to perform audits and determine 
whether the applicant complies with all policies and procedures. Afterward, the leader of 
the FSC assessor team then writes a report on the issues raised during the field test, which 
is again reviewed by an FSC Regional Coordinator. 
                                                                                                                                                 
from ICEFI itself (WRM 2002). 
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Table 4.1: FSC Accreditation 
* FSC Certifier Accreditation Source115 
A Applicant contacts Secretariat about becoming FSC-
accredited. 
Sec. 1.1 
B FSC representatives visit applicant’s offices to assess 
management systems. 
Sec. 3.5 
C FSC representatives meet with local stakeholders. Sec. 3.6 
 Evaluation team leader drafts summary, reviewed by FSC 
executives116. 
Secs. 3.8 and 3.9 
B Applicant and FSC audit at least one FSC-certified firm Secs. 3.17 and 4 
 FSC team leader reports on issues raised during field tests, 
reviewed by an FSC Regional Coordinator. 
Secs. 4.15 and 4.16 
A FSC Regional Coordinator drafts accreditation report, 
reviewed by applicant. 
Secs. 5.3, 5.4 and 5.5 
D Public summary is prepared by FSC Secretariat (required 
content is described in Section 6.3). 
Sec. 5.9 
 Public summary submitted to FSC Board, which may 
require additional actions or approve accreditation of the 
applicant. 
Secs. 5.10, 5.11 
and 7.2 
 Ongoing compliance with FSC policies is verified by 
annual audits by FSC assessors of certification firms and at 
least one FMU/COC-certified firm. 
Part 2.4, Sec. 4.1 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.1 
 
                                                 
115 Unless otherwise noted, all references here are from Part 2.2 of the FSC Accreditation Manual (FSC 
1999a). 
116 While such actions could be interpreted in P-A terms, the level of resolution in this analysis is the 
individual organization (e.g., firms or ENGOs). See Appendix II for details of how P-A dynamics are 
operationalized here. 
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After discussing the results of the field test with the FSC Executive Director, the 
Regional Coordinator prepares a draft accreditation report that summarizes the findings 
of the assessment process to-date, and describes any pre-conditions for assessment. This 
is then reviewed by the applicant firm. A public summary of this report is then prepared 
by the FSC Secretariat, which is then submitted to the FSC Board, who have the authority 
to request additional information, or approve accreditation of the applicant. Continued 
compliance with FSC policies is verified by annual audits (performed by FSC assessors) 
of the certification firms and at least one of their certified FMUs or COC firms. 
When a forest company (FMU) wants to become certified (see Table 4.2 and 
Figure 4.1), they apply directly to an accredited certification body (e.g., SmartWood, 
SCS), who is required to send them information about FSC certification procedures, fees, 
access rights, and confidentiality agreements, as well as the rights and obligations of 
certificate holders (i.e., the FMU itself). Applicants must then send the certifier an 
overview of the firm’s forests, descriptions of the management system, type and quantity 
of harvested products, and a summary of the available human and technical resources. In 
addition, they sign a contract obligating them to comply with evaluation requirements, 




Table 4.2: FSC FMU Certification 
* FSC Forest Management Certification Source117 
E FMU applies to certifier, who sends information about FSC 
certification procedures, rights and obligations of certificate 
holders, audit contracts. 
Sec. 3.22 
F Applicant signs contract obligating them to comply with all 
evaluation requirements. 
Sec. 4.2.3 
E Applicant sends certifier information about firm’s forests, 
management system, etc. 
Sec. 4.2.2 
E Certifier informs applicant about scope of evaluation and 
standards applied. 
Sec. 6.2 
G/H Certifier identifies and consults with local stakeholders. Sec. 7.2  
F Certifier may make an initial “scoping” visit to applicant 
FMU. 
Sec. 7.3.2 
F Certifier team visits applicant FMU to audit both office and 
field elements. 
Part 1, Sec. 2.5  
 Certifier team prepares a preliminary audit report. Sec. 10.1.2 
E Before a decision is made, reports are assessed by applicant 
and two qualified reviewers not from assessment team. 
Sec. 11.2 
F Reports, peer reviews, and stakeholder comments are 
reviewed by certification firm’s management, which has 
final approval authority. 
Sec. 12.2 
I If an assessment is approved, certifier prepares a public 
summary (required content is described in Part 3.3). 
Sec. 13.2 
 Certified FMUs are audited annually to verify compliance 
with FSC Standards and with any certification conditions. 
Sec. 15.2 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.1 
 
 
                                                 
117 Unless otherwise noted, all references are from Part 3.2 of the FSC Accreditation Manual (FSC 1999a). 
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Certification firms must ensure that both auditors and the applicant FMU are fully 
informed about the scope of the evaluation, the standards which will be applied, and 
similar preparatory information. Local stakeholders identified during the initial “scoping” 
visit (including government and civil associations) are to be contacted a month before the 
certification audit itself, and given sufficient information (e.g., FSC standards) to be able 
to contribute to the assessment. 
During the field assessment, certifiers are required to maintain systematic  
procedures for all aspects of the audit: preventing conflicts-of- interest; stakeholder 
identification and consultation; indicators against which compliance with the standard is 
assessed; scoring methodology (for partial compliance); and more. Following the audit 
(which may last several days), the lead auditor prepares a final audit report, which must 
be reviewed by the applicant and two qualified experts (who may work for the 
certification firm, but cannot have been part of the assessment team). 
All reports, peer reviews, and stakeholder comments are then assessed again by 
the certification firm’s management, which has final approval authority. If conditional 
approval is given, the applicant must sign a binding agreement to comply with the 
conditions before their certification is approved. Once an assessment is approved, a 
public summary report must be prepared by the certifier. Those FMUs which have 
functional systems for identifying and tracking harvested products (e.g., round logs) are 
eligible for a joint FMU-COC certificate. Those without such systems are only eligible 
for an FMU certificate; their products cannot be FSC-labeled, nor be part of an FSC 
chain-of-custody). When an FMU-COC certificate is issued, certifiers must also inform 
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the applicant of FSC’s label use requirements118. Certified FMUs must be monitored 
annually to verify compliance with FSC Standards and with any certification conditions; 
certificates are valid for five years, after which the FMU must undergo another full audit. 
Manufacturers who wish to be COC-certified with the FSC (see Table 4.3 and 
Figure 4.1) also contact certification firms directly, who are required to send them 
detailed information about COC certification procedures, detailed contractual information 
(e.g., fee, access, and confidentiality agreements), and the rights and obligations of 
certificate holders. In turn, applicants send certifiers descriptions of their products and 
suppliers, storage, transportation, and record-keeping systems, and manufacturing 
processes. They also sign a contract obligating them to comply with evaluation 
requirements, including monitoring and publication of audit summaries. 
Table 4.3: FSC COC Certification 
* FSC Chain-of-custody Certification Source119 
J Firm contacts certifier about interest in COC certification Sec. 3.22 
J Certifier sends information about COC procedures, rights 
and obligations of certificate holders, and contract 
information. 
Sec. 3.22 
J Applicant returns information about products and suppliers, 
storage, transportation, and record-keeping systems, and 
manufacturing processes. 
Sec. 4.2.2 
K Applicants sign contract obligating them to comply with all 
evaluation requirements. 
Sec. 4.2.3 
J Certifiers inform applicants about scope of evaluation. Sec. 6.2 
K Certifiers visit the applicant firm and perform a COC audit. Part 1, Sec. 2.5  
                                                 
118 These are found in FSC On-product Labelling Requirements (FSC 2004b). 
119 Unless otherwise noted, all references are from Part 3.4 of the FSC Accreditation Manual (FSC 1999a). 
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* FSC Chain-of-custody Certification Source119 
 Auditor prepares final audit report (required content 
described in Part 3.5. 
Sec. 8.2 
K Final audit report reviewed by individual or group chosen by 
certifying body (specified in Part 3.1, Section 5), which has 
final approval authority. 
Sec. 9.2 
I If assessment is approved, certifier prepares public summary 
(required content described in Part 3.5). 
Sec. 9.2 
J Certifier informs COC certificate holder of FSC label 
policies. 
Sec. 10.2 
 COC firms audited annually to verify compliance with FSC 
Standards and any certification conditions. 
Sec. 15.2 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.1 
 
Figure 4.1: FSC-Chile 
 
As with the FMU audits, during a COC assessment, certifiers are required to 
maintain systematic procedures for all aspects of the audit, including: review of record 
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keeping systems; assessing the risk of “co-mingling” certified and non-certified 
materials; evaluating labeling processes; and more. After the audit, the lead auditor 
prepares a final audit report, which must be reviewed by the certification firm’s 
management, which has final approval authority. If conditional approval is given, the 
applicant must sign a binding agreement to comply with the conditions before the 
certification can be issued. After an assessment is approved, a public summary report 
must be prepared by the certifier, who also informs the applicant of FSC’s label use 
requirements, including the requirement that the COC registration code appear whenever 
the FSC label is used. Like FMU certificate holders, COC firms must be audited annually 
to verify compliance with COC Standards and with any certification conditions. 
 
4.3 CertForChile (CertFor) 
CertFor is the newest NSMD alternative available to Chilean forestry firms (van 
Hensbergen 2001), designed to be “more in line with the reality of forestry (in Chile)” 
(Miranda 2002b, p 42). Once industry began to seriously consider the environmental 
concerns of its destination markets (it was estimated that market losses could reach 
US$122 million), they began searching for solutions that could give them an alternative 
to FSC processes (CORFO 2001; Schlegel and Echeverria 2001b). A product of 
governmental, industrial, academic, and NGO interests, CertFor is designed as a private, 
voluntary system, subordinate to Chile’s state-based regulation, including relevant 
international treaties120 to which the country is a signatory (CertFor 2004a). 
                                                 
120 This includes the non-binding Montreal Process indicators (CertFor 2001a). 
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Based partly on the PEFC and SFI systems, CertFor was designed as an 
alternative to FSC certification (Schlegel and Echeverria 2001b). Though its governance 
structure differs significantly, CertFor also emphasizes environmental, social, and 
economic values in its approach (CertFor 2001a; Cerda 2003). The standard “aspires to 
perfect the way in which plantations 121 are managed” (Miranda 2002a, p 42), but most of 
all, CertFor’s founders wanted to create a locally controlled standard that would be 
internationally recognized, and thus serve to protect Chile’s markets in North America 
and Europe (Lignum 2001; CertFor 2003). 
Over the latter half of 2000122, Fundación Chile, INFOR, CORMA, and 
CORFO123 worked to form a working group to define national standards for plantation 
management, based on the standard developed by a similar 1999-2000 INFOR project, as 
well as consultation with national and international experts (CertFor 2001b; Lignum 
2001b). The project was officially launched on January 5, 2001, organized into four 
hierarchical units: a Superior Council, the project’s highest authority; a Technical 
Committee, tasked with reviewing draft standards; Working Groups, responsible for 
developing draft standards and processes; and a Secretariat, charged with daily 
management duties (held by Fundación Chile during CertFor’s development phase). Both 
the Superior Council and Technical Committee include industrial and government 
                                                 
121 This standard was developed and approved within a 14 month window main objective was to “develop 
an internationally recognized national SFM standard for radiata pine and Eucalyptus spp. plantations, for 
natural lenga (Nothofagus pumilio) forests and second growth native forests” (CertFor 200, p 14).] 
122 Though not publicly identified as such until April, CertFor had been in development for at least a half-
year, with CORFO funding approved the September before, and the project’s Superior and Technical 
Councils chosen in October and December, respectively (Morales 2003a). 
123 The CertFor project was funded by CORFO (75 percent), forest companies (24 percent) and Fundación 
Chile (1 percent) (Cerda and Lira 2001). 
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representatives, as well as leading academics (CORFO 2001), elected124 by CertFor 
members (CertFor 2003). 
By the end of January, 2001 the Superior Council had approved CertFor’s 
Principles and  held the project’s first organizational meeting. Over the following six 
weeks, the Working Group developed standards to address each Principle, which were 
then revised by consultants to ensure compliance with international standards and 
processes (CertFor 2001b). By late March, the first draft standard was submitted to the 
Technical Committee (van Hensbergen 2001). After field tests were completed (Dubé et 
al. 2004), the CertFor standard was publicly announced and opened for public comment 
in September, including a consultative workshop attended by a large number of NGOs, 
experts, and government representatives (Ambiente y Desarrollo 2001; Lignum 2001a). 
Following a second comment period in January, the Superior Council approved the final 
standard, just over a year after the project had begun125 (Dubé et al. 2004). 
Until CertFor signed an accreditation agreement with INN in July of 2004 (see 
below), the Superior Council assumed the authority to license certifiers. Following a field 
audits in early October 2002, IMO certified Promotora de Certificación Forestal, Ltda 
(PROCER) on January 21, 2003 (CertFor 2006). As of January of 2006, six FMUs had 
                                                 
124 A caveat:  I have found only a single reference that suggests this is the case. Given that both the Superior 
Council and Technical Committee were formed before the group’s first organizational meeting (and that 
membership on those bodies remained unchanged afterwards), I suspect this is a creative interpretation of 
the term “to elect.” 
125 By comparison, development of a CertFor native forest standard has taken much longer. In 2002, it was 
announced that Fundación Chile, INFOR and CORMA would work to develop a national management 
standard for native forests (Fundación Chile 2002a). The draft was undergoing closed evaluation in 2004 
(CertFor 2003), but has yet to be publicly announced. 
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been certified to the CertFor standard126, for a total of 1,552,420 hectares127 (ibid.). 
 
4.3.1 The CertFor System 
Like the FSC, CertFor also implements its system through three basic processes, though 
these differ somewhat: auditor accreditation; certifier accreditation; and FMU and COC 
certification, both of which share the same procedural design (see below). To ensure that 
auditors are competent and follow CertFor Standards, both individual auditors and 
certification firms are accredited. As with the FSC, FMUs wishing to label their products 
must apply for joint FMU-COC certification (CertFor 2004a), although unlike the FSC, 
these processes – though not the standards applied – are identical. In this section, I 
describe and graph the authority and informational relationships between principals and 
agents for each of these systems. 
The CertFor auditor accreditation process (Table 4.4, Figure 4.2) begins when an 
applicant completes a five-day Auditor Training, held periodically by CertFor personnel. 
Those wishing to become Lead Auditors must also have international experience with 
ISO 14001 or another standards-based certification system. To be accredited, a person 
then sends an application to the CertFor Executive Director, who reviews their 
qualifications and experience. If minimum requirements are met, the Executive Director 
then forwards the application to the CertFor Superior Council for approval. If the CertFor 
Superior Council approves, the auditor’s name is placed on CertFor’s list of accredited 
auditors, which is sent to accredited certification firms. 
                                                 
126 Three of which are owned by the Arauco Group. 
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Table 4.4: CertFor Auditor Accreditation 
* CertFor Auditor Accreditation Source128 
L Applicant auditor completes five-day CertFor Auditor 
Training. 
Sec. 8.2.3 
L Applicant informs CertFor of interest in being CertFor-
accredited 
Sec. 8.1 
L CertFor Executive Director sends application form to 
applicant. 
Sec. 8.1 
 The application is reviewed by CertFor Executive Director. Sec. 8.2 
 If minimum requirements are met, CertFor’s Executive 
Director sends application to CertFor Superior Council for 
approval. 
Sec. 8.2.5 
M If Superior Council approves, auditor’s name is placed on 
CertFor’s list of accredited auditors, sent to accredited 
certification firms. 
Sec. 8.4.1 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.2 
 
Rather than handle certifier accreditation directly, CertFor has contracted this 
task129 to INN. The process begins (Table 4.5, Figure 4.2) when the applicant firm 
contacts INN about their interest in becoming CertFor-accredited. Once a completed 
application packet and initial document review is received, INN’s Accreditation Division 
sends an Audit Plan to the applicant firm. INN auditors then perform a field assessment 
of the applicant firm, applying a number of ISO standards (CertFor 2004a). After INN 
auditors observe the applicant firm performing a CertFor certification field assessment, 
                                                                                                                                                 
127 This is nearly 6,000 square miles – an area larger than the state of Connecticut. 
128 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this section are from Procedimiento para la Acreditación de 
Auditores (CertFor 2003c). 
129 Until the INN contract was negotiated, CertFor certifier accreditation directly (CertFor 2003c). 
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the lead auditor writes an Audit Report identifying any non-compliance, which is then 
discussed with applicant firm. The INN Evaluation Committee reviews Audit Report and 
specifies any corrective actions. Once no corrective actions remain, the INN 
Accreditation Division sends a report to the INN Accreditation Committee, which sends 
an accreditation contract to applicant firm. To ensure that certifiers are complying with 
all INN and CertFor policies, INN assessors monitor the accredited firms annually. 
Forest owners and manufacturers who wish to be certified under the CertFor 
system first contact an INN-accredited certification firm (currently, QMI or SGS). COC 
certification is required for anyone intending to use the CertFor logo, with the exception 
of FMUs that market directly to end consumers (CertFor 2004b). Only joint FMU-COC 
CertFor certificates have been issued to date, and since the process is virtually identical 
for COC certification, I will describe the process for these joint certifications. 
 
Table 4.5: CertFor Certifier Accreditation 
* CertFor Certifier Accreditation Source130 
N INN is contracted by CertFor to accredit certifying bodies (CertFor 2002a) 
O Applicant contacts INN about becoming accredited as 
CertFor auditors. 
Sec. 5.1 
O Applicant returns application packet to INN, pays document 
review fee. 
Sec. 5.2 
O If application packet is complete, INN Accreditation 
Division sends an Audit Plan to applicant. 
Sec. 5.3.3 
                                                 
130 Unless otherwise noted, all references in this section are from Reglamento para la Acreditación de 
Organismos de Evaluación de la Conformidad (INN-Chile 2004). 
 129 
* CertFor Certifier Accreditation Source130 
O131 INN auditors perform field assessment of applicant, 
applying ISO 19011 criteria : Guidelines for Quality and 
Environmental Management Systems Auditing. 
Sec. 5.4.3 
O INN auditors observes applicant performing a CertFor 
certification field assessment. 
Sec. 5.6 
O Lead INN auditor discusses Audit Report with applicant, 
identifying any non-compliances. 
Sec. 5.4.6 
 INN Evaluation Committee reviews Audit Report and 
specifies any corrective actions. 
Sec. 5.5 
 Once no corrective actions remain, INN Accreditation 
Division sends report to INN Accreditation Committee. 
Sec. 5.7.1 
O INN sends accreditation contract to applicant firm. Sec. 5.8.2 
P Contract obligates applicant to all accreditation provisions. Sec. 5.8.2 
 INN assessors monitor accredited firms annually. Sec. 5.9 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.2 
 
Once a forest company has sent an application (Table 4.6, Figure 4.2) and a 
description of its management system and resources to a certifier, the certification firm 
sends the applicant a Pre-Assessment proposal and contract, which obligates the applicant 
firm to Pre-Assessment processes (e.g., access rights, associated fees). Along with the 
signed contract, the applicant returns a list of stakeholders to the certification firm, which 
is cross-checked during the Pre-Assessment visit to the FMU. Afterward, the Lead 
Auditor drafts a Pre-Assessment Report, identifying the challenges the FMU would likely 
                                                 
131 Unlike other processes of the NSMDs described here, INN does not appear to require applicants to sign 
binding contracts prior to field assessments (though it does require payment before any action on its part). 
Prior to such obligation (e.g., the accreditation contract), INN assessments appear to be mere information 
sharing, with either party capable of ending the assessment process at any time (Sec. 5.4.8). 
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encounter during a full assessment, and sends a copy to the applicant for review. 
Should the applicant chooses to continue, they sign a contract obligating them to 
Main Assessment provisions. The certifier then begins stakeholder consultation at least 
thirty days before the Main Assessment field audit. Following the Main Assessment, the 
Lead auditor drafts the Main Assessment Report, which is again reviewed by the 
applicant. Then the Main Assessment report and Public Consultation reports are 
submitted to a Peer Review panel of three experts, one of whom must be non-Chilean. If 
report passes Peer Review, all reports are then sent to the CertFor Superior Council, 
which holds the ultimate authority to issue certificates. 
If the applicant is seeking either a joint FMU-COC or a simple COC certificate, 
and the Superior Council approves their assessment report, they are asked to sign a 
contract that obligates them to CertFor’s Logo Use provisions. Once the certifier issues a 
certificate, they then delete any confidential information (previously identified as such by 
the applicant) from the Main Assessment Report, and make that edited report available 
upon request to stakeholders. To ensure that the certificate holder is complying with 
CertFor standards and implementing any required Corrective Actions, certificate holders 
are monitored annually. CertFor certificates are valid for up to five years, after which a 
new Main Assessment is required (CertFor 2004a). 
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Table 4.6: CertFor FMU and COC Certification 
* CertFor Forest Management and COC Certification Source132 
Q Applicant contacts INN-accredited certification firm about 
interest in CertFor certification. 
CertFor 2004, p 16 
Q Applicant returns application, including basic description of 
applicant’s management system and resources. 
CertFor 2004, p 16 
Q Certification firm sends applicant Pre-Assessment proposal 
and contract. 
Pr. 4.5.1 Sec. 8.1 
R Applicant returns signed contract, obligating them to Pre-
Assessment provisions. 
Pr. 4.5.1 Sec. 8.1 
Q Applicants sends a list of stakeholders to certification firm. Pr. 4.7 Sec. 8.1 
R Certification team visits applicant firm and performs a Pre-
Assessment, cross-checks stakeholder list for 
comprehensiveness. 
Pr. 4.5.1 Sec. 8.6; 
Pr. 4.7 Sec. 8.2.1 
Q Lead auditor sends Pre-Assessment Report to the applicant 
for review. 
Pr. 4.5.1 Sec. 8.7, 
8.8 and 8.9 
R Applicant signs contract obligating them to Main 
Assessment provisions. 
Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.1 
S Certifier contacts stakeholders and begins consultation 
process at least thirty days before Main Assessment. 
Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.5; 
Pr. 4.7 Sec. 8.2.2 
R Audit team visits applicant and performs Main Assessment. Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.7 
P Lead auditor prepares draft Main Assessment Report, 
reviewed by applicant. 
Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.7.7 
and 8.9 
T Main Assessment report and Public Consultation reports are 
submitted to Peer Review.  
Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.10; 
Pr. 4.3.2; Pr. 4.7 
                                                 
132 References to “Pr. 4.5.1”  are from Procedimiento para la ejecución de la visita de pre-auditoria 
(CertFor 2003e); to “Pr. 4.7”  are from Procedimiento para la Realización del Proceso Consulta Pública 
(CertFor 2003g); to “Pr. 4.5.2” are from Procedimiento para la ejecución de la visita de auditoria de 
certificación  (CertFor 2003d); to “Pr. 4.3.2” are from Procedimiento de Revisión por Pares (CertFor 
2003b); to “Pr. 4.3.3” are from Procedimiento de Decisión de Certificación de Transición  (CertFor 2003a); 
to “Pr. 4.4” are from Procedimiento para la Emisión de Certificados (CertFor 2003f); and to “Pr. 5.1.1” are 
from Proforma Form Pre-evaluating Report (CertFor 2003h). 
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* CertFor Forest Management and COC Certification Source132 
U If report passes Peer Review, all reports are sent to CertFor 
Superior Council 
Pr. 4.5.2 Sec. 8.11 
V CertFor Superior Council has ultimate authority to issue 
certificates. 
Pr. 4.3.3 Sec. 8.3 
V Applicant signs Logo Use contract, obligating them to Logo 
Use provisions. 
Pr. 4.4 Sec. 8.5; 
Pr. 4.14 
P Certification firm issues CertFor Certificate to applicant 
firm. 
Pr. 4.4 Sec. 8.5 
 Certification firm deletes information previously identified 
as confidential by applicant from Main Assessment Report. 
Pr. 5.1.1 Sec. 12 
 
 
W Certification firm is to make edited Main Assessment Report 
available upon request. 
Pr. 4.7 Sec. 8.6.1 
 Certifiers perform annual audits to verify certificate holder 
is complying with (or exceeding) CertFor Standards, and 
implementing any required Corrective Actions. 
CertFor 2004, p 17 
* Letters correspond to the arcs in Figure 4.2 
 
Figure 4.2: CertFor 
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4.4 Comparing implementation structures 
Having established the rules, roles, and responsibilities of both public (Chapter 3) and 
private forest policy in Chile (this chapter), we are now ready to compare structural 
aspects of these implementation designs. In Chapter 2, I defined (see Figure 2.7) two 
minimal conditions for a policy to be considered regulatory: clear lines of delegation (i.e., 
determinacy) (Schneider 1987; Calvert, McCubbins, and Weingast 1989), and separation 
between principals and agents (i.e., political breadth) (Mitnick 1980). If we 
(momentarily, at least) ignore issues such as the relative capacity and self- interested 
behavior of actors participating in these systems, we can also compare structural features 
expected to produce slippage, understood as sequential (O'Donnell 1952; Pressman and 
Wildavsky 1984) and parallel complexity (Lyne and Tierney 2002; Nielson and Tierney 
2003). To the degree that implementation designs differ along these dimensions, we may 
assume they vary in their structural capacity to achieve their stated aims – in other words, 
they may be ranked according to their reliability as means of policy implementation. 
Such differences can be expected to matter, regardless of whether such systems are based 
in state or non-state institutions, whatever their nominal goals or the strictness (or laxity) 
of their substantive standards. 
In the sections below, I compare these structural aspects of each of the four 
policies graphed in Chapters 3 and 4 (D.S. 701/19561, D.L. 19300/D.S. 30, reproduced in 
Figure 4.3, as well as FSC and CertFor), and conclude with a discussion of an often-
overlooked feature of NSMD implementation, the chain-of-custody. I revisit these results 
in the concluding chapter, placing them in the richer qualitative context, and noting their 
significance in light of the results of the social distancing tests of Chapter 5. 
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At the most fundamental level, reliable policies (regulatory or otherwise) must 
clearly identify the roles and responsibilities of those tasked with implementation 
(Schneider 1987; Wood and Waterman 1991). These “commitment rules” assure other 
actors that the short-term self- interest of implementing agents will not negatively impact 
their shared goals (Cutler, Haufler, and Porter 1999). In more basic terms, the clear 
assignment of responsibilities is critical to reliable implementation (Mitnick 1980; Lyne 
and Tierney 2002). Therefore, for a policy to produce consistent and reliable outcomes, 
all implementation roles must be formally defined – they must be determinate. 
Since each of the policy systems under consideration here (see Figures 4.1, 4.2 
and 4.3) can be graphed133, it appears this fundamental aspect of policy reliability has 
been met by all systems. While there is arguably some question as to whether some 
organizations should be considered as 3rd or 4th-party institutions (e.g., Fundación Chile), 
this does not affect the determinacy of the policy design itself, as the relationships 
between all institutions have been formally defined. Thus, each of the systems considered 
here appear to meet the minimal condition of determinacy. 
                                                 
133 Of course, the level of analysis dictates the level of detail. Though each of these policies prescribes 
several intra-firm processes (e.g., internal review requirements), I did not graph such features, since the 
focus on delegation led me to choose institution-institution (i.e., firm-firm) dyads as the relevant level of 
observation (see Appendix II). 
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Figure 4.3: Chilean State Regulation 
 
If delegation can be understood as a “distance” between principal and agent, then 
the same idea can be extended to relationships between types of actors. Since the interests 
of 1st and 2nd-parties are interdependent by definition, reliable implementation cannot be 
based on direct delegation between such actors (Taylor 1958). This is especially true of 
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policies that are regulatory in nature – those designed to restrict a subject’s choice of 
activity (Mitnick 1980). In other words, for a policy to be expected to produce consistent 
and reliable outcomes, there can be no direct delegation between 1st and 2nd-parties – it 
must exhibit this minimal political breadth. As we can also see from the delegation 
graphs (Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3), no such delegation relationships are found in any of the 
policies considered here. Thus, each of these systems appears to exhibit sufficient 
political breadth. 
Regardless of whether goal conflict is assumed or not, slippage is likely to 
increase with the number of delegation relationships in a delegation system (O'Donnell 
1952; Pressman and Wildavsky 1984). As in the children’s game Telephone, as chains 
grow longer (i.e., sequential complexity), the likelihood of slippage increases (Pressman 
and Wildavsky 1984). Since this constraint can only be expected to compound other 
factors, it does not matter whether goal conflict actually exis ts – ceteris paribus, a policy 
is likely to be as reliable as other alternatives, only if its sequential complexity is no 
greater than that of the alternative systems. In the implementation networks in Figures 
4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, the maximal sequential complexity is the number of links in the longest 
(directed) path between principals and agents. 
As we see in Table 4.7, Chile’s state forestry regulation appears to exhibit the 
greatest sequential complexity. For D.L. 701/19561, this path leads from either the  
legislature or president, through the Ministry of Agriculture, to CONAF, local police, and 
finally the policy targets, individual forest management units (FMUs). For D.L. 19300 / 
D.S. 30, the longest path follows from the legislature through the Ministry of Agriculture, 
to CONAMA, the regional COREMAs, and on to individual FMUs (see Figure 4.3). 
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Although links between the legislature, the president, and the Ministry of Agriculture are 
shared by both policies, the level of sequential complexity is not changed when both 
policies are considered together. 
 
Table 4.7: Structural Complexity 
 
Policy Figure Sequential Parallel 
D.L. 701 / 19561 4.3 4 6 
D.L. 19300 / D.S. 30 4.3 4 5 
All state forestry regulations  4 11 
Forest Stewardship Council 4.1 2 0 
CertFor Chile 4.2 3 2 
    
Of Chile’s two NSMD systems, CertFor exhibits slightly greater sequential 
complexity, as found in the paths from the CertFor Secretariat to INN, certification firms, 
to either FMUs or chain-of-custody (COC) firms (see Figure 4.2). Although the CertFor 
Secretariat links directly to both policy target types (sequential complexity = 1), since the 
system requires the participation of both INN and certification firms, to ignore these 
actors would be to ignore key features of that policy’s design. In addition to exhibiting 
the lowest apparent sequential complexity, the FSC system appears to have the fewest 
delegation relationships overall, from the FSC Secretariat, to certification firms, to either 
FMUs or COC firms. 
Slippage can also be expected to emerge when contracts are established between 
multiple principals and a single agent (i.e., parallel complexity), whether or not goal 
conflict is assumed (Lyne and Tierney 2002; Nielson and Tierney 2003). As with 
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sequential complexity, we can expect “noise” (e.g., differences in how policy goals are 
communicated) when multiple principals communicate “simultaneously” with agents. 
Thus, even where multiple principals share preferences, some information loss may be 
expected at each contractual link. Ceteris paribus, a policy is as likely to produce reliable 
outcomes as alternatives, only if its parallel complexity is no greater than that of other 
policy systems. In the implementation networks of Figures 4.1, 4.2, and 4.3, parallel 
complexity is determined by identifying all “recipients” of more than one delegation 
relationship, and summing the total number of additional incoming links for those agents. 
As Table 4.7 also shows, parallel complexity appears to vary much more than 
sequential complexity. Again we find state regulation of forestry to show the greatest 
complexity. D.L. 701/19561 arguably includes a greater variety of instrumental 
approaches (e.g., subsidies, loans, tax holidays, direct monitoring) than any of the other 
systems, which may be reflected in its marginally greater parallel complexity. It is also 
the oldest policy considered here, and thus may have more “institutional legacies” to 
contend with134. While there is little difference in the number of multiple principal 
relationships found in each of the two state policies, they each exhibit dramatically more 
parallel complexity than either NSMD approach, even when each is considered in 
isolation. Such differences are even starker when both state regulations are combined, as 
parallel complexity is cumulative135 across policy systems (unlike sequential complexity). 
                                                 
134 Since some policies develop within rich institutional contexts, certain tasks may fall under the purview 
of multiple, pre-existing institutions. It is also possible that such diversity may emerge over time, as new 
features are assigned, or as existing institutions vie for control over political or other resources associated 
with policy implementation (see North 1990). 
135 Since relationships between the legislature, the president, and the Ministry of Agriculture are shared by 
both policies, we need only account from them once. 
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Of the two NSMD systems, CertFor also appears to exhibit slightly more parallel 
complexity, though the direct relationships between the CertFor Secretariat and its policy 
targets may actua lly be designed to reduce any slippage caused by the serial complexity 
of that system. While the temporal sequence of relationships between principals and 
agents in the CertFor system may serve to minimize the impact of such complexity (the 
only link between the Secretariat and policy targets is the final decision to grant a 
certificate), such multiple-principal relationships are completely absent in the FSC 
system. 
 
4.5 The weakest link: sequential complexity and information 
Thus far, the non-state approaches in Chile appear to be clear improvements over state 
forest policies in structural terms – both NSMD systems seem to exhibit lower sequential 
and parallel complexity. If we were to judge the relative merits of state and non-state 
approaches based on this evidence, we could reasonably conclude that the latter are more 
likely to be capable of producing reliable outcomes. However, there are good reasons to 
believe that such conclusions might be premature. As market-driven labeling systems, 
both FSC and CertFor include a chain-of-custody instrument, designed to assure both 
consumers and producers that only products from certified forests bear their labels 
(CertFor 2004b; FSC 2004b). While the minimal features of these instruments were 
graphed in Figures 4.1 and 4.2 (as described by the policy documents of each system), 
chain-of-custody systems for commodities are likely to be much more complex in 
practice (Dickson 2001). 
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Figure 4.4: Chain-of-Custody Mechanisms  
 
Consider how the chain-of-custody is expected to function: reliable connections 
between producers and consumers require every processor, manufacturer, wholesaler and 
retailer that purchases certified materials to be certified (see Figure 4.4). The 
requirements for chain-of-custody firms are generally simpler (e.g., auditable material-
streams), but without a COC certificate, firms cannot sell their products as certified 
(Egestad 2001; Borregaard et al. 2002). In structural terms, this means that although 
delegation chains between Secretariats, certifiers, and applicant firms remain relatively 
short, the informational chains may in fact be quite long – an alternative source of 
sequential complexity that has generally been ignored. Since participation in non-state 
systems is voluntary, the magnitude of such complexity will vary according to the 
economic strategies of the participants. The voluntariness of non-state policy introduces a 
degree of indeterminacy to any NSMD system, a factor that appears to be especially 
problematic for chain-of-custody instruments. Maintaining the chain requires each actor 
to enter contracts with certified suppliers and purchasers – each of which must have also 
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entered contracts with the same certification system136. In policy systems where 
participation is voluntary, and global commodity markets where production chains 
may in fact be quite long, chains-of-custody are likely to be both indeterminate and 
sequentially complex. Moreover, such instruments would appear to substantially 
increase transaction costs over either market processes or state-based regulatory 
approaches alone. If the effectiveness (or persistence) of NSMD systems depends on 
maintaining auditable linkages between producers and consumers, such structural factors 
may in fact nullify any improvements that such approaches may offer over state-based 
implementation. 
Thus far, I have established that the challenge of producing cooperation among 
increasing numbers of participants need not be based solely on self- interested behavior 
(e.g., Olson 1965), but may occur simply because no act of communication is ever 
perfect, regardless of participants’ motives. However, we can predict this process to be 
even more difficult as participants’ direct knowledge of one another declines (Akerlof 
1970). Indeed, this is exactly the problem which certification is intended to address 
(Cason and Gangadharan 2002; Strausz 2003). There is no reason why we should not 
expect policy systems which span significant distances (however the term is defined) to 
be vulnerable to the same sort of informational limits. As Thomas Princen has observed, 
“...as geographic and cultural distance increase, disparities in information, especially 
ecological information, increase” (Princen 1997, p 245). State regulatory processes may 
be geographically constrained, but in today’s world market-based systems are often 
                                                 
136 Although some certification systems have signed “mutual recognition” pacts (e.g., PEFC and CertFor), 
supporters of other forest certification approaches (e.g., FSC) have strongly resisted this approach. 
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implemented at regional and global scales. If it is true that informed consumers are a 
critical necessary condition for functional market-based systems (Teisl and Roe 1998, 
2000), factors that limit communication may ultimately limit policy success. It is this 





















5 SLIPPAGE, DISTANCE, AND INFORMATION 
[FSC’s] communications strategies within the country will consider 
different levels, from professionals in private businesses and public 
services, to the general public. … To maintain a level of public awareness, 
it will be key to maintain regular communication, through newspaper 
articles and other media reports. 
 
Otero 1998, p 2 
 
[T]ransactions are problematic when an agent’s actions cannot be 
observed and when asymmetries in information and differences in 
incentives between the principal and the agent are prevalent. 
 
Princen 1997, p 247 
 
The literature on asymmetric information in markets has underscored the “role of 
reputations to improve efficiency” (Cason and Gangadharan 2002, p 114), and 
certification itself is seen as a means of providing reliable information about actor 
reputations (Miller 1992; Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000; Strausz 2003). Indeed, the 
ultimate success (or failure) of any given NSMD system may depend on its ability to 
communicate relevant information to consumers (Teisl, Peavey, and O’Brien 2001). As 
market-based systems, NSMDs are predicated on the informed consumer’s ability to 
influence producers through their purchasing behavior (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004a), but this requires that consumers are exposed to information about one of two 
things: the firms themselves, or the labeling systems in which they participate. 
Ignoring (for the moment, at least) the potential for person-to-person 
communication137 (e.g., chain-of-custody systems) to produce error at larger scales, 
                                                 
137 While the potential certainly exists for informational asymmetries to exist between the principals and 
agents who are formally (contractually) engaged in these systems, I will not discuss them here, for two 
reasons. First, the structural conditions which can be expected to give rise to such problems (i.e., multiple 
principals and lengthier delegation chains) have already been discussed and shown to be roughly 
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“broadcast” strategies (e.g., newspapers, journals) may circumvent the limitations of 
sequential complexity by “skipping ahead” – communicating relevant details directly to 
those further along (Rodenstein and Donath 2000). Thus, actors throughout the product 
chain may learn of NSMD systems indirectly, from reports or press releases published in 
newspapers or journals. However, even as cultural factors have been shown to compound 
error in sequentially complex communications systems (Kashima 2000; Barner-
Rasmussen and Bor 2005), we should expect limits to the efficacy of broadcast strategies, 
as well. In particular, global-scale systems could be expected to experience problems of 
geographical, cultural, or epistemic distance (Princen 1997; Conca 2001; Bendix and 
Liebler 2003). 
In this chapter, I develop and apply an empirical test of the certification-related 
content in publicly available communication about forest certification. If informed 
consumers are a necessary condition for functional market-based systems (Teisl and Roe 
1998; Teisl, Roe, and Levy 1999), consumers who lack information about market choices 
will be unlikely to reward “good” producers any more often than “bad” ones, reducing 
incentives for any producer to act responsibly (Princen 1997). Since NSMD systems are 
predicated on effective communication between producers and consumers, factors that 
influence information quality can also be expected to impact the effectiveness and 
ultimate success of NSMD systems. 
For global markets, such as those which exist for forest products, the physical 
distance between producers and consumers is likely to have a profound effect on 
                                                                                                                                                 
commensurate across these NSMD systems (though ceteris paribus, state regulation is less likely to be 
vulnerable to slippage, due to chain-of-custody instruments). Second, deception could be expected to afflict 
both state-based and NSMD systems, and I am not qualified to make definitive judgments about actor 
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consumer knowledge (Princen 1997). But geographical scale is only one factor which 
influences the spread of new knowledge; as I argued in the second half of Chapter 2, 
other factors (e.g., language, epistemic framing) may also be important (Sastry and Rao 
1952; Muttagi 1975; Dickson and MacLachlan 1990). Known collectively as “social 
distance,” we can reasonably expect these factors to influence communication between 
producers, certifiers, and buyers. Indeed, a broad understanding of social distance 
(including geographical separation) may provide significant insight into the function of 
global markets (Dickson and MacLachlan 1990). Ceteris paribus, as distance increases, 
we can expect both the availability and quality of origin-specific information to decline 
(Princen 1997). Again, when markets fail to provide feedback (especially in a positive 
sense) to producers, market-based policy approaches cannot be expected to succeed as a 
means of providing or ensuring public goods (Princen 1997, 1999), or even survive as 
market competitors (Teisl, Roe, and Levy 1999; Teisl, Peavey, and O’Brien 2001). 
Geographers and media researchers have long studied the potential for physical 
distance to influence news coverage (e.g., Molotch and Lester 1974). For global- level 
NSMDs that attempt to function in large and disparate markets, news media serve as a 
critical means of communicating such information, and thus shaping attitudes and 
behavior (Bendix and Liebler 2003). Indeed, it is difficult to conceive of how a global-
scale NSMD could work without leaving significant evidence of its activities in the mass 
media. By tracking coverage of forest certification generally, as well as the specific 
stakeholders engaged in developing, implementing, and promoting NSMD systems, it 
should be possible to measure and assess the information available throughout the market 
                                                                                                                                                 
claims in this issue area. 
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chain. By separating sources by geography, language and professional audience (see 
Figure 5.1), we can draw inferences about actors’ awareness of the issues in each media 
segment, and thus measure the relative impact (if any) of each social distance factor 
considered here. For the purposes of this comparison, I make quite optimistic 
assumptions about information quality, ignoring issues of accuracy by presuming (for the 
moment, at least) that any news facilitates “informed” consumption. 
 
Figure 5.1: Social Distance Dimensions  
 
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows: I begin with a discussion of 
content analysis as a method138, then explain how I identified the specific terms and 
categories used in this analysis (as well as the justification for excluding other terms). I 
then describe the technique used to identify variations in content across media segments 
                                                 
138 To preserve readability, I offer a detailed explanation of the techniques applied in this chapter in 
Appendix II. That discussion includes:  a comparison of manual and computer methods; the exact means by 
which I identified and controlled sources; description of the process and limitations of translating the 
coding sheet into Spanish; the technique used to reduce “false positives” in the article pool; and calculating 
the validity rate of the computer-based method. Additional source material (e.g., sources used by year and 
media segment, as well as their availability throughout the period of study, etc.) is also included in the 
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(i.e., dimensions of social distance), and to establish when cross-segment comparisons 
are statistically valid. Before describing the results of that analysis, I briefly revisit the 
social distance framework which I detailed in Chapter 2, emphasizing the relevance of 
each factor to Chile’s forest products industry and the NSMDs competing in that market. 
Following a discussion of the hypotheses test results, I compare the relative availability 
of information on each NSMD and its stakeholders, as well as several unanticipated 
patterns which emerge from the  analysis, and discuss how these might impact our 
interpretation of the other results. 
 
5.1 Analyzing message content 
The analysis of text (broadly conceived) is the foundation of traditional social science 
research (Roberts 1997). As a principal means of communication, text provides a record 
from which theories can be developed, and against which they can be tested (Bernard and 
Ryan 1998). Over the past century and more139, scholars have developed a broad range of 
techniques to systematically analyze lexical or grammatical patterns, or even the semantic 
meaning of texts, and to track such content across time and space (Danielson and Lasorsa 
1997). Fifty years ago, the communications researcher Bernard Berelson established the 
seminal definition of content analysis: “a research technique for the objective, systematic, 
and quantitative description of the manifest content of communication” (Berelson 1971, p 
6). While others have posed more nuanced definitions (e.g., Krippendorff's: "a research 
technique for making replicative and valid inferences from data to their context," 1980), 
                                                                                                                                                 
Appendix. 
139 In the late 19th century, researchers often compared the “column inches” of newspaper coverage of 
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the emphasis has always been on systematic means to describe content, test hypotheses, 
or otherwise compare messages to experience (Wimmer and Dominick 2000). 
The variety of methods is impressive; building from what is essentially a 
comparison of text strings (e.g., full or partial words, sentences, paragraphs, pages and 
documents), it is possible to identify lexical, grammatical, semantic and/or conceptual 
features (Bernard and Ryan 1998). An early lexical analysis technique was concordance, 
by which all unique words within a document (or corpus) are tallied, along with their 
rates of incidence (Krippendorff 1980). Based on inferred relationships between word 
occurrence and document content or authorship, researchers can map semantic 
differences and author characteristics, even to the point of being able to identify gender 
(Corney et al. 2002; Koppel, Argamon, and Rachel Shimoni 2002). In other words, once 
researchers develop systematic rules for sorting words and phrases into categories 
(semantic or otherwise), it is possible to statistically compare the degree to which texts 
represent such concepts (Rosenberg, Schnurr, and Oxman 1990; Riffe, Lacy, and Fico 
1998). This “thematic or dictionary-based” approach has been used by researchers since 
the early 1960s; though the technique has been criticized as “linguistically 
unsophisticated,” it is still considered to be appropriate for many research questions 
(Evans 2002). Virtually all dictionary-based analysis is now performed with computers 
(Züll and Landmann 2004); this makes the process “entirely reliable,” but does not 
guarantee the validity of the inferences between the occurrence of particular text strings 
and larger theoretical concepts (Bernard and Ryan 1998, p 616-17). 
                                                                                                                                                 
various issues (Bernard and Ryan 1998). 
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To understand how information about certification and Chilean NSMDs and 
stakeholders is communicated throughout the global forest products market chain140, I 
identified 197 certification-relevant articles from Chilean media, and 1,899 more141 from 
LexisNexis’ Academic Universe. LexisNexis’ database not only includes a very large 
number of geographically disparate sources142 (Bendix and Liebler 2003), but other 
features of Academic Universe enable me to control for factors such as the location, 
language and target market of each publication. It is regularly used by media scholars as a 
source of content (e.g., Bengston and Fan 1999; Bendix and Liebler 2003; Boykoff and 
Boykoff 2004; Koenig and MacMillan 2004), as it offers easy access to an enormous 
variety of media outlets (Tankard Jr, Hendrickson, and Lee 1994). However, I have gone 
one step further, using features of Academic Universe as analytical tools – a technique 
suggested by Tankard Jr. et al., in 1994 (p 6). Briefly, the procedure is as follows: first, I 
identified terms that could be combined to identify articles on the general topic of forest 
products certification within each publication (which LexisNexis separates by scale, 
location and language). I identified approximately143 225 publications (including 29 in 
                                                 
140 I chose this simple quantitative method over more qualitative approaches because I did not want to be in 
the business of interpreting the “character” of news coverage. This technique (despite its clear limitations) 
enables me to interpret the results with more confidence. At any rate, any distinctions between the 
qualitative and quantitative aspects of this research should not be overdrawn – many of the articles used in 
this chapter’s analysis have informed the more explicitly qualitative approach of the earlier chapters. 
Moreover, the technique used here is still based on qualitatively defined categories. 
141 This included every article that addressed forest certification and at least one of the NSMD systems in 
this study between March 1st 1991 (the first such article) and July 21st 2004 (the last date I gathered such 
data), with an estimated false-positive (i.e., non-relevant articles) rate of 12.2 percent. See Appendix II for 
details. 
142 LexisNexis currently indexes more than 5,600 newspapers, magazines, journals, newsletters, news 
wires, and news transcripts worldwide, including 77 in the Spanish language (2005). 
143 This figure includes a number of false-positives (articles not genuinely related to the certification of 
forest products), estimated to occur in the overall article pool at the rate of 12.2 percent. See Appendix II 
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Spanish) that mention at least one of the NSMD systems active in Chile. After 
developing parallel coding dictionaries in English and Spanish (discussed in the 
following section), I used the “Search Within Results” feature of Academic Universe to 
identify the number of articles within each general search containing terms from each 
dictionary category. Again, by rigorously controlling the source publications, I was able 
to separate them by location144 and target audience. Once I completed all searches145, I 
then combined sources according to their social distance “location,” and calculated the 
proportion at which each category was mentioned within each. Articles published in 
Chile (few of which were available in electronic format) were hand-coded and aggregated 
in a similar manner. 
There are three essential premises upon which this analysis is based. First, that the 
amount of news coverage can influence public opinion, an assumption that has been 
repeatedly supported in media research (e.g., Graham and Dziuban 1996; Bengston and 
Fan 1999; Bendix and Liebler 2003). Second, that the “amount” of issue coverage can be 
derived from lexical analysis – that is, by looking for specific terms across all articles 
available within a given media environment – also a well-established research technique 
(Bernard and Ryan 1998; Bendix and Liebler 2003). Third, that the relevant issues, 
actors, and concepts have been accurately and sufficiently represented in the terms and 
                                                                                                                                                 
for details. 
144 Clearly, not all publications are equal. For example, although I have treated The New York Times as a 
US paper, it is read worldwide – and by many more people than the majority of the other US papers used in 
this analysis (e.g., regional papers, journals). 
145 There were 129 pool-generating searches (based on the way LexisNexis organizes its sources and the 
incidence of relevant articles), each of which was again searched against 27 categories (3,483 actual 
searches in total). 
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categories used for the analysis. There is no simple response to this last challenge, as the 
appropriateness of any analytical approach is ultimately a subjective judgment, albeit one 
we might hope is well- informed. 
 
5.2 Coding for content 
Clearly, the most critical element of this approach is the development of a valid coding 
dictionary. This is generally understood to be a labor-intensive exercise (Züll and 
Landmann 2004), as researchers must identify not only the set of theoretically relevant 
concepts – and the strings that unique ly represent them – but also repeatedly test these 
against the text corpus (Bengston and Fan 1999). The process is iterative, with 
researchers working back and forth between category formulation and search results, 
until the dictionary is seen146 to represent valid relationships in the data (Bernard and 
Ryan 1998). Text strings that are ambiguous, or could refer to concepts not central to the 
study, are eliminated during this phase (Bengston and Fan 1999). 
Given the centrality of the FSC and CertForChile systems to this project, an 
obvious starting point are the Principles which each promotes as their central substantive 
goals (CertFor 2002c; FSC 2004c). Beginning with English- language versions of each 
program’s Statement of Principles (see Appendix IV), I used WordStat147 software to 
generate a concordance of the unique words and phrases occurring in these documents148. 
                                                 
146 Despite the quantitative nature of the statistical analysis, it is of course, predicated on qualitative 
distinctions.  
147 This program is part of a text analysis software suite distributed by Provalis Research 
(www.simstat.com).  
148 Excluding function words, FSC and CertFor Principles contain 190 unique words, of which 49 are 
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I then manually sorted the strings from this list into four conceptual categories, ignoring 
terms with neutral or ambivalent meanings (e.g., benefits, impacts, sustainable). I then 
entered the resulting thirty-nine words (and one phrase) into WordStat’s Dictionary 
Builder to check for synonyms and related terms149, from which I also selected terms 
based on their clear relevance to one of the four categories. This process added eleven 
additional terms, with some overlap between terms (e.g., plural forms). 
Since these terms were to be used in a semi-automated content analysis, it was 
important to reduce redundant variation150. Since the LexisNexis search engine supports 
wildcards151, it is possible to search for all word variations which share a common root152. 
The technique for reducing words in this manner is known as “stemming” or “suffix 
stripping” (Stephen 1999, p 5). After defining a subset of stemmed words, I again 
eliminated terms that were either too narrow or too general to likely be useful in an 
analysis of a broad range of media sources (e.g., land, soil, wellbeing). This left twenty 
terms to identify the type of substantive issues (environmental, social, economic) 
discussed across the various media streams. 
                                                                                                                                                 
common to both. 
149 WordStat’s Dictionary Builder enables users to generate synonyms, antonyms, “similar terms,” 
hypernyms (“…it a type of,” also known as a coordinate term), hyponyms (“types of …”), holonyms (“…is 
a part of,” also known as membership), meronyms (“parts of …”), attributes, and otherwise “related terms.” 
Of these, only the synonym and “related term” categories suggested terms which were both appropriate and 
unambiguous. 
150 This is principally an issue of tractability, as all searches were entered by hand. 
151 These are symbols used to find word or phrase variations, based on a specific (“*”) or unlimited (“!”) 
number of characters within a text string. 
152 Such that a search on “market!” will produce market, markets, marketing, marketed, or marketable. 
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Because of the importance of monitoring and certification to NSMD stakeholders, 
I included two categories intended to reflect these more procedural aspects of 
implementation. The first (PROCESS1) includes variations on the terms certify, monitor, 
enforce, accountable, and custody (also derived from FSC and CertForChile Principles). 
Another category (PROCESS2) tracks whether and where the “nth actor” terminology153 
(described in Chapter 2) occurred in media coverage of forest certification. 
As I argued in Chapter 1, since NSMDs are increasingly proposed as alternatives 
to the state-based provision of public goods, it is critical to understand how this might 
impact values traditionally associated with the state. Moreover, if we are concerned with 
liberal democratic values, the most important of these are concepts such as participation, 
representation, and delegation. Accordingly, I have included variations on these terms in 
a third implementation-related category (PROCESS3), and also established separate 
categories for each of the following concepts: stakeholder, public, private, government , 
and regulation. 
Since Chile is both the milieu of this case study and the point of origin for any 
forest products that might make their way from certified Chilean producers to foreign 
consumers, I included a separate category for the terms Chile and Chilean, as well as 
another for variations on the term boycott, to see how news of the 2002 ForestEthics 
campaign was communicated through the global distribution chains. To determine the 
visibility of the each NSMD approach, I created separate categories for each system, as 
well as for the stakeholders who have participated in their development, drawn from 
                                                 
153 As I explain in Appendix II, this terminology does not have a ready analog in the Spanish language. 
Although phrases such as “partes independientes” are sometimes used to refer to 3rd parties, the convention 
is not consistent. Instead, such concepts appear to be largely ignored in Spanish language media. 
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program materials and local media articles (a technique used by Miller and Stebenne 
1992 and Miller and Pavlik 1993 to track political campaigns). Finally, to estimate 
awareness of the producers themselves, I established separate categories for the forest 
management units (FMUs) participating in the FSC, CertForChile and ISO 140001 
systems, as well for those FMUs that have been certified under multiple programs (i.e., 
FSC/ISO, CFC/ISO, FSC/CFC/ISO). Though ISO 14001 has no explicit mechanism for 
connecting producers with consumers throughout market chains, the system has been 
promoted in Chilean media as a reflection on producers’ environmental concerns (Araya 
2002; Lignum 2002b). Therefore, I included ISO-relevant content to see how such issues 
were communicated outside of the country. The final (English language) coding 





Table 5.1: English-language Search Terms 
Terms derived from FSC and CertFor Principles:  
ECONOMICS market! or efficien! or product! or profit! or servic! 
ENVIRONMENT biodivers! or biolog! or conserv! or ecolog! or ecosyste! or 
environmen! or natur! 
SOCIAL commun! or equit! or fair! or indigenous or neighbor! or safety 
or soci! or worker! 
PROCEDURAL 1 accountab! or certif! or custody or delegate or enforce! or 
monitor! 
PROCEDURAL 2 “first party” or “second party” or “third party” or “1st party” or 
“2nd party” or “3rd party” 
PROCEDURAL 3 participa! or represent! or delegate! 
Additional categories:  









FSC  FSC or “Forest Stewardship Council” 





Additional categories (continued) 
ICEFI Stakeholders “Agrupación de Ingenieros Forestales por el Bosque Nativo” or 
AIFBN or “Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de la Fauna y Flora” 
or CODEFF or “Departamento de Acción Social” or DAS or 
“Federación Nacional de Sindicatos de CONAF” or FENASIC 
or “Red Nacional de Acción Ecológica” or RENACE 
ICEFI / FSC FMUs “Rio Cruces” or “Bosques Cautin” or Anchile or “Los Lagos” or 
“Tierra Chilena” or “Forestales Regionales” or “CAF El Alamo” 
or Procer or “Sociedad Agrícola y Forestal Degenfeld” 
CERTFOR (CFC) CertFor 
CFC Stakeholders “Fundación Chile” 
CFC FMUs CELCO or “Forestal Valdivia” 
PEFC PEFC or "Pan European Forest Certification" or “the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification” 
“ISO 14!” (ISO) “ISO 14!” or “International Organization for Standardization” 
ISO FMUs Licancel or Quilpolemu or “Cementos Bío Bío” or “Bosques 
SA” 
ISO Stakeholders “Instituto Nacional de Normalización” 
FSC/ISO FMUs “Bío Bío” or Tornagaleones or Millalemu or Terranova 
CFC/ISO FMUs MININCO or “Bosques de Chile” or Arauco 
CFC/FSC/ISO FMUs “Forestal y Agricola Monteáguila” or FAMASA 
 
5.3 Mapping social distance 
Although Chile’s domestic demand has been described as “generally inconsequential” 
(Mery 1996), fo rest products constitute more than fifteen percent of the country’s exports 
(second only to copper) (Wilcox 1996). In fact, Chile is one of the ten largest producers 
worldwide, with exports valued over US$2 billion in the year 2000 (Mery, Kengen, and 
Lujan 2001); the United States is its largest single market (Lignum 2002b), currently 
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consuming thirty-seven percent (US$622 million) of all forest exports (Lignum 2003c, p 
23). This relationship is of clear strategic importance to Chilean producers, as evidenced 
by the American subsidiaries that have been established by each Chile’s largest forest 
companies (i.e., Arauco, Mininco, and Terranova) in recent years (Arauco 2003; Lignum 
2003c; Terranova 2003). As I emphasized in earlier chapters, supporters of both FSC and 
CertForChile are acutely sensitive to any issue that might affect Chilean competitiveness 
in American markets (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Moura 2002). 
Recall the hypothesis for the effect of geographical distance from Chapter 2: 
ceteris paribus, a given NSMD could be said to be at least as reliable as state-based 
regulation only if publicly available information about that system is as common in the 
media of critical export markets as in the producer country. Given the central importance 
of American demand for Chilean forest products, a strict interpretation of this hypothesis 
would be to apply a three-step test, comparing the content of media in Chile to the US, 
and then to the rest of the world. The absence of such an effect is proven if the proportion 
of articles mentioning particular categories fail to decline (attenuate) across distance (see 
H5, in Table 5.2). Yet such an approach is not completely satisfactory – despite the 
important of US markets, that relationship is only partially (and inconsis tently) related to 
geographic distance. Ideally, we would like to be able to control for the actual physical 
distance of each media source from Chile. This would be exceptionally difficult in 
practice, as would controlling for variations in the scale and distribution of readership 
across media outlets. A more general test is therefore to simply compare the content of 
Chilean national media to that which originated outside the country (see H6, in Table 
5.2). 
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Table 5.2: Informational Hypotheses 




IF: certification-relevant information is at least as 
common in the media of critical export markets as in the 
producer country (three-step test) 
H5 
 
 IF: certification-relevant information is at least as 





IF: The proportion of certification-relevant information is 
at least as common in media written in the dominant 
language of importing nations as in media using the 




IF: The proportion of certification-relevant information is 
at least as common in general media (e.g., newspapers) as 
it is in specialized media (e.g., professional journals) 
H8 
   
If social distance does indeed impact communication patterns along at least one of 
these dimensions, it would also be useful to know whether such effects vary across other 
media segments. For example, it may be that geographical distance may not have as 
strong an effect in forestry or professional (e.g., manufacturing) journals as in the popular 
press, given the critical importance of international trade to those commercial industries. 
Therefore, in addition to a general test of each hypothesis (e.g., geographical effects 
across all industry and general media), where the data permits (see Appendix IId), I will 
test other dimensions of social distance in isolation. 
To the degree that information exchange is “contingent on the way in which 
social structure brings people together” (Burt 1987, p 1288), any factor known to separate 
people (e.g., language, culture, class) could be expected to produce discontinuities of 
communication (Barnett and Choi 1995). Though culture and language are often 
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correlated with geography (Akerlof 1997), the match is not exact – both span borders 
(Barnett and Choi 1995), and multicultural, multilingual societies are found worldwide 
(especially in the United States and Europe). Given the dominance of Spanish in Chile, 
and English in the United States (plus the availability of media in both languages 
worldwide), we can establish a two-step test of the cultural- linguistic social distance 
hypothesis in Chapter 2: an NSMD could be said to be equivalent (or “better”) than state-
based regulation if (and only if) the amount of NSMD and other certification-relevant 
information does not decline (attenuate) from Spanish to English- language media (see H7, 
in Table 5.2). 
Communication is also known to be influenced by norms about what information 
is important or appropriate (Craig, Gadgil, and Koomey 2002). Such cognitive “frames” 
are often shared by expert communities that often emerge from both socialization and 
professional training (Shannon, Meidinger, and Clark 1996; Bendix and Liebler 2003). In 
fact, social distance effects have been observed between occupations (Laumann 1965). 
Since it is common to speak of forest products markets in terms of producer, professional 
and general consumer segments (Forsyth, Haley, and Kozak 1999), we might apply this 
relationship directly to the expert-framing hypothesis from Chapter 2: an NSMD could be 
said to be equivalent (or “better”) than state-based regulation if (and only if) NSMD-
relevant content does not attenuate across specialized (e.g., professional journals) and 
general media (e.g., newspapers) segments (see H8, in Table 5.2). 
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5.4 Identifying variations  
This analysis compares the content of all articles that address forest certification issues, 
as published by sources that vary by their geography, language, and target audiences. 
Because Chilean sources were hand-coded, content in these sources was identified at the 
level of individual articles. However, since it was not feasible to analyze articles acquired 
through LexisNexis individually, content ratios were identified only in aggregate terms 
(e.g., all articles published by major American papers in 2002). Thus, although the 
computer-based method used here determines whether individual articles contains 
specific search strings, applied to multiple articles, it reports summary results of all 
articles within the group. 
 
Terminology: To improve readability, I adopt several conventions to refer to the various 
theoretical and empirical elements of the following discussion. 
The word “context” refers to specific media environments (e.g., 
CHILE.SPANISH.FORESTRY journals). 
The words “ratio” and “signal” refer to the proportion of content within specific media 
contexts. 
The word “segment” is somewhat more general, referring to contexts across a single 
social distance factor (e.g., INDUSTRY media in CHILE, the US, or the WORLD). 
Both elements – contexts and segments – are formatted in SMALL CAPS to distinguish 
them from more general usage of such terms (e.g., “despite Chilean forest company fears, 
BOYCOTT was rarely mentioned in FORESTRY sources outside of CHILE”). 
Similarly, to identify specific content apart from more casual use of such terms, content 
categories are capitalized and underlined (e.g., CHILE). 




Partly for this reason, and partly to adjust for enormous variability in the number 
of articles each source published, hypotheses are tested comparing the proportions of 
content within each media segment (see inset, below). Whether two proportions are seen 
as statistically different is based on the “z-score” (calculated as the difference of two 
proportions, divided by their standard errors154), with significance identified at three 
thresholds: five percent (z = 1.695), one percent (z = 2.575), and one-tenth of one percent 
(z = 3.08) (Kennedy 1998). Since my purpose here is to discover whether content 
attenuates as it “moves away” from the origin, I do not need statistical significance in the 
opposite direction to support the null – the absence of significant directionality also 
suggests that attenuation is not present. 
 
5.4.1 Geography and distance 
Evidence to support the strictest interpretation of geographical distancing (H5) was quite 
weak. When no other social distance factors (e.g., expertise) are controlled for, there are 
no proportions of any category that were both statistically distinct and uniformly 
directional (see Table 5.3). However, considering the results of a looser interpretation of 
geographical separation (H6, below), the most likely explanation for this failure is that 
this dimension of social distance was poorly specified. Accounting for the 12.2 percent 
sampling error in NON-CHILEAN sources (see Appendix II for details), attenuation was 
                                                 
154 The formal equation: , in which p = proportional values, and n = the number of 
articles from which each proportion is calculated. 
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supported only for the SOCIAL category within the INDUSTRY media segment155. 
Otherwise, statistically significant directionality (sloping downward or upward) was not 
evident. There were several instances in which content signals were not statistically 
distinct across all three contexts – lending support to the null hypothesis, that 
geographical distance was not a factor for these categories. However, as I discuss in 
Section 5.5, we must be careful when interpreting results where the proportions are 
essentially negligible (i.e., below 5 percent). Overall, this strictest interpretation of signal 
attenuation based on geographic variation was not borne out. 
                                                 
155 There is also possible signal decay for ISO in GENERAL media (at the 0.05% level), but this is in 
question, as the difference between the ISO signal in US and the rest of the WORLD (excluding CHILE) media 
falls within the sampling error range. In general, I will avoid discussing any evidence that is qualified in 
this way. 




























































CHILE 0.853*** -0.026  CHILE  0.741***  0.010  CHILE 0.895*** -0.040*** 
CertFor 0.382***  0.007  ISO  0.567*** -0.031***  ISO 0.257*** 0.009* 
CFC STK 0.289***  0.000  PROCESS 3  0.518***  0.113  ICEFI STK 0.323*** -0.004** 
CFC 0.241***  0.003  SOCIAL  0.372***  0.200*  BOYCOTT 0.223*** -0.022* 
ICEFI STK 0.240*** -0.003  REGULATION  0.331*** -0.021  CFC STK 0.218*** 0.000 
PEFC 0.237***  0.048  PRIVATE  0.305**  0.067  FSC/ISO 0.207*** -0.001 
PROCESS 3 0.194*** -0.053  ICEFI STK  0.267***  0.000  CFC 0.182*** 0.003 
FSC/ISO 0.156***  0.000  CFC STK  0.267***  0.000  CFC/ISO 0.174*** -0.002 
CFC/ISO 0.144*** -0.001  PEFC  0.241** -0.174***  PEFC 0.169*** -0.058*** 
BOYCOTT 0.130*** -0.012  ENVIRONMENT  0.205***  0.056  FSC/ISO/CFC 0.137*** 0.000 
FSC/ISO/CFC 0.126***  0.000†  GOVERNMENT  0.197  0.297***  ENVIRONMENT 0.132*** -0.021 
ENVIRONMENT 0.114***  0.008  ISO STK  0.167*  0.000  PROCESS 1 0.074* -0.012 
 




























































ISO STK 0.069***†  0.000  PUBLIC  0.154  0.267***  ICEFI 0.073***† 0.000 
ICEFI 0.061***†  0.000  CFC  0.100*†  0.000  PROCESS 3 0.057 -0.073* 
PROCESS 1  0.058 -0.027  FSC/ISO/CFC  0.100*†  0.000  ISO FMUs 0.048*† 0.000 
ISO FMUs 0.053***†  0.000  ISO FMUs  0.067†  0.000  FSC FMUs 0.037 0.002 
GOVERNMENT  0.033 -0.076  FSC/ISO  0.067†  0.000  GOVERNMENT 0.035 -0.139*** 
STAKEHOLD  0.027 -0.013  CFC/ISO  0.067†  0.000  ISO STK 0.016† 0.000 
FSC FMUs  0.026  0.002  ICEFI  0.033†  0.000  CFC FMUs 0.008† 0.000 
CFC FMUs  0.008†  0.000  STAKEHOLD  0.023  0.031  STAKEHOLD -0.028** -0.016 
REGULATION -0.002  0.025  BOYCOTT  0.015  0.036  PUBLIC -0.071 0.184*** 
PUBLIC  0.003  0.201***  FSC FMUs  0.000†  0.000  ECONOMICS -0.103* -0.005 
SOCIAL -0.035  0.052*  CFC FMUs  0.000†  0.000  PROCESS 2 -0.134*** 0.073*** 
PRIVATE -0.035  0.041  PROCESS 1 -0.005  0.087  REGULATION -0.135*** 0.019 
 
                                                                 
† Since no articles were found to mention these concepts outside of Chile, these values are unaffected by sampling error. 




























































ECONOMICS -0.036 -0.007  ECONOMICS -0.023  0.000  PRIVATE -0.151*** 0.046* 
PROCESS 2 -0.130***  0.086***  PROCESS 2 -0.146*  0.133*  SOCIAL -0.198*** -0.018 
FSC -0.342***  0.040***  FSC -0.433***  0.169***  FSC -0.260*** 0.042*** 
 
 
* = P = 0.05 ** = P = 0.01 *** = P = 0.001          = Within sampling error range 
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However, once geographical conditions are relaxed (i.e., simply comparing CHILE 
to all NON-CHILEAN media), we observe dramatically different results (see Table 5.4). 
When all expertise segments are combined, signal attenuation is statistically observed for 
over half (52 percent) of all content categories; the effect is even stronger for FORESTRY 
media (63 percent). Even the media segment with the least evidence of decline 
(GENERAL) revealed statistically measurable reductions across more than 44 percent of 
the categories. 
Not surprisingly, terms referencing CHILE itself showed the strongest attenuation 
(83 percent) across all categories, but ISO and CFC_STK (CertForChile stakeholders) 
also decreased significantly (39 and 29 percent, respectively). Apart from INDUSTRY 
media, local- level Chilean content (e.g., NSMD participants and stakeholders) tended to 
drop off when certification was discussed outside the country (or was rarely discussed 
even within Chilean media). Similar results are observed for the tendency for references 
to participatory language (PROCESS3) to decrease (most significantly in INDUSTRY 
media, at 59 percent), though this was not the case for GENERAL media. In fact, this 
category was evident in more than one-third of all GENERAL media articles in both CHILE 
and NON-CHILEAN media (34 percent for each). 
It is interesting to observe that terms in the ENVIRONMENT category also 
tended to decline along this dimension (though this was only statistically demonstrated 
for FORESTRY and INDUSTRY sources). However, even where these concepts were least 
salient (NON-CHILE.ENGLISH.FORESTRY), they were addressed in nearly three out of every 
four articles. Thus, even if signal attenuation can be clearly demonstrated, we must be 
careful when interpreting results. 
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Given the central role the Forest Stewardship Council has played throughout the 
history of forest certification, it is not surprising to see strong evidence that the FSC has 
been discussed more frequently – across all media segments – outside of Chile. The FSC 
clearly benefits (in terms of public awareness) from its global profile and centrality to the 
development of forest certification overall. Other NSMD categories are strongly 
impacted by geographical distance, with attenuation evident for twelve of fifteen such 
categories (80 percent), a majority of which (60 percent) were never observed in the NON-
CHILE media. 
Overall, the data suggest that physical distance has very important impacts on the 
communication of certification-relevant knowledge. This is especially true of locale-
specific information (e.g., the CFC labeling system), but also appears to operate on more 
general concepts, as well (e.g., PROCESS3, PUBLIC). This effect, and its significance 
for competitive, global-scale NSMD systems, will be discussed further in the following 
chapter. 
 























































CHILE 0.833***  CHILE 0.836***  CHILE 0.747***  CHILE  0.866*** 
ISO 0.387***  ISO 0.500***  PROCESS 3 0.588***  ICEFI STK  0.319*** 
CFC STK 0.289***  CFC STK 0.391***  ISO 0.547***  ISO  0.264*** 
CFC 0.243***  CFC 0.370***  SOCIAL 0.497***  CFC STK  0.218*** 
ICEFI STK 0.237***  PEFC 0.326***  GOVERNMENT 0.383***  BOYCOTT  0.207*** 
PEFC 0.199***  SOCIAL 0.320***  PRIVATE 0.347***  FSC/ISO  0.206*** 
PUBLIC 0.162***  PUBLIC 0.262***  PUBLIC 0.321***  CFC  0.185*** 
FSC/ISO 0.156***  PROCESS 3 0.243***  REGULATION 0.318***  CFC/ISO  0.173*** 
PROCESS 3 0.152***  ENVIRONMENT 0.146***  ICEFI STK 0.267***  FSC/ISO/CFC  0.137*** 
CFC/ISO 0.143***  REGULATION 0.136**  CFC STK 0.267***  PEFC  0.126*** 
FSC/ISO/CFC 0.126***  CFC/ISO 0.130***  ENVIRONMENT 0.240***  ENVIRONMENT  0.117*** 
ENVIRONMENT 0.120***  ICEFI STK 0.120***†  ISO STK 0.167*  ICEFI 0.073***† 
BOYCOTT 0.120***  FSC/ISO 0.120***†  PEFC 0.132  PUBLIC  0.067 
 























































ISO STK 0.069***†  FSC/ISO/CFC 0.120***†  CFC 0.100*†  PROCESS 1  0.065* 
ICEFI 0.061***†  ISO STK 0.109***†  FSC/ISO/CFC 0.100*†  ISO FMUs   0.048*† 
ISO FMUs  0.053***†  ICEFI 0.054*†  ISO FMUs 0.067†  FSC FMUs  0.039* 
FSC FMUs 0.027*  ISO FMUs  0.054*†  FSC/ISO 0.067†  ISO STK  0.016† 
PROCESS 1 0.037  STAKEHOLD 0.076*  CFC/ISO 0.067†  CFC FMUs  0.008† 
REGULATION 0.018  PRIVATE 0.069  PROCESS 1 0.049  PROCESS 3  0.002 
STAKEHOLD 0.017  BOYCOTT 0.043  STAKEHOLD 0.042  STAKEHOLD -0.040*** 
CFC FMUs 0.008†  FSC FMUs 0.022†  BOYCOTT 0.038  GOVERNMENT -0.069 
SOCIAL 0.006  ECONOMICS 0.012  ICEFI 0.033  PROCESS 2 -0.080*** 
 PRIVATE -0.002  CFC FMUs 0.011†  FSC FMUs 0.000  ECONOMICS -0.107** 
GOVERNMENT -0.027  PROCESS 2 -0.015  CFC FMUs 0.000  PRIVATE -0.117*** 
ECONOMICS -0.042  GOVERNMENT -0.024  ECONOMICS -0.023  REGULATION -0.121*** 
                                                 
† Since no articles were found to mention these concepts outside of Chile, these values are unaffected by sampling error. 
 























































PROCESS 2 -0.062***  PROCESS 1 -0.052  PROCESS 2 -0.063  SOCIAL -0.211*** 
FSC -0.311***  FSC -0.421***  FSC -0.328***  FSC -0.229*** 
 
* = P = 0.05 ** = P = 0.01 *** = P = 0.001          = Within sampling error range 
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5.4.2 Language, culture and distance 
The language in which a source is written is a crude means of capturing less “concrete” 
cultural factors, considering the general correlation of language with geography (as well 
as the strong results of the previous hypothesis). Yet though it is likely impossible to 
completely separate language from geography, the substantial number of SPANISH sources 
outside of CHILE permit us to test potential effects both with and without a strong 
geographical influence. 
Though it is not surprising that terms relating to CHILE show clear attenua tion 
from SPANISH to ENGLISH across both groupings (see Table 5.5), the magnitude of this 
decline is substantially smaller than any of those observed in the tests of Hypothesis 6. 
More interesting is the stronger attenuation of PEFC-related content when CHILE sources 
are excluded; despite the importance that CertForChile supporters have placed on 
affiliation with the PEFC program, it seems unlikely that CFC-certified exporters are 
primarily interested in Spanish-speaking consumers. 
Many of the instances in which the null is supported are also substantively 
interesting, especially those dealing with conceptual categories, as these may be more 
indicative of cultural or linguistic differences. For instance, although the categories 
STAKEHOLDER and PROCESS2 are more common in ENGLISH media, there are no 
direct analogues for these terms in the Spanish language. Yet the same cannot be said of 
terms such as PUBLIC, which were discussed at comparable levels in both languages 
when CHILE media were included, but which was not discussed at all in NON-
CHILE.SPANISH media. Similarly (though not surprisingly, considering the results of 
Hypothesis 6), the absence of attenuation for messages about local stakeholders and 
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FMUs must be qualified by the fact that many of these terms are simply not discussed at 
all outside of CHILE. In general, the evidence here suggests that linguistic or cultural 
factors do influence the communication of certification-relevant knowledge, albeit the 
effect cuts both ways, and appears weaker than that observed for physical distance. 
 
5.4.3 Epistemic communities and distance 
As in Hypothesis 5, this test compares content signals across three segments, requiring 
attenuation across both of those more “distant” to invalidate the null. And, as was 
generally true in that earlier test, this did not occur. However, for media outside of CHILE 
(i.e., US and WORLD), the lack of evident attenuation for many categories (see Table 5.6) 
must be interpreted in light of the fact that many of these terms are not discussed at all. 
Thus, while the data may not support this particular operationalization of professional 
community-as-distance, it nevertheless underscores the significance of geography to the 
communication of certification-relevant information. 
 


























CHILE 0.562***  PEFC  0.256*** 
PEFC 0.235***  PROCESS 1  0.177*** 
ISO 0.227***  PROCESS 3  0.158*** 
CFC STK 0.172***  CHILE  0.135*** 
PROCESS 3 0.164***  SOCIAL  0.094* 
ICEFI STK 0.152***  ENVIRONMENT  0.051* 
CFC 0.150***  ? CFC/ISO  0.032* 
ENVIRONMENT 0.105***  ECONOMICS  0.032 
FSC/ISO 0.103***  ? ICEFI STK  0.026*† 
CFC/ISO 0.098***  REGULATION  0.025 
PROCESS 1 0.090***  FSC/ISO  0.018 
FSC/ISO/CFC 0.076***  FSC FMUs  0.006† 
BOYCOTT 0.074***  CFC  0.000† 
SOCIAL 0.070*  CFC FMUs  0.000† 
ISO STK 0.040***  CFC STK  0.000† 
 
 


























ICEFI 0.032***  FSC/ISO/CFC  0.000† 
ISO FMUs 0.030***  ICEFI  0.000† 
FSC FMUs 0.020**  ISO  0.000† 
CFC FMUs 0.005†  ISO FMUs  0.000† 
REGULATION 0.010  ISO STK  0.000† 
GOVERNMENT -0.015  BOYCOTT -0.021 
ECONOMICS -0.022  STAKEHOLD -0.045*** 
PRIVATE -0.028  PRIVATE -0.049 
STAKEHOLD -0.016  GOVERNMENT -0.067 
PUBLIC -0.041  PROCESS 2 -0.083*** 
PROCESS 2 -0.078***  FSC -0.102*** 
FSC -0.233***  PUBLIC -0.279*** 
 
* = P = 0.05 ** = P = 0.01 *** = P = 0.001          = Within sampling error range 
                                                 
† Since no English media articles were found to mention these concepts, this value is unaffected by sampling error.  
 















































































FSC  0.063* -0.105***  CFC STK  0.125  0.049  PUBLIC  0.095  FSC  0.145** -0.105* 
CFC  0.058***  0.005  CHILE  0.081 -0.145*  ECONS  0.078  PROC 3  0.142** 
-
0.185*** 





CFC STK  0.025  0.040*  PEFC  0.059  0.097  STKHLD  0.048  PROC 1  0.137** -0.041 
PROC 3  0.021  0.007  FSC/ISO  0.053 -0.143**  PROC 2  0.037  SOCIAL  0.092 
-
0.374*** 
CFC/ISO  0.013 -0.005  STKHLD  0.030  0.100*†  PEFC  0.026†  BOYCOTT  0.018 -0.041* 
FSC/ISO  0.011 -0.007  FSC FMUs  0.022† 
-
0.040***  FSC 
 
0.022**  STKHLD  0.008  0.002 
CHILE  0.007  0.064*  ICEFI  0.021 -0.039  BOYCOTT  0.016  FSC/ISO  0.000† -0.004 
BOYCOTT  0.005 -0.032*  FSCISOCFC  0.020 -0.037  CHILE  0.010  ICEFI STK  0.000† -0.004 
 
 










































































FSC FMUs  0.005† -0.005  CFC FMUs  0.011† -0.008  PROC 3  0.000  CFC  0.000†  0.000† 
STKHLD  0.004  0.030  BOYCOTT  0.009 
-
0.191***  CFC FMUs  0.000†  CFC FMUs  0.000†  0.000† 
ICEFI  0.004  0.001  PROC 1  0.003 -0.020  CFC STK  0.000†  CFC STK  0.000†  0.000† 
FSCISOCFC  0.004  0.010  ECONS -0.009  0.158**  FSCISOCFC  0.000†  FSCISOCFC  0.000†  0.000† 
CFC FMUs 0.002† -0.001  PROC 2 -0.012  0.025  ICEFI  0.000†  ICEFI  0.000†  0.000† 
ISO FMUs -0.003  0.011  ISO FMUs -0.012  0.018  ICEFI STK  0.000†  ISO FMUs  0.000†  0.000† 
ISO STK -0.014  0.036*  FSC -0.012 
-
0.151***  ISO FMUs  0.000†  ISO STK  0.000†  0.000† 
GOVT -0.024 -0.082*  ISO STK -0.058  0.151*  ISO STK  0.000†  FSC FMUs  0.000† -0.001 
SOCIAL -0.025 -0.164***  ISO -0.067 
 
0.301***  FSC FMUs -0.003  CFC/ISO  0.000† -0.005 




0.048***  CFC -0.003  CHILE -0.003 -0.040** 
ICEFI STK -0.034  0.028  ICEFI STK -0.147 -0.056  FSC/ISO -0.003  ENVIRO -0.004 -0.102* 
                                                 
† Since no articles were found to mention these concepts outside of Chile, these values are unaffected by sampling error. 
 










































































ECONS -0.036  0.079***  SOCIAL -0.159* 
 
0.414***  CFC/ISO -0.003  PROC 2 -0.010 -0.023 
ENVIRO -0.047 -0.032  PRIVATE -0.162 
 
0.328***  ISO -0.009*  REGN -0.020 -0.025 
REGN -0.054  0.044  REGN -0.194* 
 
0.401***  ENVIRO -0.025  ISO -0.031  0.031 
PROC 2 -0.049*  0.002  PUBLIC -0.199* 
 
0.320***  REGN -0.065  PUBLIC -0.041  0.013 
PEFC -0.093**  0.110***  PROC 3 -0.246** 
 
0.461***  PRIVATE -0.128*  ECONS -0.044  0.073* 




0.278***  SOCIAL -0.156*  PEFC 
-
0.200***  0.142** 
 
* = P = 0.05 ** = P = 0.01 *** = P = 0.001          = Within sampling error range 
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5.5 Comparing messages 
It is also important to look at these results not merely as relative proportions, but in terms 
of the actual rates at which content has been discussed across the various media 
segments. When we look at the data in this way, a few important patterns emerge. First, it 
is clear that the FSC is not only the overwhelmingly most-mentioned NSMD system, but 
that its central organizing principles (as evidenced by the organization’s three-chamber 
rulemaking structure) have also dominated discourse about forest products certification. 
FSC is the only NSMD category which appears in more than half of the source articles 
across all contexts (though CHILE is also dominant across all media segments within 
CHILE). The next most commonly mentioned NSMD-specific term is PEFC, which is 
found fairly often in the Chilean media, with nearly one of three (FORESTRY), one of four 
(INDUSTRY), and one of every seven (GENERAL media) articles containing the term. Again, 
this Europe-based labeling system accepted CertFor as a member in the October 2004. 
Yet in the United States, PEFC was mentioned in fewer than one in thirty INDUSTRY 
articles, and not at all in GENERAL media sources. Expanding the scope to all NON-CHILE 
media, INDUSTRY sources were the most likely to mention PEFC (one of five) and 
GENERAL media sources barely mentioned the program (one of twenty articles). 
Strangely, PEFC was not mentioned at all by the FORESTRY sources included in the 
analysis, even though these were all European in origin. 
Overall, mention of CHILE and local- level stakeholders and NSMD systems (i.e., 
CertForChile) was a rare occurrence outside of the country (see Table 5.7). Out of more 
than 1,500 articles, CHILE was found in only 38 cases (less than three percent); mention 
of stakeholders was rarer still, with the most prevalent, FSC/ISO (Forestales Bío Bío, 
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Millalemu, Terranova, or Tornagaleones), appearing only twice. Outside of the country, 
the CertFor system was explicitly mentioned only once (see below). The majority of 
stakeholder categories were simply absent in these media segments. CHILE was also 
mentioned in the context of forest certification in one other NON-
CHILE.ENGLISH.FORESTRY source, though only to draw brief attention to a variety of other 
countries taking up the PEFC. The article’s real focus was on the establishment of a UK 
branch of that system (Forestry & British Timber 2003, p 9). 
While FSC’s high profile may be attributed to its early and consistent leadership 
on this issue, the evidence strongly suggests that competitors have a great deal of ground 
to cover before they could hope to achieve similar salience. In general, the only terms 
(aside from the FSC) consistently mentioned across all media were essentially conceptual 
in nature. Again, while these results may not be surprising, they do require us to strongly 
qualify our expectations of the competitiveness of non-FSC NSMDs in global markets. 
Finally, for a full picture of the available information, it is useful to understand 
NSMD-related content on an article-by-article basis. Again, articles directly mentioning 
CHILE as a source for certified wood are exceptionally rare. Possibly the most important 
event was the ForestEthics campaign to promote Chilean FSC-certified suppliers in 
(González 2002). The “high-profile” campaign was launched with a full-page 
advertisement in the New York Times on September 13, 2002 (ForestEthics 2002b). 
However, despite generating a tempest within Chile itself, neither the ad nor the 
campaign appear to have registered much media interest in United States. While several 
sources reported on the agreement signed fourteen months later between CMPC-Mininco, 
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Table 5.7 Actual Rates of Content Across Non-Chilean Articles 
Rate ENGLISH language  n = 1548  Rate SPANISH language  n = 154 
FSC 1484  PROCESS 1 150 
ECONOMICS 1327  ENVIRONMENT 136 
PROCESS 1 1282  ECONOMICS 135 











GOVERNMENT 606  PROCESS 3 75 
PROCESS 3 476  GOVERNMENT 62 
PUBLIC 458  PEFC 42 
PRIVATE 331  CHILE 26 
REGULATION 214  REGULATION 26 















STAKEHOLDER 74  CFC/ISO FMUs 5 










FSC/ISO FMUs 3 










CFC 1  CFC 0 
CFC FMUs 1  CFC FMUs 0 
CFC STK 1  CFC STK 0 
CFC/ISO FMUs 0  FSC/ISO/CFC FMUs 0 
FSC FMUs 0  GOVERNANCE 0 













Table 5.7 Actual Rates of Content Across Non-Chilean Articles (continued) 
Rate ENGLISH language  n = 1548  Rate SPANISH language  n = 154 
ICEFI STK 0  ISO FMUs 0 












Arauco and “US and Chilean environmentalists” (only ForestEthics and 
Greenpeace Chile were identified), most were either syndicated articles by a single author 
(e.g., Tobar 2003b, a), or wire reports (e.g., San Jose Mercury News 2003). Oddly, none 
of these mentioned certification (considering the centrality of FSC certification to 
ForestEthics’ campaign), and were therefore not captured by the search protocols used in 
the social distance analysis. 
The only NON-CHILE.ENGLISH.FORESTRY article which discussed CHILE in any 
detail also mentioned forest management certification, including the intent of Millalemu 
and Monteaguila to implement ISO 14001, the European Commission-funded project 
with INFOR and CONAF, and a passing reference to research comparing FSC criteria to 
forest management practices in Chile at the time (Timber Trades Journal 1998). The only 
identified NON-CHILE.ENGLISH.GENERAL article (though an argument could be made that 
it belongs in the INDUSTRY segment) that directly mentioned a Chile-based forest products 
company as a source for certified wood was an announcement about a leadership change 
at Terranova’s US subsidiary, Terranova Forest Products (Business Wire 2004). 
CHILE was more common in the NON-CHILE.SPANISH.GENERAL media, though 
still only appearing in 17 percent of those articles, six of which focused on the 2002 
ForestEthics boycott effort (e.g., Spanish Newswire Services 2002). These articles 
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provided the most detail about forest certification in Chile, though this information was 
still generally limited to those stakeholders directly promoting the boycott (stakeholders 
in the FSC standard-setting process, such as Defensores del Bosque, among them), or the  
FSC-certified forestry companies within Chile. However, even with these fairly detailed 
articles, mention of Chilean stakeholders was still unusual overall – the most common, 
CFC/ISO (Bosques de Chile, or Forestales Arauco or Mininco), appeared only five times 
(3.3 percent). While it was slightly more probable to find other forest companies (FMUs) 
mentioned in this segment, as in the NON-CHILE.ENGLISH media, the majority of 
stakeholders were not discussed at all. Purely linguistic effects (e.g., there is no 
convenient Spanish word for “stakeholder”) were also evident, with terms such as “3rd 
party” completely absent as well. 
In NON-CHILE.ENGLISH.INDUSTRY media, reference to CHILE was limited to the 
role of the country as a manufacturing site for a US-based flooring company which had 
secured COC certification with the FSC (Contract Flooring Journal 2003, p 6). A similar 
pattern was evident for many NON-CHILE.ENGLISH.GENERAL media sources: while many 
mentioned both CHILE and certification, most of these focused on non-Chilean forest 
industry actors (e.g., Weyerhaeuser, Boise Cascade), though they may have drawn 
attention for their activities in that country (see AScribe Newswire 2002). While 
certification (and especially FSC, at 96 percent) was discussed in articles throughout the 
period (the earliest in 1994), reporting tended to “spike” around key events, such as local 
conflicts over the FSC system (Associated Press 2003; Bangor Daily News 2003; 
Edgecomb 2003). 
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6 RECOGNIZING SCALE IN STATES AND MARKETS 
Where governments do not govern, the private sector does. 
 
Haufler 2001, p 29 
 




During the latter part of the 20th century, the growth of international trade agreements led 
towards increased integration and harmonization of state economic policies. 
Unfortunately, cooperation on other public goods lagged, failing to address many of the 
externalities associated with the huge expansion of global economic activity. At the same 
time, developing nations were told the key to improving their economic status was to 
maximize their comparative advantage, which given their lower levels of industrialization 
and wealth, usually meant exporting natural resources with little or no processing. As 
these trends grew in scope, scale and pace – increasing pressure on environmental and 
social systems – concerns about long-term sustainability began to emerge. 
One issue area where public concern was most pronounced focused on the 
dramatic levels of deforestation, especially in the tropics. Yet despite considerable efforts 
by state and civil society actors during the 1970s and 80s, negotiators failed repeatedly to 
establish a global forest treaty. In response, NGOs partnered with forest products 
companies to develop market-driven approaches to protect public goods by private 
means. These systems derive policymaking authority from stakeholder participation and 
market demand, rather than state institutions (Cashore 2002; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
                                                 
156 This quote, which translates to “but who shall watch the watchman?” is from Satire VI:  The Ways of 
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2004b). Such non-state, market-driven models are increasingly being proposed as 
alternatives to unproductive (or unresponsive) state-based policy processes, often with 
claims that they will improve efficiency and policy effectiveness (e.g., Campbell 1997; 
Yilmaz 1998; Council of Economic Advisors 2003; Russell and Clark 2003). Yet despite 
the implicit political significance of transferring regulatory authority (and capacity) from 
public to private actors, until now no studies have compared NSMD and state-based 
approaches as reliable means of policy implementation. This is partly due to assumptions 
that state and market institutions are fundamentally incommensurate, but also by the lack 
of a comparative framework that is tractable yet still capable of illuminating the 
sometimes subtle differences between policy systems (Schneider and Ingram 1997). This 
dissertation is an effort to develop just such a framework, by focusing on formal and 
informal structural factors that could be expected to impact the likelihood of 
implementation designs to achieve their nominal goals. 
Comparing state-based and NSMD policy systems requires that we do more than 
merely ignore distinctions between the institutional foundations of each, especially where 
markets are global in scope. To truly understand the capacity of market-driven systems to 
“compete” with more territorially constrained state policies, we must acknowledge the 
role of information in consumer decisions, and how that might differ at national and 
global scales. While some characteristics (e.g., price, material quality) may be readily 
observable at either the point-of-purchase or once a product is used, others may require 
that consumers be exposed to additional information about the “value-added” by the 
means of production (e.g., environmental safeguards, labor relations). This presents 
                                                                                                                                                 
Women, a misogynistic comedy about the “dangers of marriage” (1992). 
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consumers with a dilemma – even if their intention is to favor such goods, they must not 
only trust that product labels honestly reflect reality, but also be able to discriminate 
between multiple labels that represent different capacities, philosophies, and possibly 
even levels of integrity. In other words, these “credence” or “reputation” goods157 require 
informed consumers far more than traditional markets (Caswell et al. 1996). Rather than 
merely assume that NSMD systems are equivalent means of ensuring public goods, we 
should consider how such informational needs might effect the ability of either state or 
non-state systems to reliably inform “constituents” (i.e., citizens or consumers). 
To gain leverage on such questions, I have identified and measured internal and 
external structural factors that can be expected to negatively affect communication in 
both state-based and NSMD regulatory systems (see Figure 2.7, replicated as Figure 6.1). 
I interpret internal structure as networks of authority-delegation dyads (of principals and 
agents), creating a generalizable comparative framework that can be applied to state, non-
state or hybrid policy systems. Though the range of external structural factors that might 
degrade communication may be quite broad, I focused on the forms of social distance 
that we could expect to be relevant to global-scale systems. While state regulatory 
systems are territorially bound, both of the NSMD systems considered here strive to 
appeal to market actors on a global scale. Thus, evidence that social distance erodes the 
quality of information available throughout those market chains should lead us to 
question – or at least qualify – the reliability of NSMD systems which have been 
                                                 
157 Again, since consumers cannot tell the quality of credence or reputation goods before or even after 
purchase, they must have trust in the seller’s claims (Golan, Kuchler, and Mitchell 2000; Engel 2001). 
Markets for these goods are typically much harder to sustain than those where consumers can determine 
quality themselves prior to purchase (i.e., search goods) or after use (i.e., experience goods) (Caswell and 
Mojduszka 1996; Cason and Gangadharan 2002). 
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implemented at scales beyond the national level. 
 
Figure 6.1: Comparing State and Market-Driven Implementation Systems  
 
Thus, my goal has been to estimate the capacity of NSMD approaches to reliably 
ensure public goods (relative to state-based systems), with a case study of Chilean 
forestry. To address this question, I first defined two conditions (H1,  H2) for minimally 
reliable oversight : formally defined delegation (determinacy) and the absence of such 
relationships between 1st or 2nd parties (political breadth). If these conditions are not met, 
an implementation system cannot be said to be truly regulatory or likely to produce 
reliable results. 
No act of communication is perfect – the transfer of information always 
introduces some degree of “noise” and degrades quality. Researchers have long known 
that such error is compounded when instances of communication increase; this 
observation allows us to compare the implementation networks of both state-based and 
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non-state policies by the relative likelihood that policymaker demands can be 
successfully communicated to all subordinate agents (H3, H4). Ceteris paribus, we would 
expect those systems exhibiting greater structural complexity to present greater barriers 
to successful communication between policymakers and policy targets, and thus be 
generally less reliable means of achieving policy goals. 
We also know that communication can be problematic wherever actors are 
separated by culture and experience (social distance). While such factors may be 
relatively insignificant at the national level (at least in the Chilean context), they may be 
quite important at a global scale. Because NSMD approaches are predicated on informed 
demand 158, evidence that social distance is correlated with declines in the quality of 
publicly available and NSMD-relevant information (H5, H6, H7,  H8) should lead us to 
question the reliability of such systems as means of ensuring public goods – at least at 
regional or global scales. While the magnitude of such factors depend on the market 
strategies of participants, this also raises an element of uncertainty about the consistency 
of policy outcomes. Moreover, even where it is possible to mitigate the effects of these 
factors, such costs may make a given system competitively disadvantaged to those less 
affected. If state-based systems prove weaker in terms of their internal structures (H1, H2, 
H3, H4), NSMD approaches may indeed present an improved design. But where NSMD 
systems are applied at global levels, any evidence of social distancing (H5,  H6, H7,  H8) 
means that external structural factors may threaten to reduce or eliminate such benefits. 
                                                 
158 If consumers cannot distinguish between labels, then labels have little value as a means of product 
differentiation (Morris 1997; Costa and Ibanez 2000). 
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6.1 Revisiting the evidence 
Inasmuch as it was possible to graph the roles and obligations detailed in each systems’ 
policy documents, all of the systems considered here met the condition of determinacy. 
However, as I demonstrated in Chapter 4, the chain-of-custody – a critical instrument for 
connecting producers and consumers – introduces a degree of indeterminacy to both 
NSMD systems. Since participation in such systems is voluntary, we would expect 
systems that rely on chain-of-custody instruments to provide feedback to producers to be 
less reliable than those that do not. While this does not mean that NSMDs will always be 
less effective as a means of policy delivery, such challenges are not insignificant. 
Anecdotal evidence suggests that in the case of forest certification, a large proportion of 
certified logs are “lost” along the value chain159. This has been attributed to the voluntary 
nature of these systems, as well as to the relative scarcity of COC-certified companies160. 
In fact, this has been a major concern throughout the history of forest certification. Such 
losses should lead us to question the reliability of such systems to create market 
incentives for producers, and more generally, the functionality of market-based policy 
systems at the global level. 
On the other hand, all of these systems appear to satisfy the condition of political 
breadth – no direct delegation linkages were observed between 1st and 2nd parties, as such 
                                                 
159 When the Conservation and Community Investment Forum interviewed certifiers, foresters, and 
academic researchers in 2001, it was claimed that only one of every five logs leaving FSC-certified forests 
ended up in FSC-labeled products (2002).  
160 Even when certification has been verified all the way to retailers, there is not guarantee that those goods 
will be labeled as such (Teisl and Roe 2000). Large COC retailers (e.g., Home Depot, Lowe’s) often avoid 
labeling certified goods, due to the irregularity of supplies, or concerns that sales of other products might be 
negatively impacted. Others (e.g., IKEA) have corporate branding policies that bar placing other logos on 
their products (Archer, Kozak, and Balsillie 2005). 
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actors were involved only as the targets of policy implementation. For both FSC and 
CertFor, this is not unexpected – indeed, one of the earliest lessons in the development of 
the forest certification regime was that consumers tended to lack faith in labels that were 
not 3rd-party certified (Teisl and Roe 1998; Cason and Gangadharan 2002). Though 
representatives of both forestry companies and industrial associations were actively 
involved in the development of both the FSC and CertFor systems, such participation was 
not delegatory in nature. While we may question the proper role of target actors in 
policymaking processes, we must use other analytical tools to shed light on such 
processes. Of course, such linkages – indeed, all structural patterns apart from those 
related to chain-of-custody instruments – are likely to be rather idiosyncratic, and thus 
less likely to be generalizable across all NSMD systems. 
With this in mind, the NSMD systems considered here offer clear improvements 
in terms of parallel complexity (i.e., multiple principals), the factor which also varied the 
most across policy systems. Chile’s state implementation systems exhibit more than twice 
the parallel complexity of the most complex NSMD system, CertFor. In part, this reflects 
the diversity of the state’s policy tools, which include instruments such as subsidies, 
loans, tax holidays, and direct monitoring. But it may by partly derived from 
“institutional legacies,” the overlapping responsibilities often associated with long- lived 
state policies (North 1990). However, it is unlikely that all forms of parallel complexity 
are equivalent161. It is reasonable to believe that the duplicate relationships within the 
                                                 
161 In other words, that the “magnitude” of parallel complexity is commensurate, regardless of the particular 
procedures and institutions involved. Rather, it seems likely that some forms of parallel complexity may be 
specifically designed to reduce slippage (e.g., competing agents, each empowered to report on any 
deceptive behavior by others). While it is not clear that this has been the case for any of the systems studied 
here, it still suggests limits to which metrics such as parallel complexity might be universally applied. 
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CertFor system were designed to reduce the effects of sequential complexity, by 
interjecting direct and fina l authority by the Secretariat. Determining whether such 
differences matter is something that must be established with performance-based 
measures. 
Structural comparisons become more complicated when we consider sequential 
complexity. While Chile’s state-based forestry regulations exhibit the longest delegation 
chains, the balance shifts when we consider the “informational chains” necessary to 
guarantee that the products of certified forests (and only certified forests) bear 
certification labels. To link producers to consumers, chain-of-custody systems require 
that every link between forests and store shelves be certified. Since global commodity 
chains are often quite lengthy, the sequential complexity of these label-based systems 
may in fact be much greater than that of (Chile’s) state regulatory systems. Though the 
actual length of a chain-of-custody depends on market structure and the economic 
strategies of firms along the chain (including voluntary participation in NSMD systems), 
such factors are exogenous to the NSMD policies themselves. This means that in 
practice, NSMD systems which rely on COC instruments are likely to be both 
indeterminate and sequentially complex. This may seem intuitively obvious, and in fact, 
direct-marketing to consumers was an early strategy of wood certifiers. However, to my 
knowledge, before now no one has identified the extended chain-of-custody as a 
structural flaw inherent in global-scale NSMD systems. 
Given such challenges, the market-driven aspect of NSMD systems appears to be 
their weakest point. Yet those attempting to connect producers and consumers at the 
global level face the additional problem of social distance – understood here as the 
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tendency for informational asymmetries to emerge as actors are separated by geography, 
culture, or epistemic framing. Since domestic- level state-based policies are territorially 
constrained, such factors are less likely to be significant. However, inasmuch as informed 
consumers are necessary for label-based systems to succeed, any factor that produces 
such asymmetries will also limit the reliability of NSMD approaches as a means of policy 
delivery at the global scale. 
In estimating the impacts of three forms of social distance on publicly available 
communication about forest certification, I determined that epistemic framing (i.e., 
professional communities) showed no attenuation effect (i.e., terms were no less common 
in INDUSTRY and GENERAL media articles than in FORESTRY publications). On the other 
hand, cultural distance showed a moderate attenuation effect, even when Chilean sources 
were excluded to reduce possible geographical effects. Especially interesting is a decline 
in the mention of the PEFC system, considering both its European origins and the claims 
that CertFor proponents have made about how that program will increase the visibility of 
their products beyond Chile. 
However, such results should be qualified by near or total absence of many terms 
in media outside of Chile (see Figure 6.2). Indeed, it is geographical distance that 
demonstrates the strongest impact on communication quality. Sixteen categories were 
found in less than five percent of all NON-CHILE articles, including PEFC and CertFor, 
with the latter found in only a single article found outside of Chile. By comparison, FSC 
is found in 96 percent of NON-CHILE articles162. This is not surprising, given the historical 
                                                 
162 This apparently high salience must be qualified – a search of MAJOR PAPERS in LexisNexis reveals that 
US-based Home Depot was discussed in at least 5,313 articles in 2003 alone. 
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importance of the Forest Stewardship Council in the development of forest certification. 
The FSC has more than 740 FMUs and 4,200 COC companies certified in over 70 
countries163 (FSC 2006b); by comparison the PEFC and its affiliated programs 
(CertFor164 among them) have certified 184 FMUs and 2,598 COC firms across 21 
countries165 (PEFC 2005). Though geographical distance may have serious implications 
for the competitiveness of market-driven systems, such effects must be understood within 
context, as other market alternatives may be advantaged in particular markets. Again, 
while this may seem intuitively obvious, relatively few scholars (or practitioners) have 
suggested that social distance may present problems for market-driven governance 
systems in general (exceptions include Princen 1997, 1999; Conca 2001). To my 
knowledge, this is the first attempt to measure such effects at the global level. 
                                                 
163 As of January 2006, fifteen FMUs and twenty-six COC firms were certified to FSC standards in Chile 
(FSC 2006b). 
164 Currently, six FMUs  and nine COC firms are CertFor-certified (CertFor 2006). 
165 This amounts to 133,889,563 hectares globally, almost twice the FSC’s total of 68,125,087 hectares 
(FSC 2005), reflecting the general reluctance of the world’s larger forest companies to embrace the FSC 
process. 
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Figure 6.2 Categories with Statistical Evidence 
of Attenuation or Gain Across Geographical Distance 
 
Again, the problems caused by social distancing effects are in addition to those 
posed by internal structural factors – NSMD systems operating at global scales are prone 
to both. Though it may be possible for broadcast communication strategies to “skip 
ahead” to consumers further down the product chain, this cannot overcome all 
weaknesses of chain-of-custody systems. Because geographic and cultural distancing 
effects are evident across all market segments (FORESTRY, INDUSTRY, GENERAL), 
broadcast strategies may still fail to inform actors intermediate between producers and 
end consumers. Given the complexity, spatial distribution, and cultural diversity of global 
commodity markets, the task of informing manufactures, retailers and consumers is 
clearly a great challenge. Since the FSC so clearly dominates international discourse 
about forest certification, this problem would seem to be especially difficult for newer, 
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local systems, such as CertFor. The surprisingly scarce mention of the PEFC system 
(despite its greater certified acreage) suggests that a mutual recognition strategy (by 
which CertFor products are allowed in the PEFC chain-of-custody system) may not offer 
the market advantages which proponents of CertFor have hoped for. 
 
6.2 Implications  
These results echo many of the concerns that have been raised in the past about the 
reliability of private regulation (Vrielink and Brandsen 2004). Even before the newest 
wave of NSMD policies, scholars pointed to the critical importance – yet tenuous nature 
– of information in market-driven systems (Parkinson 1975; Laric and Sarel 1981). The 
tendency for both extended market chains and social distance to erode communication 
has been highlighted (e.g., Princen 1997; Fuchs and Lorek 2002), as has the possibility of 
geographical distance to affect the competitiveness of more distant producers (e.g., Bass 
et al. 2001). Thus, while NSMD approaches may be successful at national or regional 
scales, they are much less likely to produce consistent feedback at the global level. Since 
the regulatory apparatus of modern nation-states are territorially defined, we would 
expect the distancing effects for state-based policies – or locally based, market-driven 
systems – to be less than those found in global markets166. Ceteris paribus, we would 
expect NSMD systems to be most successful where distances (both structural and 
geographic) between producers and consumers can be minimized. For some goods, lower 
structural distances may be achieved through direct marketing, though this is likely only 
                                                 
166 Large or culturally diverse states would likely face more challenges of this sort than smaller, culturally 
homogenous states. While this is less of a factor for this particular case study, it does limit the 
generalizability of social distance as a constraining variable. 
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feasible for higher value goods (e.g., doors and moldings167). For those of lower value 
(e.g., roundwood, lumber168), geographic constraints are more likely to be significant. 
This is supported by the global distribution of certified producers; both the FSC and 
PEFC have been most successful at gaining marketshare in Europe, where most certified 
producers are also found (Thornber 1999, 2003; PEFC 2005). More distant producers – 
where the challenge of sustainable forest management is arguably more critical – have 
been disadvantaged in those markets (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). While this 
may not be entirely attributable to either structural complexity or social distancing, the  
evidence I’ve presented here suggests that such factors should be of concern to those 
seeking to promote environmental and social sustainability via market forces. 
However, distancing may not be the only – or most important – factor affecting 
the availability of producer information in consumer markets. Where market demand is 
so vast that it can only be met by a multitude of sources, it is unreasonable to expect 
individual producers or labeling systems to have a salience with consumers that is 
significantly greater than their marketshare. Although US markets consume over one-
third of Chile’s forestry exports, this amounts to only 0.3 percent of US forest product 
imports (Howard 2004). In this context, it would seem unrealistic to expect Chilean 
producers – or Chilean policy systems – to have a very high profile in US media. Add to 
this the confusion caused by the great variety of certification and producers labels in the 
marketplace (recall Figure 2.6), and we have a clearer picture of the challenges facing 
                                                 
167 Andersen Windows and Alexandria Moulding, two of the largest international wood products 
manufacturers in Chile, have both announced FSC-only purchasing policies, to the irritation of those in the 
Chilean industry who do not actively support FSC certification (El Mercurio 2003; Lignum 2003a). 
168 Roundwood are unprocessed logs, while lumber (also known as sawn wood) has been milled to 
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conscientious consumers (Cabarle et al. 1995; Teisl and Roe 2000). 
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that if we want NSMD approaches to 
apply to a significant proportion of global production, markets must either be 
predominantly local169, or substantially concentrated170. While informational asymmetry 
is greater for products sourced from greater distances, the evidence shows this is likely to 
be less problematic for local sources. It may be possible to reduce asymmetries by 
combining ecolabels with othe r information (e.g., producer marks, country-of-origin 
labeling), and thus effectively shorten COC chains, reduce social distance, or both. But it 
is clear that both the context and scale of policy institutions – and the markets within 
which they compete – are likely to be more important factors for the success (or failure) 
of any given NSMD policy system than aggregate demand. This means that there are real, 
practical limits to our ability to achieve sustainability via market forces, just as there are 
limits to state-based regulatory approaches. In the Chilean context, structural complexity 
affects both state and market-based institutions, but social distance is much more likely to 
be an additional complicating factor for the latter. When comparing the expected efficacy 
of NSMD models with state-based regulatory approaches, we must always be conscious 
of such limitations. 
                                                                                                                                                 
standardized dimensions (Dykstra and Heinrich 1997).  
169 Ensuring global-scale public goods through localized markets faces the persistent problem that neither 
capital nor demand are evenly distributed. Indeed, it is the wealth and higher consumption of the US, 
Europe, and East Asia (rather than their proximity) that have made them Chile’s most important markets. 
170 Of course, concentration increases the potential for other well-known problems, both economic and 
political. Bottlenecks of either supply (monopoly) or demand (monopsony) tends to produce market 
distortions (Princen 1997; Milward 1998), and disproportionate economic power has long been associated 
with disproportionate political power (Dahl and Lindblom 1953). 
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Some have suggested that the weaknesses of Chile’s state forestry regulation may 
be resolved by clarifying CONAF’s formal legal status (Silva 1997a; Clapp 1998) and 
strengthening that agency’s authority (e.g., giving enforcement powers to forestry 
officials) (Leslie 1997). Paradoxically, this may even increase the effectiveness of the 
private sector approaches (Haufler 2001). However, these reforms alone would still not 
address problems of structural complexity (see Table 4.7). The non-state systems 
operating in Chilean forestry offer clear advantages in terms of parallel complexity, as 
well as possible marginal improvements in sequential complexity (leaving aside the 
problems associated with chain-of-custody instruments). Assuring both citizens and 
consumers may require the state to retain policymaking and licensing authority, as well as 
liberal use of “fire-alarm” oversight. An approach that has been successfully 
implemented in neighboring Bolivia is to establish state standards that are equivalent to 
NSMD alternatives in terms of stringency, but which exempt forest companies from 
government oversight if they have been certified by a state-recognized non-state system 
(Jack 1998; Taylor II, Nittler, and Kraljevic 2002). In at least some national contexts171, it 
may be possible to design hybrid systems to combine the best of both approaches: the 
more established policymaking authority of state institutions, and the leaner 
implementation structures of non-state systems (Koppell 2003). 
Thus, peculiarities of the Chilean case may limit our ability to generalize all of 
these conclusions to other contexts. Chile presents a strong case for (potentially) effective 
                                                 
171 This option is available to Bolivian lawmakers because most forestland is owned by the state, and leased 
to logging companies. The model is much less feasible in Chile, where productive forests (and tree 
plantations) are overwhelmingly in private hands, and the constitution strongly emphasizes private property 
rights. 
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regulation: low levels of state corruption and relatively stronger economic status may 
imply an unusually high state capacity, and the country’s highly modern commercial 
forestry suggest a relatively high capacity to implement any regulation, regardless of its 
institutional origins (i.e., state, non-state, or hybrid). However, Chile’s history of 
neoliberal policies – and related emphases on private property rights and natural resource 
exports – has produced an environmental regulatory apparatus that is in fact, relatively 
weak (Rojas 1994; Silva 1997b). While many other wood exporters have also struggled 
to apply state forestry regulations, higher levels of corruption or generally fewer state 
resources in other national contexts may make state-based regulation even less reliable 
there. Similarly, the less-sophisticated forest industries and poorly defined property rights 
– both of which are common in the developing world – are each also likely to generally 
limit the ability to implement either state or non-state regulatory policies. Where these 
producers are also structurally or socially distant from demand for certified forest 
products (also quite common), we would expect NSMD policies to face significantly 
greater challenges than we find in Chile. 
 
6.2.1 The problem of demand 
Of course, while partially retaining state policymaking authority may address a few 
functional challenges and normative concerns, critical issues remain. Perhaps most 
significant is the problem of demand – market-driven means of ensuring public goods are 
predicated on the belief that given a choice, informed consumers will discriminate in 
favor of certain goods, and such preferences will be communicated to producers in terms 
of higher prices for those goods, or an increase in market share (Wynne 1994; Sikod 
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1996). Product labels serve as the principal means of differentiation, which in the case of 
forest certification is intended to inform consumers that those products have greater 
“value-added,” inasmuch as their harvest or processing conform to standards intended to 
protect public goods172 (Simula, Rametsteiner, and Blåsten 2001). The model is meant to 
provide producers with incentives to turn out more “high-value” products, and thus 
expanding the protection of public goods (Moran 2001) (see Figure 6.3). But for such 
systems to function properly, at least two other conditions must be met: there must be an 
available supply of certified and labeled goods in the marketplace; and consumers must 
be sufficiently informed and motivated to prefer those goods over others (von Mirbach 
2000; Simula et al. 2001). This presents something of a Catch-22 – producers are unlikely 
to incur additional cost173 to produce such goods without some guarantee that consumers 
will respond, and even willing consumers are unable to reward producers if labeled 
products are not readily available (Hansen et al. 1998; UN-ECE et al. 1999; Whiteman et 
al. 1999). 
                                                 
172 Since the “added-value” of such goods cannot be determined by examining the products themselves 
(before or after purchase), markets for these credence  goods are very different from those of ordinary 
commodities (Caswell and Mojduszka 1996; Engel 2001). They are heavily influenced by the level of 
consumer trust, one of the principal reasons why 3rd-party certification has become so important to NSMD 
systems (Teisl and Roe 1998; Cason and Gangadharan 2002). 
173 Bare (2000) has estimated that auditing and management costs associated with forest certification add 
9.9 percent to base stumpage costs – that is, forest managers would need to earn almost a 10 percent 
premium to break even. 
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Figure 6.3 Market feedback 
 
Since this problem is common to all new products (and efforts to differentiate 
existing products), it was anticipated by the early proponents of forest certification, who 
organized sympathetic retailers into “buyers’ groups” such as the WWF 1995 Group 
(founded in 1991, now known as the WWF-UK Free Trade Network ), to create sufficient 
demand to “jump-start” producer interest in FSC certification (Bass et al. 2001). After the 
idea was expanded to include producers’ groups, the WWF formed the Global Forest and 
Trade Network , which now represents eighteen trade groups, active in more than two 
dozen countries – though over half are based in Europe, and buyers (principally DIY 
retailers) outnumber producers ten-to-one (WWF GFTN 2005). The WWF-UK Free 
Trade Network has been exceptionally successful at the local level, claiming to account 
for nearly 30 percent of that country’s forest products market (WWF-UK FTN 2005). 
Though this represents the high-water mark for FSC certification174, the label has 
demonstrated the ability to expand or maintain market access for producers (Butterfield et 
al. 2005). Still, certified goods are not projected to account for more than a small fraction 
of the world’s total forest products market for the foreseeable future (Whiteman, Brown, 
and Bull 1999). 
                                                 
174 The FSC is believed to have the largest share of the market for certified forest products, although 
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Similarly, the ability of producers to receive higher prices for certified goods has 
never been clearly established (Teisl and Roe 2000). The year the Forest Stewardship 
Council was named (but two years before its official founding assembly), a WWF survey 
found consumers were willing to pay up to 15 percent more for sustainably harvested 
wood products (Bass et al. 2001), and later surveys largely supported this belief (Ozanne 
and Vlosky 1997, 2003; Jensen et al. 2004). However, higher prices have rarely been 
observed in practice (Gullison 2003; Anderson et al. 2005). Such evidence as does exist 
shows far lower increases (e.g., a 2 percent gain for certified plywood) (Anderson and 
Hansen 2004a), or has been restricted to rare, highly valued species for which demand is 
strong, but supplies limited (Butterfield et al. 2005, p 21). While a small percentage of 
consumers consistently purchase certified goods with little sensitivity to price, most 
switch to unlabeled products as prices increase175 (Rametsteiner 2001; Anderson et al. 
2005). The vast majority are primarily concerned with price, value and convenience 
(Roberts 1996; Anderson and Hansen 2004b). Consumer demand has not been as 
important to the expansion of forest certification as have major retailers, who have often 
supported certification as a means of deferring bad publicity from environmental groups 
(Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b). While this has rarely resulted in higher prices for 
producers, it may help to stabilize or increase their market share (Butterfield et al. 2005), 
though this point is disputed (Whiteman, Brown, and Bull 1999). Regardless, if this 
“middle-tier” is the dominant source of market-driven demand (in forestry, at least), then 
NSMD approaches may be difficult to justify in terms of consumer sovereignty, as some 
                                                                                                                                                 
demand for the PEFC label has grown slightly in recent years (UNECE-FAO 2001). 
175 The Conservation and Community Investment Forum has estimated that consumers will only accept a 5 
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proponents of market-driven public policy have argued (Zadek, Lingayah, and Forstater 
1998; Overdest and Rickenbach 2005). 
Thus, perhaps the greatest problem posed by a market-driven approach to public 
policy is that even where demand is sufficient, consumer preferences (at any point in the 
supply chain) may not reflect the factors most important to ensuring those public goods. 
Effective demand is unevenly distributed throughout the world, and distant consumers are 
unlikely to know about local ecological or social contexts. Since signal attenuation was 
observed across all market segments (i.e., FORESTRY, INDUSTRY, GENERAL), social 
distance is a likely to be a persistent constraint for NSMD systems that are applied 
beyond local or national scales. Because the global distribution of wealth is unlikely to 
change significantly before most of the problems facing “at risk” public goods are 
resolved, this suggests a serious limitation to market-driven policy systems, and should 
lead us to question the wisdom of devolving state responsibilities to increasingly 
globalized markets and market actors. 
 
6.2.2 Alternative explanations of support for NSMD systems 
Faced with persistent and powerful opposition in state-based policy arenas, and the 
possibility of gaining more direct control over policymaking processes, by the late 1980s, 
NGOs began establishing alternative means of ensuring what they perceive as public 
goods. Unable to directly rely on state power to encourage participation or compliance, 
these groups turned to markets and consumer demand as a principal means of rewarding 
(or punishing) producers. But given the low media profile of these alternative systems in 
                                                                                                                                                 
percent premium (2002). 
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critical markets, why would Chilean firms choose to participate in the CertFor system? 
Moreover, why expend the considerable resources necessary to develop an alternative, if 
such costs are unlikely to be recouped in the marketplace? One prominent explanation in 
Chile was that FSC standards were designed for tropical forests, and were thus 
inappropriate to the local context (Morales 2003a). Another was that participants in the 
local FSC working group (ICEFI) are not representative of Chilean society (Miranda 
2002b), with the implicit suggestion that the developers of the CertFor standard were 
more so. Yet another has been that “monopoly power” by any single label is undesirable, 
and that Chilean producers needed viable alternatives (Agricultural Minister Jaime 
Campos, quoted in Lignum 2003d, p 11). 
Interestingly, though CertFor proponents have often emphasized FSC’s tropical 
origins (e.g., Miranda 2002a), once their standard neared completion, they often 
emphasized the similarities of the two programs – even to the point of claiming there are 
“no significant differences” between the two (Cerda and Lira 2001, p 15)176, apart from 
what were implied to be inconsequential procedural variations (Cerda 2003). Of course, 
the first claim is strongly disputed by FSC supporters, and CertFor’s more insulated 
policymaking processes were often criticized during that system’s development (personal 
communication). While I have described variations in the implementation designs of 
                                                 
176 While this report was produced under the aegis of the “independent non-profit organization” Econativa 
(p 3), both authors were then employees of Forestal MININCO and active in development of the CertFor 
standard. Cerda is  now Executive Director of CertFor, and Director of Fundación Chile’s Forests and 
Forestry Program (Ecoamerica 2005); Lira is currently Director of the foundation’s Development and 
Conservation Program for Forests, Industry and Sustainable Tourism (Lira 2005). I am aware of no 
independent field trials that compare the two systems, nor any comparisons of either NSMD policies with 
prior management regimes. 
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these two systems in detail, I have only hinted at177 some of the differences in the way 
each system has approached participation in policymaking processes. As with the 
situation I described in the opening of Chapter 1, the most persistent differences between 
Chilean NSMD systems appear to be political in nature. This suggests that questions of 
representation may also be critical to fully understand non-state policy development. 
Certification is not cost- free – both FMU and COC firms are generally required to 
pay auditing fees to certifiers178, and licensing or membership fees to the NSMD 
secretariats. For highly competitive markets (such as exist for forest products), any 
additional cost is difficult to justify, whether it is absorbed by producers or passed on to 
consumers. Since the auditing costs for large firms are less on a per-unit basis than they 
are for smaller firms (Scrase 1999; Bass et al. 2001), certification schemes tend to benefit 
larger-scale producers more179 (Meidinger 2000). Though there is no evidence to suggest 
that this has been a factor in Chile, the ability of firms to turn regulation to their 
competitive advantage is well-known (Yandle 1983). Raising the costs borne by rivals is 
often easier and less costly than competition based on price or volume (Salop and 
Scheffman 1983). There is little reason to believe that such “Baptists and bootleggers” 
                                                 
177 A description of CertFor’s governance structure can be found in Chapter 4, Section 4.3. As the timeline 
in Appendix III also suggests, ICEFI processes were essentially democratic, with the Directorate elected by 
Working Group participants (Verscheure 2000b, 2002), whereas CertFor’s governing and technical 
councils were chosen prior to public announcement of the initiative (CertFor 2001b; Morales 2003a). That I 
have generally not emphasized such factors does not mean that I believe them to be insignificant, but rather 
that they largely fall outside of my central thesis. 
178 Throughout the FSC’s history, civil society organizations have occasionally paid such costs for small-
scale producers (especially in the developing world) as a means of promoting community development 
(Bass et al. 2001). 
179 A study of FSC-certified firms showed that FMUs of 10,000 hectares or less (38.6 square miles) 
accounted for fewer than one-fifth of all certificates and just three percent of FSC’s total certified area 
(Thornber 1999, 2003). 
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dynamics would be absent in non-state policymaking (see Yandle 1999; DeSombre 
2000); indeed, the possibility that ecolabels might serve as barriers to market-entry has 
long been of concern (OECD 1997; EPA 1998; Raines 2003). 
On the other hand, buyer and producer groups working together under the FSC 
label have seen certification as an opportunity to coordinate their efforts, and create 
sufficient demand or supply to compete on a par with the mainstream (i.e., large-scale) 
forest products industry. This quasi- integration of multiple producers under a single label 
could be interpreted as a loose form of vertical integration, similar to Alchian and 
Demsetz’s contract-based concept of the firm (1972), or Coase’s idea of firms as a means 
to reduce informational asymmetries180 (1937, reprinted in 1988). To the degree that 
NSMDs are successful “quasi- firms,” then the choice of participating in them may be 
appealing to firms that have traditionally been at a disadvantage in the marketplace (e.g., 
small- to medium-scale producers). While describing NSMD systems in this way requires 
some conceptual stretching, the underlying motivation for participation in these systems 
is still in question – to what degree are NSMD systems purely voluntary, or hierarchical? 
To what degree might participation be merely an effort to compete on an equal footing 
with large-scale producers, by combining both marketing resources and output? 
Finally, it may be that a firm’s visible participation in certification may be seen to 
have greater benefits than any potential price premiums or growth in marketshare. 
Though research has suggested that forest companies “must perceive a direct or indirect 
                                                 
180 With at least one key difference – Coase argued that firms reduced asymmetries by internalizing 
information within authoritative hierarchies, while NSMDs attempt to reduce asymmetries between 
external actors (i.e., producers and consumers). Still, the idea that economic actors might enter into stable 
contractual relations (bearing many similarities to hierarchies) as a means of lowering transaction costs (at 
least for consumers) echoes Coase’s general argument. 
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benefit” before choosing to participate in NSMD systems (Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 
2004b, p 237), such gains must be understood in context. Firms facing persistent political 
pressures – especially the possibility of non-voluntary state regulation, or negative 
exposure in critical markets – may find significant benefits in these systems (Haufler 
2001). Yet if their subsequent participation fails to fully engage citizens, local 
stakeholders, or consumers, we may reasonably question the ultimate effectiveness – or 
normative value – of such “feedback.” 
 
6.3 Directions for future research 
While the general ranking (i.e., degree of internal structural complexity) of these policy 
systems roughly parallels the expectations of both Downs’ Law of Diminishing Control 
(1966) and Williamson’s linear control-loss approach181 (1967), my “implementation 
network” framework distinguishes different forms of institutional complexity (sequential 
and parallel), and highlights potential conflicts of interest (political breadth). Because 
the framework can be applied to state, non-state, and hybrid implementation designs, it 
addresses a persistent problem within comparative policy studies (Schneider and Ingram 
1997). Moreover, although social distance has been proposed as a limiting factor for 
efforts to achieve sustainability in global markets (Dickson and MacLachlan 1990; 
Princen 1997, 1999), this is the first effort to measure empirical effects across multiple 
contexts and content categories. Combined, these two methodologies provide a clearer 
                                                 
181 Based purely on the total number of actors involved in implementation, the most complex policy design 
would be D.L. 701/19561, followed by D.L. 19300 / D.S. 30, then CertFor, and finally FSC (not 
considering the real-world application of chain-of-custody instruments). This ranking is identical when 
only the number of hierarchical layers (i.e., sequential complexity) is considered (ala Williamson). 
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picture of the formal and informal structural constraints on policy implementation, 
drawing much needed attention to the twin constraints of institutional and geographical 
scale. 
Because it appears that not all forms of parallel complexity are likely to have the 
same impact on communication, I want to determine if such features are most often 
instances of true institutional redundancy (ala North 1990), or whether they are designed 
to reduce slippage (i.e., divergence between principals’ goals and agents’ actions). I 
suspect that the sequence of oversight will be a significant factor, as might the presence 
or absence of “fire alarm” oversight. For instance, the dyads between the CertFor 
Secretariat and FMU and COC firms (see Figure 4.2) are the last oversight/delegation 
relationships in that system’s certification processes182, effectively giving the Secretariat 
the “final word” on the issuance of certificates. It is also possible that certain network 
characteristics (e.g., the distribution of “sending” or “receiving” links by agent) may 
reflect other relevant structural relationships, such as the degree to which control has 
been centralized or distributed, or the relative importance of delegatory or purely 
informational (e.g., “fire alarm” oversight) relations. Exploring oversight and delegatory 
relationships from a structural perspective– and across a variety of implementation 
network designs – may provide insights about which policy instruments are more 
effective, and why. 
                                                 
182 Such information is implicit in the ordering of links (e.g., A, B, C…) in the implementation network 
graphs I presented in Chapters 3 and 4. 
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I am also interested in seeing whether the “harmonization” of multiple policy 
approaches can be observed in their formal implementation structures, and more or 
generally, the degree to which policy designs have evolved structurally over time. If 
possible, I would also like to compare real-world COC market chains, to identify under 
what conditions these have been successful in connecting producers to consumers – in 
other words, to systematically test the hypotheses that NSMD actors that pursue 
strategies to reduce structural or social distance are more likely to succeed in the 
marketplace (i.e., attain market premiums or increased marketshare). I also believe more 
could be learned about the protection of public goods by private means by applying these 
methods to other issue areas where both state and NSMD policy systems are found (e.g., 
organic agriculture, social standards). However, just because the network framework 
allows for multiple actor types (e.g., state, non-state, hybrid) does not mean that research 
needs to be restricted to areas where all of these types are found – as Figure 4.3 
demonstrates, we may be able to reveal interesting patterns by comparing state-based 
policies to each other. In fact, the degree to which internal structural factors are correlated 
with empirical success or failure (even across issue areas) may suggest positive reforms 
for state-based (or non-state) policy designs. 
Finally, although I was able to demonstrate strong evidence of geographic 
distancing effects, the statistical validity of other factors (e.g., cultural, epistemic) may 
have been limited more by my method of aggregating content, than by actual patterns in 
the data. I believe the results I have presented here could be strengthened by using article-
level coding and Logit analysis instead. I would also like to try representing geographic 
distance more directly, possibly by introducing an ordinal dummy variable to control for 
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general proximity. Because some time has passed since I gathered the articles for the 
original analysis, I would also like to return to Chile to gather additional media materials 
and re-interview stakeholders about the current status of forest certification there. 
 
6.4 Regulatory institutions of states, markets, and civil society 
While the choices and strategies of individual actors may significantly affect outcomes 
for both state-based and NSMD policies183, all must contend with the structural factors I 
have described here. In developing this two-part framework (structural complexity and 
social distance), I have been careful to avoid assumptions about actors’ motivations – 
indeed, we would expect complexity and distance to be constraints even if every actor 
were perfectly altruistic. Since the problems of informational asymmetry and slippage are 
only worsened by goal divergence (i.e., non-altruistic or selfish motives), we can assume 
that these structural factors represent a minimal baseline for policy success. In other 
words, introducing more “realistic” assumptions about actor motivations is only likely to 
make the problems identified here worse. Similarly, I have generally ignored the 
possibility that individuals may have different decisionmaking capacities – or abilities to 
act upon those decisions – either of which may also significantly impact policy outcomes. 
Instead, I have focused on factors that have been either formally (and endogenously) 
defined in the constitutive documents of each policy system, as well as the exogenous 
factors which have been observed in social systems of increasing scale and heterogeneity. 
                                                 
183 As I have already explained, the choice of whether to participate in voluntary systems affects the 
determinacy of each system, and strategies such as direct marketing may reduce sequential complexity. 
More generally, slacking and other forms of deception may also seriously impede the effectiveness of any 
policy forms. 
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Apart from those related to determinacy and political breadth, my hypotheses all derive 
from one assumption – that no act of communication is perfect. By investigating some of 
the various ways that formal and informal institutions can be expected to degrade the 
flow of communication, I have developed not only a framework capable of comparing 
very diverse institutions, but also established some of the baseline conditions by which 
agency is constrained. 
Thus, my approach is broadly compatible with what have been dubbed the “Three 
New Institutionalisms” (Hall and Taylor 1996; Kato 1996)184. Rather than building my 
arguments on assumptions about the motives of actors or institutions, I have generally 
followed Skocpol’s advice that institutional analyses ought to be historically and 
empirically grounded (1984; 1995). However, though I have remained neutral as to the 
“rational” or “self- interested” behavior of participants, the more formal elements of my 
framework (especially implementation networks) should accommodate a variety of 
rational choice perspectives (Waterman and Meier 1998), even as it provides a more 
nuanced and empirical understanding of how complex institutions are designed. This 
should also lead to more realistic theories of principal and agent dynamics at the systemic 
level (Lyne and Tierney 2002; Lyne, Nielson, and Tierney 2003). Indeed, despite claims 
by Bendor et al. that any study of principals and agents beyond the dyadic relationship is 
“excess baggage” (Bendor, Glazer, and Hammond 2001, p 236), I believe that I have 
offered conclusive proof that macro-structure can matter. 
                                                 
184 While these authors agree about two schools of new institutionalism (historical institutionalism and 
rational choice), they formulate the third somewhat differently. Whereas Hall and Taylor add sociological 
institutionalism, which emphasizes the effect of cultural contexts on institutions, Kato offered bounded 
rationality as based on assumptions distinct from that of rational choice. However, her formulation of 
bounded rationality is sufficiently broad that it appears to merely reflect a greater emphasis on the political 
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Inasmuch as we expect both structural complexity and social distance to 
negatively impact the transfer of information, this framework could also be interpreted as 
an extension of the concept of bounded rationality to both formal and informal social 
systems. In fact, elements of this approach were implicit in Williamson’s studies of 
hierarchy and optimal scale (1967; 1970) and explicit in Princen’s work on “shading and 
distancing” in global markets (1997). However, by supporting a more empirically 
grounded understanding, my framework should offer greater resolution on the root causes 
of suboptimal outcomes, whether they stem from these structural factors, or from 
strategic behavior185. Similarly, my formulation of social distance – and its effects on 
communication – should be recognizable to sociological institutionalists who strive to 
situate institutions in more subtle cultural contexts (e.g., Gilardi 2002). By paying closer 
attention to the possibility that various forms of social distance may affect 
communication throughout local, regional and global markets, we will be better able to 
assess many of the claims (and counterclaims) made about the success of NSMD policies. 
I have also helped to extend institutional and organizational analysis into new 
areas. While the use of organigrams is not uncommon in organizational analysis (e.g., 
Mintzberg and Westley 2000), this is the first time this formal approach has been applied 
to compare regulatory forms. Again, this method could facilitate comparative policy 
studies, which has long lacked a generalizable framework of sufficient subtlety 
(Schneider and Ingram 1997; Vedung 1998). Because the method also accounts for the 
role of non-state and hybrid actors in policy implementation, it enables comparison of 
                                                                                                                                                 
science literature over that of sociology. 
185 Lyne et al. contrast the structurally induced problems of multiple principals (i.e., parallel complexity) 
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state, non-state and hybrid policy designs – at least in terms of delegation, oversight, and 
related structural characteristics at the systemic (and sub-systemic) level. This not only 
helps to ground our discussion of both state and non-state policies, it allows us to move 
beyond the metaphorical use of the term “regulatory” to describe many non-state system 
dynamics. Indeed, by applying this network-based, principal-agent framework to other 
regulatory forms – and experimenting with a variety of assumptions about actors’ 
capacities and motives – we should be able to extend current theories of regulation in 
new directions. 
 
6.5 Governance in the era of globalization 
This project began with a casual observation that procedural elements of policy 
implementation appeared to be more contentious to supporters of competing non-state 
policies than differences in their standards of substantive success. Although other 
scholars have attempted to compare non-state policy systems in terms of process, these 
have generally been studies of stakeholder access and participation (e.g., Elliott 1999; 
Elliott and Schlaepfer 2001; Lindahl 2001). Others have compared non-state systems to 
state-based policies by focusing on the means by which policymaking authority (or 
legitimacy) is established and maintained, outside of the state’s formal coercive authority 
– especially market-driven systems (e.g., Cashore et al. 2001; Cashore 2002). While there 
have been other examples where scholars have compared state and non-state policy 
systems by their substantive standards (e.g., Pinchot Institute for Conservation 2005; US 
Forest Service 2005), this is the first attempt to compare such systems according to their 
                                                                                                                                                 
with the “ordinary agency losses” attributable to goal divergence or deception (2002, p 9; 2003, p 7). 
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expected effectiveness as means of policy delivery. 
Where states have failed to establish strong and effective policies, civil society 
organizations have come to work directly with economic interests to develop non-state 
means to regulate responsible behavior (Haufler 2001; Cashore 2002). Yet while these 
non-state, market-driven systems may increase the alternatives available to those 
concerned with sustaining public goods, they may reduce options in other areas. 
Economic actors have been known to pursue non-state initiatives as a means of pre-
empting state regulation (Sheppard 1999a; Arnold 2003); in fact, many proponents of 
private regulation have proposed such approaches as part of a broader privatization of 
economic and social regulation (e.g., de Bruijn and Norberg-Bohm 2001; Albrecht 2002; 
Council of Economic Advisors 2003). Yet if the alleged economic benefits of NSMD 
systems are illusory (or at least rare), it is difficult to see how they can be sustained as 
means of ensuring public goods. This is problematic, since devolving regulatory 
functions away from state institutions affects the state’s future capacity. The ability to 
discipline economic actors relies on maintaining the countervailing power186 currently 
derived from both governmental and civil society actors (Haufler 2001); indeed, we may 
find it more difficult (and possibly more costly) to re-regulate at a later point than to 
shore-up or reform current state capacity. 
                                                 
186 The term countervailing power comes Galbraith’s 1952 classic American Capitalism. While Galbraith 
had focused on the state’s role in economic regulation (e.g., prices, wages), the principal is the same for 
social regulation (e.g., environmental standards); economic actors have little incentive to serve the broader 
public good without a non-market force (e.g., government) strong enough to compel their cooperation 
(1954). 
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Whether we consider these NSMD systems as simply the latest examples of 
private governance187 (Sasser 2001; Falkner 2003), or as nascent examples of an 
emergent international “soft law” (Walter 2003; Bernstein and Cashore 2004), they 
present dramatic innovations to the means of policy delivery (Cashore, Auld, and 
Newsom 2004b) This is especially the case for regional and global (i.e., transnational) 
public goods, of which the environment is one of the clearest examples (Sonnenfeld and 
Mol 2002). Though the benefits of such goods often transcend national boundaries, the 
cost of sustaining them is primarily borne locally. This presents widespread incentives to 
free-ride on the efforts of others, and thus a persistent source of institutional and market 
failure. This holds true for both state and market actors, each of which often face 
incentives to externalize costs in pursuit of greater competitiveness (Goodwin and Harris 
2001; Revesz 2001). Indeed, most of the new-era NSMD policies have been promoted as 
means to reduce such failures, even while increasing efficiency and ultimately, policy 
effectiveness. 
Because independently monitored certification with a label-based chain-of-
custody – features of both the FSC and CertFor systems – are considered the “gold 
standard” of NSMD governance (Wartelle 2002; Cashore, Auld, and Newsom 2004b), we 
may assume that the factors impacting voluntary chain-of-custody instruments at the 
global scale (indeterminacy, sequential complexity, and social distance) would likely be 
worse for other NSMD forms. Without independent monitoring and  an auditable chain-
                                                 
187 “Governance” parallels “government” inasmuch as both involve rule systems intended to influence 
purposive, “goal-oriented activities” (Rosenau 1992, p 4), but the first is more inclusive. Whereas 
government has recourse to police powers, governance may also include systems based less on formal 
authority than on shared goals and norms (ibid.). 
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of-custody, consumers are unlikely to place much trust in the claims of producers, 
manufacturers or retailers (Golodner 1997; Zadek, Lingayah, and Forstater 1998), and 
without product labeling, it is difficult to see how even well-meaning consumers could 
realize their preferences in the marketplace (Cason and Gangadharan 2002). But since 
there are conditions under which NSMDs are unlikely to produce reliable outcomes (e.g., 
when sequential complexity and social distance are greatest between producers and 
consumers), we must question whether market-driven public policy is truly the panacea 
that so many of its supporters would have us believe (e.g., Campbell 1997; Yilmaz 1998; 
Schwarcz 2002a; Holcombe 2003). 
For those public goods which transcend political boundaries, there are no easy 
answers. This is a different issue than whether we prefer a system of one dollar-one vote, 
or one person-one vote. Though how we define “the public” is as important as how we 
define the public good, there are also functional reasons why we might choose one 
approach over another. Based on the results of this research, we should expect neither 
state or non-state systems to perform well as institutional and geographical scale 
increases. Regardless of whether we seek to sustain public goods by public, private, or 
hybrid means, we must expect slippage to increase along with institutional scale – 
especially the extended chains-of-custody associated with global markets. And inasmuch 
as rational demand (political or economic) is predicated on informed citizens or 
consumers, we must also expect feedback to the “suppliers” of public goods to diminish 
with social – and especially geographical – distance. Given the evident importance of 
structural and social distance, it seems that establishing and maintaining reliable 
oversight (i.e., watching the watchmen) will very likely require us to localize control. To 
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paraphrase the late House Speaker Tip O’Neill, “all implementation is local” (1994). The 
same may be said of reliable oversight – and thus, effective regulatory policy – whether it 





APPENDIX I: IDENTIFYING NETWORK RELATIONS 
The implementation networks I have depicted in this dissertation are single-mode and 
multi-relational (Wasserman et al. 1999), in that they involve a single class of entities 
(encompassing agencies, firms, and civil society organizations) that are interconnected by 
delegation, information, or resource transfer relationships. They are similar to 
organigrams (formal models of organizational structure), but differ in at least one 
fundamental respect: whereas organigrams have typically been used to depict paths of 
authority or responsibility within a single organization, implementation networks – at 
least as applied to regulatory policies – must by definition include multiple independent 
actors or organizations (Taylor 1958; Mitnick 1980). It is this seemingly minor difference 
that has prevented analysts from developing formal network models of regulatory 
implementation. 
The most basic unit of measure in a network is the dyad, defined as two actors 
and the link (or relationship) connecting them. In broadest theoretical terms, actors are 
“discrete individual, corporate or collective social units” (Wasserman et al., 1999, p 17), 
which might be understood quite broadly. But because the central purpose of my 
framework has been to highlight regulatory processes, I have generally chosen to ignore 
tasks mandated within single “corporate units” (i.e., intra-organizational processes), since 
these lack sufficient political breadth. Of course, what constitutes a “corporate unit” is 
not always obvious. Where there is evidence of budgetary or managerial autonomy (e.g., 
agencies within a government bureaucracy), I have treated those “nested” units as 
separate from others within the larger organizational structure. Where such autonomy has 
been less evident (e.g., FSC regional offices), I have considered those larger 
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organizations as unitary actors, and treated any mandated processes as internal. What this 
means, of course, is that the complexity of any given implementation network is likely to 
be dependent on the level of resolution (or “granularity”) of the analysis. 
Similarly, while all but two links (see Figure 3.1) in the implementation networks 
that I mapped in Chapters 3 and 4 represented either a delegatory or an informational 
relationship between actors, certain provisions of D.L. 701 / 19561 could not be 
characterized in this way (i.e., loans and reimbursements for reforestation and 
management costs). For other policies, it is possible that other types of linkages between 
principals and agents may also be relevant. Thus, the complexity of a given 
implementation network also depends on the theoretical focus of the researcher and the 
character of the policies being studied. 
One of my central goals in this research has been to ground as much of my 
analysis as possible in empirical data. Thus, in interpreting the implementation networks 
for each policy system, I have worked solely from the formative policy documents of 
each (e.g., organic laws, by- laws, regulations). Identifying the dyads of which the 
networks are composed is a matter of scanning the documents for passages that describe 
actions which are either required or permitted, and parsing the subject actors (those who 
“act” upon others) and predicates (verbs or verb phrases, and the objects of those verbs) 
into principals, relations, and agents. Of course, this is as much an art as a science in 
practice. Yet it is arguable that the roles and obligations can be consistently interpreted 
from policy documents – indeed, this is the essence of the first hypotheses of 
determinacy. 
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For example :  
FSC Accreditation Manual, Part 2.2. Section 3.6:  
 “During the evaluation visit, the FSC evaluation team: … discusses problems that have 
been identified during the evaluation of the application documents; … discusses concerns 
that have been identified by local consultees … inspects additional documentation …” 
Can be parsed to:  
a FSC representatives visit applicant’s offices to assess management systems. 
b FSC representatives meet with local stakeholders. 




Procedimiento para la ejecución de la visita de pre-auditoria, Section 8.1:  
“El procedimiento comienza una vez que se ha firmado un contrato entre el postulante y 
el cuerpo certificador, y se ha llegado a un acuerdo en relación a las tarifas 
involucradas.” 
Trans: “The procedure begins once a contract has been signed between the applicant and 
certifying body, and they have agreed to the fees involved.” 
Can be parsed to:  
c Applicant returns signed contract, obligating them to Pre-Assessment provisions. 





Simplifying assumptions  
Of course, reducing what are often quite lengthy and complicated policy documents to 
(relatively) simple network visualizations requires several simplifying assumptions – 
some of which may be quite unrealistic. Judgement as to the degree to which any 
individual assumption may be acceptable – or unacceptable – will very likely require an 
in-depth understanding of the relevant actors and institutions at hand, as well as the real 
world contexts within which those policy systems play out. For instance, a close reading 
of the case studies I presented in Chapters 3 and 4 (as well as Appendix V) suggests that 
several assumptions may need to be qualified. These assumptions can be grouped into 
two categories, according to the core elements of the unit of measure: the equivalency of 
actors and of the linkages between them. As I argue in Chapter 6, 
In any setting where multiple actors are involved, we can reasonably expect those 
actors to vary – sometimes quite significantly – by both motives and capacity. I addressed 
the first of these in Chapter 2 (see the discussion on preference divergence in Section 
2.2), and emphasized in Chapter 6 how the negative effects of either structural 
complexity and social distance are only compounded by goal conflict between 
participants (see Section 6.4). Again, even if all actors were perfect altruists, structural 
limits on communication can be expected to impact their ability to coordinate their 
actions towards shared goals. 
One potentially problematic simplifying assumption I have applied to these 
implementation networks is that all actors are considered to have an equivalent capacity 
to perform their roles and seek their objectives. Given the known diversity of some 
participants (e.g., the largest Chilean forestry firms, versus local NGOs), this may be 
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more or less significant, depend ing on the magnitude of the tasks and challenges facing 
each. For instance, larger firms may command greater resources, but also tend to face 
more complex management challenges. In general, whether individual actors or 
institutions are mismatched will depend on specific contexts, identified through careful 
case studies. And, as I argued in Chapters 2 and 6, while it may be possible for 
individuals or groups to mitigate the impact of some structural factors, the resources 
required to accomplish this feat would necessarily be diverted from other purposes (e.g., 
lower prices, higher profits). This would disadvantage such actors relative to others of 
similar capacity, but who face less-significant structural challenges. 
But perhaps the greatest simplification I have made when operationalizing these 
implementation networks has been to treat all linkages of a given type (i.e., relation) 
between actors as equivalent. This means that not only have I ignored potential variations 
in the “importance” of individual links (e.g., voluntary relationships are treated the same 
as more “coercive” ones), but I have also generally ignored multiple linkages between 
identical actors – that is, I have treated single instances of delegation or information 
transfer no differently than many, repeated linkages. Moreover, while the sequence of 
delegation or information transfers is sometimes implicit in the ordering of linkages (see 
the discussion in Chapter 6, Sections 6.2 and 6.3), this may just as often be masked 
wherever multiple linkages between actors are not treated individually. It may also be 
that the order in which responsibilities are detailed in policy documents is not identical to 
the sequence by which they will occur in practice. For instance, provisions in D.L. 
701/19561 tha t mandate reimburse for reforestation costs are described relatively early in 
the text of the law, but would clearly occur only after other delegation and monitoring 
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tasks. Thus, integrating sequence and timing into a formal network framework would 
necessarily require much more complicated methodologies than I have developed here. 
While focusing on the purely structural features of policy design clearly omits 
many important factors, it still facilitates comparison of policies with differing goals, 
constituent actors, and organizing principles. A full understanding of the similarities and 
differences of multiple policy approaches requires that we pay attention to other 
contextual factors (e.g., actor capacities and motives, substantive policy provisions), 
which is why I have attempted a richer case study than was absolutely necessary to 
















APPENDIX II: CONTENT ANALYSIS IN LEXISNEXIS ACADEMIC UNIVERSE 
The first step in using Lexis-Nexis’ Academic Universe to perform content analysis is to 
generate an initial search pool. These are partly defined by the way Lexis-Nexis 
organizes its web-based interface188, but I also delimited the searches by calendar year, to 
facilitate possible time-series analyses at a later point (see Figure II.1). To generate the 
initial pool, I searched for articles that mentioned189 “wood” or “woods,” variations190 on 
the word “forest” (e.g., forests, forestry), “timber”, or variations on the word 
“certification” (e.g., certify, certified). Because the purpose of this analysis was to gauge 
the relative availability of public source information about the forest certification systems 
relevant to Chilean forestry, I also limited the article pool to those mentioning the FSC, 
CertFor, or PEFC systems (using the Boolean “AND” function). 
                                                 
188 The relevant content groupings for this project were:  General News (Major Papers, Magazines and 
Journals, Newsletters, Policy Papers, Time Incorporated Publications); US News (Midwest, Northeast, 
Southeast, and Western Regional Sources); World News (North/South American, European, Asia/Pacific, 
and Middle East/Africa News Sources); News Wires; News Transcripts; Non-English Language News  
(Spanish Language News); and Business News  (Business and Finance, Industry News, and Knight-
Ridder/Tribune Business News). 
189 I used similar terms for Spanish-language sources (see Appendix VII). 
190 As I mentioned in Chapter 5 (Section 5.2), Academic Universe supports “wildcards,” symbols which 
can be used to delimit a specific (“*”) or unlimited (“!”) number of characters within a given text string. 
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Table II.1: Pool-generating Keywords  
 wood or fores! or timber or lumber or certif! 
AND FSC OR “Forest Stewardship Council” OR PEFC OR " Pan European Forest 




"Dangerous Goods Certification" OR "Fairmont State" OR "Financial Services 
Corp!" OR "Forest Park" OR "Free Speech Coalition" OR "Freeport-McMoRan 
Sulphur" OR "Insurance Counselors" OR "Lake Forest" OR "new hires" OR 
"PR Newswire European" OR “Field Studies Council” OR “Figure Skating” 
OR “Fiji Sugar Corporation” OR “Financial Services Compensation” OR “First 
South China” OR “Florida Southern” OR “Food Standard Committee” OR 
“Foreign Sales” OR “Forest School Camps” OR “Framingham State College” 
OR “FSC Management Corp!” OR “FSC Paper” OR “FSC Urban Ministries” 
OR “Funeral Standards Council” OR “stock-market” OR “Tax Association” 
OR asbestos OR components OR electronic! OR financial planner OR game 
OR hospital OR mortgag! OR obituar! OR securities OR spor** OR troop! 
OR wrestl! 
 
Of course, this technique still produces a number of false-positives (Tankard et al. 
1994) (i.e., articles not really related to forest products certification). After a significant 
trial-and-error period (i.e., scanning the initial search results), I was able to develop a set 
of “AND NOT” terms that reduced the overall false-positive rate to 12.2 percent (see Table 
II.1). I then was able to identify those media sources which had produced relevant articles 
for each segment and annual time period. Overall, I found 196 English- language and 29 
Spanish-language sources (see Appendix VII for a full listing) which published articles 
on forest certification between 1991 and 2004, for a total of 1,899 articles. 
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Figure II.1: Generating Search Pools in Academic Universe 
 
To identify the national origin and epistemic segment (as well as period of 
coverage 191) for ambiguous sources (e.g., the “Courier Mail,” published in Brisbane, 
Australia), I first referred to the “About This Title” links (within the “Source List” 
subpage) of Lexis-Nexis’ Academic Universe® “Guided News Search” (see Figure II.2). 
Where that information was not sufficient to resolve the location or target audience of the 
source, I went to Internet searches (see Appendix V for a full listing of Academic 
Universe sources, by year and market segment). To ensure the maximum consistency of 
my search results192, I generated each search pool again, this time limiting the results to 
only those sources known to have produced valid articles (and also, controlling for 
location and target market) (see “Step 5” in Figure II.1). 
                                                 
191 Of course, the availability of sources varies widely across time and place, but even sources accessible 
throughout the 1990s (e.g., the New York Times, Chilean media), only discuss forest certification 
sporadically. This is the chief justification for consolidating the content analysis results solely by social 
distance context (e.g., CHILEAN-SPANISH-GENERAL media), rather than attempting a time -series analysis. 
192 LexisNexis is constantly adding new media sources; therefore, the same pool-generating keywords 
might call up varying numbers of articles for a given period and market segment. Thus, limiting the final 
pool-generating searches to known sources is more likely to produce consistent outcomes over time, as 
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Figure II.2: Selecting Individual Source Media 
 
 
Thematic content analysis in academic universe 
Once again, a key premise of categorical or thematic coding methodology (and indeed, of 
many other forms of content analysis) is that terms which occur more frequently are 
“more important” (or at least represent a greater salience of those terms) (Lee 2004). This 
approach is based on three assumptions : the amount of media coverage of an issue can 
influence public opinion; that this can be estimated from a lexical analysis; and that the 
appropriate terms have been identified for the analysis. The first two assumptions have 
been repeatedly supported by media researchers (e.g., Graham and Dziuban 1996; 
Bernard et al. 1998; Bendix et al. 2003). As I explained in Chapter 5, the last of these is a 
quintessentially subjective question, which I have done my best to satisfy in that chapter. 
As Tankard et al. (1994) have suggested, when sufficient care is taken to control 
for source and context, it is possible to use LexisNexis’ Academic Universe to analyze 
                                                                                                                                                 
LexisNexis expands its resources. 
 227 
content. Yet while their approach was simply to determine the distribution of stories 
about target issues, I have gone a step further, using the “Search Within Results” feature 
of Academic Universe to identify the portion of articles within a general search which 
also address more focused topics. Since Academic Universe reports the total number of 
cases returned by all its searches, it is thus possible to identify general statistical 
characteristics about the pool of all results. 
Figure II.3: Initial Search Results 
 
The process is as follows: as I have already described above, I first selected the 
relevant sources for a given social distance segment (e.g., US-ENGLISH-GENERAL_MEDIA) 
within each search groups allowed by Academic Universe (e.g., GENERAL_NEWS-
MAJOR_PAPERS). The combination of the segments defined by the social distance 
framework and Academic Universe’s internal organization resulted in 129 pool-
generating searches. Working from a template which included all of my search terms, I 
noted the total number of articles generated by each search (see highlighted area in Figure 
II.3). Using “Search Within Results,” I then searched for the occurrence of terms from 
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each of the 27 sub-categories, and noted the number of articles containing those terms 
(see Figure II.4). This resulted in a total of 3,483 individual content searches across the 
entire corpus of forest certification articles. 
Figure II.4: Search within Results 
 
Once all 129 pools had been searched for the content associated with each sub-
category, I aggregated the absolute (i.e., not proportional) values identified for each pool 
and sub-category according to the appropriate social distance segment. I then simply 
divided the “Search within Results” number by the size of each pool-generating search to 
determine the ratio of content associated with each sub-category for each social distance 
segment. I then compared these proportions for statistical difference using a t-test, which 
accounts for variations in population size (e.g., differences in the total number of articles 





APPENDIX III: CERTIFICATION TIMELINE 
1983 The International Tropical Timber Agreement (ITTA) is signed at the 
UN Conference on Tropical Timber. It is the first to binding 
commodity agreement include a conservation mandate (Sizer 1994). 
1985 The Tropical Forestry Action Program (TFAP) is launched by FAO, 
UNDP, the World Bank, and the World Resources Institute. TFAP 
aimed to promote international donor coordination in the 
development of National Forestry Action Plans (Sizer 1994). 
1986 International Tropical Timber Organization (ITTO) is established 
(Elliott 1999). 
1988 Friends of the Earth UK publish the “Good Wood Guide,” an early 
effort to encourage the purchase of “environmentally or socially 
sensitive” wood products. The initiative sought to create demand for 




The British government and Friends of the Earth submit a proposal to 
the ITTO to study the feasibility of labeling tropical wood (Elliott 
1999). 
1990 Rainforest Alliance’s SmartWood program certifies Perum Perhutani 
in Indonesia (Donovan 1996). 
 The “1995 Group” is formed by ITTO, WWF, and “major retail and 
wholesale companies” in the UK, to “reduce consumption of 
unsustainably produced forest products” (Donovan 1996). 
1991 Home Depot begins selling certified non-timber forest products 
(Eisen 1996). 
April The idea and name “Forest Stewardship Council” are proposed at a 
California meeting of timber users, traders, environmentalists, and 
human rights organizations (FSC 2003). 
May The first draft of the FSC charter is written (it later evolved into the 
FSC Statutes and Bylaws) (FSC 2003). 
July First draft of FSC’s Forest Stewardship Standards are written (these 







A WWF report mentions that it is helping establish a “credible 
independent labeling scheme that gives consumers a choice. A group 
of small-scale traders and several environmental groups – the Forest 
Stewardship Council – is working on the scheme details (Elliott and 
Sullivan 1991). 
1992 UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) is held 
in Rio de Janeiro. 
 Woodworkers Alliance for Rainforest Protection proposes the 
establishment of a Forest Stewardship Council (Elliott and Donovan 
1996).  
March 16-18 An interim FSC board is elected at a Washington, DC meeting to 
organize the FSC founding assembly (Elliott and Donovan 1996). 
October Consultation with representatives from eleven countries lead to 
agreement on the initial FSC Principles and Criteria (except Principle 




First draft of FSC Principle 10 (Plantations) is written (FSC 2003). 
October 1-4 FSC founding assembly meets in Toronto, 130 attend from 25 
countries. A Board of Directors is elected, with the “mandate to 
establish the FSC and to develop FSC’s statutes and membership 




A new ITTA is negotiated; the 1983 agreement remains in force until 
the new one is ratified (Sizer 1994). 
April 29 First mention of certification in Chile, as a CONAF proposal to 
ensure that forest products are from "sustainably managed" native 
forests. (Estrategia 1994b). 
May ITTO publishes the first international report on forest certification 
(Baharuddin and Simula 1994) and organizes working group to study 
the issue (Elliott 1999). 
August FSC Secretariat is established in Oaxaca, Mexico (FSC 2003). 
 A seminar is convened by ProChile and the German Development 
Institute to discuss ecolabeling and sustainable forest management 





Discussion of proposal to have CONAF certify native forest 
management. (Estrategia 1994a). 
September FSC Statutes and Principles and Criteria are approved by FSC 
members (FSC 2003). 
September 21 First mention of the FSC in Chilean public media, written by the then 
President of INFOR. (Catepillán U 1994). 
1995 Chile joins the International Forest Industry Roundtable, which 
"provides the opportunity to establish contacts with important 
industrial forestry associations of other countries such as the AFPA 
(US), Bracelpa (Brazil), Skogsindustriera (Switzerland), CEPI 
(European Union), and the Forest Products Association (Canada). 
Support of the AFPA has been key" (Raga 2002a). 
February Santiago Declaration signed at the sixth meeting of Montreal Process 
members (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Elliott 1999). 
June ISO begins discussing a proposal to develop sustainable forest 
management standards (Mankin 1996). 
1996 According to Elliot and Donovan, INFOR and Fundación Chile 
“expressed interest in certification” as early as 1996 (1996). 
January  First four FSC auditors are accredited (FSC 2003). 
February FSC Principle 10 (Plantations) is ratified (FSC 2003). 
June First FSC General Assembly held in Oaxaca, Mexico (FSC 2003). 
February 21 FSC logo is announced in London (FSC 2003). 
May SmartWood certification, mentions Home Depot's "preferred 
purchasing" policy. (Schatz and Triana 1996, reprint from WSJ). 
November Broad discussion, including (FSC) certifiers, FSC, overview of 
certification by international region (including vague mention of 









CONAF and INFOR formed the Working Group for Sustainable 
Forest Management (GMS), to achieve consensus on criteria and 
indicators. The Group, presided over by CONAF, also includes 
CORMA, CONAMA, and the Foreign Relations Ministry. NGOs 
such as Defensores del Bosque Chileno, CODEFF, la Agrupacion de 
Ingenieros Forestales por el Bosque Nativo, and CIFAG are invited to 
participate. (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Schlegel and Echeverria 
2001b). The project is funded by a grant from the European 
Community (Cerda and Lira 2001). 
July 31 Grupo Santa Fe and FAMASA (both part of Grupo Shell) are the first 
ISO 14K-certified Chilean forest-products companies. (Aravena 
1997; El Mercurio 1997; Las Ultimas Noticias 1997). 
October FSC Percentage-based claim policy is announced (FSC 2003). 
November Seminar by Richard Donovan (SmartWood), sponsored by CIPMA 
and SUSTENTA XXI Forestry Consultants. Scheduled for the end of 
the month, the seminar focuses on certification and the sustainable 
management of native forests. (Chile Forestal 1997, 1998). 
1998 CORMA issues its Declaration of Environmental Values in 
Concepción (CORMA 2002). 
January CODEFF forms a group to develop a preliminary FSC Working 
Group until an official Working Group could be formed (FSC 
1999b). 
April Chile’s FSC Working Group, the Iniciativa Chilena de Certificacion 
Forestal Independiente (ICEFI) is founded (FSC 1999b). 
May Sweden develops the first FSC-accredited national standard (FSC 
2003). 
June (Terms of reference of the) FSC Working Group are established. It is 
led by CODEFF and involving more than thirty NGOs, institutions 
and businesses (Otero and Maluenda 1998; Schlegel and Echeverria 
2001b). 
July 9 CODEFF sponsors a seminar in Santiago on the FSC national 
initiative (Sheppard 1999a). 
August Pan-European Forest Certification working group formed by small-
scale Finish, German, French, Norwegian, Austrian and Swedish 





28 members of the Chilean (FSC) National Initiative Working Group 
are elected (FSC 1999b). 
1999 Home Depot establishes an office in Chile (Miranda 2002b). 
April First International Certified Products Fair held in Mainz, Germany 
(Environmental News Service 1999). 
 ICEFI National Working Group proposes applying to the FSC for 
formal recognition (FSC 1999b). 
June Second FSC General Assembly in Oaxaca, Mexico (FSC 2003). 
June 30 PEFC system launched in Paris (Cadman 2001b). 
August 26 Home Depot vows not to purchase products made from old-growth 
timber (Bond 1999). 
September ICEFI working group elects Directorate, coordinating and secretariat 
role is given to CODEFF (for two years) (Verscheure 2000a); ICEFI 
begins work on FSC standards for Chile (Voces del Bosque 2002). 
October ICEFI Native Forest Technical Committee begins work on a draft 




International Certified Products Fair held in London (Voces del 
Bosque 2002). 
August INFOR-Fundación Chile project (un-named) will be ready in 2001; 
CORMA’s Temas de Fondo describes an effort to support a national 
standard, recognized by PEFC and the "Mutual Recognition" 
initiative of the International Forest Industries Roundtable (Estrategia 
2000). 




CertFor Superior Council is chosen (Morales 2003a). 
November ExpoCorma2000 focuses on certification of environmental 
management (El Sur Concepción 2000; Estrategia 2000). 
December CertFor Technical Committee is selected (Morales 2003a). 
 US and Chile begin bilateral trade negotiations (USTR 2002). 
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2001 Chile becomes the leading mold ings exporter to the US (Lignum 
2003c). 
January 5 CertFor Working Group formed to “work with international 
consultants in the identification and definition of the National 
Standard for plantations, based on the standard developed by INFOR 
in December 2000. Attending were Aldo Cerda and Antonio Grass 
(CORMA), Maria Ines Miranda (Fundación Chile), and Victor 
Vargas (INFOR) (CertFor 2001b). 
 Forestal Monte Aguila (FAMASA) has 60,290 hectares of 
eucalyptus, e. nitens and radiata FSC-certified (FSC 2006b). 
January 22 (CertFor) Superior Council approves CertFor’s Nine Principles 
(CertFor 2001b). 
January 26 First CertFor organizational meeting (CertFor 2001b). 
February Chilean national standards initiative (unnamed), a CORFO-
Fundación Chile partnership (with subtle reference to CORMA), 
including a two-week assessment by international consultants Berty 
van Hensbergen (South African Association of Forest Owners and 
Borje Drakenberg (Professor of Forestry at the Swedish Agricultural 
University) (Lignum 2001e). 
February 1 CertFor Working Group meets to address Principle 1 (management 
plans) (CertFor 2001b). 
February 27 CertFor Working Group meets to address Principles 2 (environmental 
values) and 3 (biodiversity) (CertFor 2001b). 
March 8 CertFor Working Group meets to address Principles 4 (soil 
productivity and water quality and quantity) 5 (local communities) 
and 6 (indigenous groups) (CertFor 2001b). 
March 13 CertFor Working Group meets to address Principle 7 (workers rights) 
(CertFor 2001b). 
March 14 CertFor Working Group meets to address Principles 8 (national laws, 
international treaties) and 9 (monitoring) (CertFor 2001b). 








CertFor Working Group gives first draft of CertFor plantation 
standard to the Technical Council, who is to review and circulate it to 
a broader range of stakeholders over the coming months (van 
Hensbergen 2001). 
April First public mention of CertForChile (Lignum 2001a). Project is 
funded by CORFO (75 percent), forest companies (24 percent) and 
Fundación Chile (1 percent) (Cerda and Lira 2001). 
May The preliminary CertFor Chile auditors manual is finished. The 
standard is field tested on properties managed by Mininco, Arauco, 
and Bosques de Chile (Lignum 2001f; Dubé et al. 2004). 
June 29 ICEFI sponsors a workshop in Temuco on High Conservation Value 
Forests (ICEFI 2001). 
July CertFor’s Superior Council decides its plantation standard may be 
opened for public comment (Morales 2003a). 
August CertFor representatives present the CertFor draft standard at the 
International Forest Industries Roundtable meeting in Oslo (Morales 
2003a). 
September CertFor is publicly announced and a website is created (Ambiente y 
Desarrollo 2001). 
September 6-23 First public comment period for CertFor draft standard, available 
from Fundación Chile headquarters and on their website (CertFor 
2001c). 
September 12 Election of 2001-03 ICEFI Board of Directors (Verscheure 2002). 
October Protocol Agreement on the Native Forest Law Project signed (Sierra 
2002). 
October 11 Forestal Berango has 2014 hectares of p. radiata FSC-certified (FSC 
2006b). 
October 18 ICEFI Board of Directors re-elect Hernan Verscheure as coordinator, 








Consultative workshop on draft of CertFor’s national plantation 
standard; participants included: Defensores del Bosque Chileno; 
Greenpeace; CODEFF; EcoNativa; university deans; FAO; CertFor 
members and staff; INN; SAG; Asociación Chilena de Seguridad; 
CONAF; CORMA; the Minister of Agriculture; CORFO; and INFOR 
(CertFor 2001b; Lignum 2001a). 
2002 Fundación Chile, INFOR and CORMA will work to develop a 
national management standard for “lenga and renewable forests,” in a 
project financed by CORFO (Fundación Chile 2002a). 
 Alexandria Moldings and Golden State Lumber will no longer 
purchase radiata pine without FSC certification (de Ovando 2003; 
Maldonado V 2003). 
January Second public comment period for CertFor draft standard (Dubé et al. 
2004). 
February Superior Council approves CertFor Chile standard (Dubé et al. 2004). 
February 4 Forestal Tornagaleones has 44,355 hectares of semi-natural and  
natural forests FSC-certified (FSC 2006b). 
March CertFor travels to the FSC Secretariat in Oaxaca, Mexico to seek 
mutual recognition with the FSC, which is not granted (El Diario 
2002a). 
March 20 Forestal Bio Bio 66,555 has hectares of eucalyptus and pine FSC-
certified (FSC 2006b). 
April 10 Greenpeace attempt to blockade the Japanese ship Iwanuma Maru, 
which is loaded with woodchips from native forests (Soza 2002). 
April 21 Terranova (inc Millalemu) 120,237 hectares of radiata and other 
species is FSC-certified (FSC 2006b). 
April 25-27 Forest Leadership Forum-International Certified Wood Trade Fair 
held in Atlanta (Voces del Bosque 2002). Domtar (one of the largest 
paper companies in North America) announces it is seeking FSC 
(COC) certification, and will be developing a new line of FSC-
certified products (Carlton 2002). 
May PEFC receives mutual recognition application from CertForChile 
(Lignum 2002; Morales 2003). 





CertFor completes draft Chain-of-custody standard (Morales 2003a). 
June 15 CAF El Alamo has 3,501 hectares of eucalyptus, poplar, and pine 
FSC-certified (FSC 2006b). 
June 29 INFOR and CORMA sponsor a closed workshop on certification in 
Concepción. Also attending were Fundación Chile, CONAF, INN 
and the company members of CORMA. The objective of the 
workshop was to communicate all that had occurred regarding this 
theme, and to coordinate future effort (CORMA 2002). 
July Superior Council approves CertFor Chain-of-custody standard 
(Morales 2003a). 
July 24 "Boycott" campaign announced (El Diario 2002b), CORMA 
Directors meet to discuss the campaign (attendees include CMPC and 
Arauco, Minister of Agriculture Jaime Campos, CORMA President 
Letamendi, and Exec-VP Eduardo Correa) and draft a letter to Chile's 
Senators and other authorities (70 letters in all) requesting the 
government make a declaration that Chile has laws and the authority 
to enforce them (La Segunda 2002a). 
July 25 Roundtable on FSC certification held at the Conference Center of the 
Sociedad de Fomento Fabril (SOFOFA) (El Mercurio 2002). Over 
150 attend, mostly business representatives and academics (ICEFI 
2002c). 
July 26 Within a week, CONAF is to convene a meeting between CORMA 
and ENGOs to forge an agreement between those actors to define a 
new native forest law. Mentions that CONAF said an appeal to the 
WTO would be unlikely, as the boycott was not private, not 
governmental action (Gonzalez 2002). 
July 28 "Next week the Minster of Agriculture will send a letter to the North 
American Wholesale Lumber Association (NAWLA) that will try to 
convince them that Chile is not destroying its forests" (Allendes E 
2002). 
July 29 At a ninety-minute meeting with Malu Sierra, Marcel Claude, 
Gonzalo Villarino (Greenpeace), and Hernan Verscheure, 
Agricultural Minister Jaime Campos said that the government was 
not going to favor any label (La Segunda 2002b). 






CertFor completes draft Group Certification standard (Morales 
2003a). 
September 13 A full-page NY Times ad marks the official launch of a campaign 
against Chilean wood that is not FSC certified. Ad appeared only in 
the paper’s Eastern edition (Gonzalez 2002; La Nacion 2002b; 
Rodríguez 2002a). 
September 19  Rio Cruces has 3,588 hectares of native species FSC-certified (FSC 
2006b). 
September 23 CORMA meets with the Director of Economic Relations about the 
NY Times ad and boycott campaign (El Diario 2002). 
September 23-24 Eduardo Morales (Director of CertFor) participates in the ninth 
meeting of the International Forest Industry Roundtable in Rio 
(Lignum 2002c). CertFor representatives agree to study 
harmonization of that standard with the national standards of 
Australia and Brazil (Raga 2002a). 
September 30 Heiko Liedeker and Daniel Arancibia come to Chile to meet with 
CMPC executives, CORMA, CONAF, Celarauco, and major 
companies that have not been FSC-certified (El Diario 2002c). At 
Fundacion Chile, they meet with the Director General Eduardo Bitran 
and Eduardo Morales, manager of Fundación Chile's Foresty 
Department (Lignum 2002a). 
October Superior Council approves CertFor Group Certification standard 
(Morales 2003a). 
October 1 Forestal Tierra Chilena has 12,753 hectares of eucalyptus FSC-
certified (FSC 2006b). 
October 5 Meeting with CORMA, Heiko Liedeker denied any support for the 
boycott, and announced the intent to "realize complimentary activities 
between the Chilean seal CertFor Chile and the FSC" (Estrategia 
2002; Rodríguez 2002b). 
October 7-9 Meeting of Latin American FSC national initiatives in Buenos Aires, 
Argentina. Fifty representatives attend to discuss FSC 
decentralization, regional strategies, and tools for developing FSC 
national standards (ICEFI 2002d). 
November Danish window company Velux accepts PEFC as equivalent to the 
FSC seal, and Lowe's, the world’s second largest DYI chain, 





Over a thousand attend CORMA-Chile 2002 to celebrate CORMA's 
50th anniversary. Fundación Chile and CORMA organized the 
International Workshop on Environmental Forest Certfiication, with 
presentations by: Juan E Correa (Exec VP, CORMA); Olivar Ruiz 
(Director, CONAMA); Aldo Cerda (Research Director, CMPC); Lern 
Apediaile (UBC); Ana Rosa Yáñez (FSC); Eduardo Morales 
(Director of Forestry, Fundación Chile); and Valentina Lira 
(Econativa) (Lignum 2002d). 
November 22 PEFC announces mutual recognition of CertFor at its meeting in 
Luxemburg (Lignum 2002e). 
November 22-26 Third FSC General Assembly in Oaxaca, Mexico (FSC 2003). Over 
1,200 persons attend from 37 countries (ICEFI 2002a). 
December Home Depot sells $250 million of FSC-certified products in 2002, 
compared to $10 million in 1999 (FSC 2003). 
December 9 Forestal Los Lagos has 16,065 hectares of eucalyptus FSC-certified 
(FSC 2006b). 
December 15 Forestal Anchile has 61,069 hectares of eucalyptus and radiata FSC-
certified (FSC 2006b). 
2003 
January 21  
 
 
PROCER has 1,522 hectares of eucalyptus, e. nitens and radiata 
FSC-certified (FSC 2006b). 
February 21 Anderson Windows sends letter to ForestEthics announcing their 
decision to require FSC certification of all Chilean products it 
purchases (Maldonado V 2003). 
March 4 Anderson Windows publicly announces it will no longer purchase 
radiata without FSC certification (de Ovando 2003; El Diario 2003b). 
March 7 Presiding over the launch of PROCER (Promotora de Certificación 
Forestal), the Minister of Agriculture reaffirmed that the government 
will not favor any form of certification (Lignum 2003d). 








The Congressional commission on natural resources and the 
environment proposes a meeting to discuss the FSC and the 
implications of the actions of some US firms, as well as how Chile is 
responding. Invitees include Carlos Weber (CONAF), Jose 
Letamendi (CORMA), Gianni Lopez (CONAMA), and Simon Berti 
(Forestal Bio Bio) (El Diario 2003a). 
April 3 CONAF and PROCER sign technical cooperation agreement to 
increase the number of smallholders interested in certification 
(Lignum 2003c). 
May 4 Home Depot brokers talks between Chilean and US environmentalists 
and Chilean forestry companies (Nixon 2004b). Chilean ENGO 
representatives include Malu Sierra (Defensores de Los Bosques), 
Bernardo Reyes (Instituto de Ecologia Politica), and Miguel Fredes 
(Centro de Estudios Ambientales) (La Tercera 2003). A "truce" is 
signed between Chilean and US ENGOs and Arauco and CMPC. The 
companies will provide information about Chilean plantations; 
environmentalists will suspend the campaign until August. Meetings 
are planned for June and August (Venegas 2003). 
May 5 Arauco "opens the possibility" of certifying itself under the FSC (La 
Segunda 2003). 
June FSC representatives meet with ICEFI and CertFor to “strengthen 
working relationships between the organizations.” FSC attendees 
included Nancy Vallejo, Mathew Wenban-Smith, Liviu Amariei, 
Danial Arancibia; ICEFI attendees included Hernan Verscheure and 
Ana Young; CertFor representatives were Guillermo Geisse (Board 
Chair), Leonel Sierralta (Chair of Technical Committee, Secretary of 
Superior Board), and Aldo Cerda (Working Group for Plantation 
Standards) (ICEFI 2003). 
June 6 US and Chile sign Free Trade Agreement in Miami (USTR 2003). 
August Bosques Arauco, Forestal CELCO, and Forestal Valdivia (Arauco) 
has 926,900 hectares CertFor-certified (CertFor 2006). 
October 31 Bosques Cautin has 15,194 hectares of Eucalyptus and E. nitens FSC-
certified (FSC 2006b). 
December 11 Sociedad Agrícola y Forestal Degenfeld Ltda has 9,607 hectares of 






FAMASA (Monteaguila) has 59,514 hectares CertFor-certified 
(CertFor 2006). 
January 9 ICEFI is legally incorporated as a Trade Association (ICEFI 2004c). 
March Bosques de Chile has 25,240 hectares CertFor-certified (CertFor 
2006). 
April 5 A new ICEFI Directorate is elected (ICEFI 2004e). 
April 17-18 Meeting of Latin American FSC national initiatives in Sao Paulo, 
Brazil to discuss funding, marketing, and participation strategies. 
Participants include: Colombia, Guyana, Argentina, Ecuador, 
Guatemala, Bolivia, Perú, Chile, Brasil, Honduras and México 
(ICEFI 2004d). 
May ICEFI opens draft standards for native forests and plantations to 
public review (ICEFI 2004g, f). 
 Forestal MININCO has 540,766 hectares CertFor-certified (CertFor 
2006). 
June 21 First draft of the CertFor Chain-of-Custory Standard is released 
(CertFor 2004b). 
July 1 INN assumes its role as CertFor accreditation body. Two certifiers – 
QMI and SGS Chile – apply (CertFor 2005). 
July 2 First draft of the CertFor Group Certification Standard is released 
(CertFor 2004c). 
September Arauco and MININCO sign the Chilean Joint Solutions Project, an 
agreement with domestic and international ENGOs. The agreement 
ends the two-year campaign to draw attention to commercial impacts 
on Chile’s native forests (Nixon 2004a). 
September 10-13 ICEFI is officially accredited as an FSC national initiative at the FSC 
10th Anniversary Conference in Bonn (FSC 2004a; ICEFI 2004b). 
October 8 DICERFA-ASTEX has 820 hectares of Eucalyptus FSC-certified 
(FSC 2006b). 
2005 
February 15  
 
CertFor is licensed to use the PEFC label (CertFor 2005). 
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APPENDIX IV: STATEMENTS OF PRINCIPLES 
CertFor Chile Principles (CertFor 2002) 
Principle 1: The use of the forest resources must be planned and managed so as to 
provide a sustained flow of products and services in successive rotations, according to a 
comprehensive long term management plan appropriate to the scale of operations and 
applicable to the Forest Management Unit (FMU), whether it belongs to a single owner 
or group of them. The master plan should be prepared before operations commence. 
Principle 2: The use of forest resources should be planned and managed so that 
the environmental values of the natural ecosystems contained in the Forest Management 
Unit are protected and significant negative impacts on biodiversity are avoided. 
Principle 3: Forest resources should be managed so as to maintain their health, 
vitality and productivity, by protecting them from fires and other damaging agents. 
Principle 4: Forest resources are managed so as to promote soil conservation and 
to minimize adverse impacts on the quantity and quality of water resources, taking 
particular account of the needs of downstream communities. 
Principle 5: Forest managers must respect the traditional and customary uses and 
rights of local communities, maintaining good neighbor relations with them and 
supporting the development of local capacities which contribute to the improvement of 
their quality of life. 
Principle 6: Forest managers will take into account declared agreements, 
documented commitments and respect the legally established rights and the traditional 
knowledge of indigenous peoples to use and manage their lands and resources. 
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Principle 7: Forest managers will respect the rights of the forest workers, 
compensating them fairly and equitably, safeguarding their health and safety at work. 
Principle 8: Forest managers respect the laws of Chile and international 
agreements and legally biding treaties and will take into consideration any other 
agreements and treaties, to which Chile is a signatory. 
Principle 9: Regular monitoring of the forest resources, the management system 
and the responsible companies and owners of the FMU, will be conducted with the 
purpose of evaluating the progress in achieving the stated principles 
 
FSC Principles and Criteria for Forest Stewardship (FSC 2004) 
Principle 1: Forest management shall respect all applicable laws of the country in 
which they occur, and international treaties and agreements to which the country is a 
signatory, and comply with all FSC Principles and Criteria. 
Principle 2: Long-term tenure and use rights to the land and forest resources shall 
be clearly defined, documented and legally established. 
Principle 3 The legal and customary rights of indigenous peoples to own, use and 
manage their lands, territories, and resources shall be recognized and respected. 
Principle 4: Forest management operations shall maintain or enhance the long-
term social and economic well-being of forest workers and local communities. 
Principle 5: Forest management operations shall encourage the efficient use of the 
forest's multiple products and services to ensure economic viability and a wide range of 
environmental and social benefits. 
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Principle 6: Forest management shall conserve biological diversity and its 
associated values, water resources, soils, and unique and fragile ecosystems and 
landscapes, and, by so doing, maintain the ecological functions and the integrity of the 
forest. 
Principle 7: A management plan – appropriate to the scale and intensity of the 
operations – shall be written, implemented, and kept up to date. The long term objectives 
of management, and the means of achieving them, shall be clearly stated. 
Principle 8: Monitoring shall be conducted – appropriate to the scale and intensity 
of forest management – to assess the condition of the forest, yields of forest products, 
chain of custody, management activities and their social and environmental impacts. 
Principle 9: Management activities in high conservation value forests shall 
maintain or enhance the attributes which define such forests. Decisions regarding high 
conservation value forests shall always be considered in the context of a precautionary 
approach. 
Principle 10: Plantations shall be planned and managed in accordance with 
Principles and Criteria 1-9, and Principle 10 and its Criteria. While plantations can 
provide an array of social and economic benefits, and can contribute to satisfying the 
world's needs for forest products, they should complement the management of, reduce 
pressures on, and promote the restoration and conservation of natural forests. 
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APPENDIX V: LEXIS-NEXIS ACADEMIC UNIVERSE SOURCES 
 News Wires 
1992 Business Wire 
1993 IPS-Inter Press Service, PR Newswire 
1995 Business Wire, IPS-Inter Press Service, PR Newswire 
1996 Associated Press, Associated Press Worldstream, Business Wire, IPS-Inter Press 
Service, PR Newswire 
1997 Associated Press, Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, 
Business Wire, IPS-Inter Press Service, PR Newswire 
1998 Associated Press, Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, 
Business Wire, IPS-Inter Press Service, PR Newswire, U.S. Newswire 
1999 Associated Press, Associated Press Online, Business Wire, Environment News 
Service, E-Wire, IPS-Inter Press Service, PR Newswire, AScribe Newswire 
2000 AScribe Newswire, Associated Press, Associated Press Online, Associated Press 
Worldstream, Business Wire, Environment News Service, E-Wire, IPS-Inter 
Press Service, PR Newswire, Associated Press State & Local Wire, U.S. 
Newswire 
2001 AScribe Newswire, Business Wire, Environment News Service, IPS-Inter Press 
Service, PR Newswire, Associated Press State & Local Wire, U.S. Newswire, 
United Press International 
2002 Business Wire, Environment News Service, IPS-Inter Press Service, PR 
Newswire, Associated Press State & Local Wire, U.S. Newswire, AScribe 
Newswire 
2003 AScribe Newswire, Associated Press Online, Associated Press Worldstream, 
Business Wire, IPS-Inter Press Service, Market Wire, PR Newswire, Associated 
Press, Associated Press State & Local Wire, U.S. Newswire, United Press 
International 
2004 AScribe Newswire, Associated Press Worldstream, Business Wire, Market Wire, 





 News Transcripts 
1995 Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Federal News 
Service 
1996 Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Federal News 
Service 
1998 FDCH News Service Capitol Report 
1999 Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Federal News 
Service, National Public Radio (NPR), All Things Considered 
2000 CNN International, CNN International World News, CNN, CNN Worldview, 
Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, Federal News 
Service, Fox News Network, Fox Hannity & Colmes 
2001 CNBC News Transcripts, Rivera Live, Federal Document Clearing House 
Congressional Testimony, NBC News Transcripts, Today 
2002 Federal Document Clearing House Congressional Testimony, National Public 
Radio (NPR), Weekend Edition Sunday, Presidential Campaign Press Materials 
2003 National Public Radio (NPR), Weekend Edition Sunday 
 US News: Midwest Regional Sources 
1997 Dayton Daily News (OH), South Bend Tribune (IN) 
1999 Bismarck Tribune (North Dakota), Dayton Daily News (OH), South Bend 
Tribune (IN) 
2000 Capital Times (Madison, WI), Dayton Daily News (OH), Milwaukee Journal 
Sentinel (WI), South Bend Tribune (IN), Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA) 
2001 Chicago Daily Herald, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (WI), Telegraph Herald 
(Dubuque, IA), The Pantagraph (Bloomington, IL) 
2002 Capital Times (Madison, WI), Chicago Daily Herald, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel 
(WI), Telegraph Herald (Dubuque, IA), The Pantagraph (Bloomington, IL), 
Topeka Capital-Journal (KS), Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, WI) 
2003 Milwaukee Journal Sentinel (WI), Wisconsin State Journal (Madison, WI) 
2004 South Bend Tribune (IN) 
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 US News: Northeast Regional Sources 
1995 The Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY) 
1996 Bangor Daily News (ME), Providence Journal-Bulletin (RI), Telegram & Gazette 
(MA) 
1997 Bangor Daily News (ME), Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA), Lancaster New 
Era (Lancaster, PA), Portland Press Herald (ME), Providence Journal-Bulletin 
(RI), Sunday News (Lancaster, PA), Telegram & Gazette (MA), The Record 
(Bergen County, NJ) 
1998 Bangor Daily News (ME), Portland Press Herald (ME), Telegram & Gazette 
(MA), The Times Union (Albany, NY) 
1999 Bangor Daily News (ME), Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA), Lancaster New 
Era (Lancaster, PA), Portland Press Herald (ME), Providence Journal-Bulletin 
(RI), Telegram & Gazette (MA), The Times Union (Albany, NY), Village Voice 
(New York, NY) 
2000 Bangor Daily News (ME), Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA), Lancaster New 
Era (Lancaster, PA), Portland Press Herald (ME), The Times Union (Albany, 
NY) 
2001 Bangor Daily News (ME), Portland Press Herald (ME), Providence Journal-
Bulletin (RI), Telegram & Gazette (MA), The Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY), The 
Record (Bergen County, NJ) 
2002 Bangor Daily News (ME), Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA), Lancaster New 
Era (Lancaster, PA), Portland Press Herald (ME), Telegram & Gazette (MA) 
2003 Bangor Daily News (ME), The Post-Standard (Syracuse, NY), The Times Union 
(Albany, NY) 
2004 Bangor Daily News (ME), Intelligencer Journal (Lancaster, PA), Lancaster New 
Era (Lancaster, PA), Montachusett Telegram & Gazette (MA), Sunday News 
(Lancaster, PA), Telegram & Gazette (MA), The Times Union (Albany, NY), 
The Union Leader (Manchester NH) 
 US News: Southeast Regional Sources 
1996 Roanoke Times & World News (Roanoke, VA), The Washington Times 




 US News: Southeast Regional Sources (continued) 
1998 News & Record (Greensboro, NC), The Post and Courier (Charleston, SC), The 
Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA) 
1999 Charleston Gazette (WV), Florida Times-Union (Jacksonville, FL), Roanoke 
Times & World News (Roanoke, VA), The Augusta Chronicle (GA), The Capital 
(Annapolis, MD), The Stuart News/Port St. Lucie News (Stuart, FL), The 
Virginian-Pilot (Norfolk, VA) 
2000 Birmingham News (AL), Chattanooga Times Free Press (TN), Sarasota Herald-
Tribune (FL) 
2001 Charleston Gazette (WV), Chattanooga Times Free Press (TN), News & Record 
(Greensboro, NC), Roanoke Times & World News (Roanoke, VA), The Capital 
(Annapolis, MD) 
2002 Charleston Daily Mail (WV), Charleston Gazette (WV), Chattanooga Times Free 
Press (TN), Richmond Times Dispatch (VA), Roanoke Times & World News 
(Roanoke, VA), The Augusta Chronicle (GA), The Commercial Appeal 
(Memphis, TN) 
2003 Charleston Daily Mail (WV), Chattanooga Times Free Press (TN), Winston-
Salem Journal (Winston Salem, NC) 
2004 Arkansas Democrat-Gazette (Little Rock, AR), The Hill, The Ledger (Lakeland, 
FL), Winston-Salem Journal (Winston Salem, NC) 
 US News: Western Regional Sources 
1991 Lewiston Morning Tribune (ID) 
1996 Cal-Osha Reporter, Press Enterprise (Riverside, CA), Salt Lake Tribune (UT) 
1997 Daily Camera, Salt Lake Tribune (UT), Spokesman Review (Spokane, WA), The 
Business Press (CA), The Columbian (Vancouver, WA) 
1998 Anchorage Daily News (AK), Lewiston Morning Tribune (ID), Tulsa World 
(OK) 
1999 Albuquerque Tribune (NM), Santa Fe New Mexican (NM), The Columbian 
(Vancouver, WA), The Oregonian 
2000 Albuquerque Journal (NM), Press Enterprise (Riverside, CA), Santa Fe New 
Mexican (NM), Seattle Post-Intelligencer (WA) 
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 US News: Western Regional Sources (continued) 
2001 Anchorage Daily News (AK), Northwest Construction, Seattle Post-Intelligencer 
(WA), Spokesman Review (Spokane, WA), The Columbian (Vancouver, WA), 
The Oregonian 
2002 Daily Journal Of Commerce (Portland, OR), The Oregonian, Seattle Post-
Intelligencer (WA), Tulsa World (OK), Vancouver Business Journal (Vancouver, 
WA) 
2003 Alameda Times-Star (Alameda, CA), Lewiston Morning Tribune (ID), Salt Lake 
Tribune (UT), San Antonio Express-News (TX), San Mateo County Times (San 
Mateo, CA), Seattle Weekly (WA), Spokesman Review (Spokane, WA), The 
Columbian (Vancouver, WA), The News Tribune (Tacoma, WA), The 
Oregonian, Seattle Post-Intelligencer (WA), The Sunday Oregonian, Tulsa World 
(OK) 
 US News: Western Regional Sources 
2004 Daily Journal Of Commerce (Portland, OR), Spokesman Review (Spokane, WA), 
The Santa Fe New Mexican (NM), Seattle Post-Intelligencer (WA) 
 Major Papers  
1991 Independent 
1992 Independent, Ottawa Citizen 
1993 Christian Science Monitor, Financial Times, Guardian, Journal of Commerce, 
Toronto Star 
1994 Australian Financial Review, Christian Science Monitor, Courier-Mail, Guardian, 
Independent, Journal of Commerce, Scotland on Sunday, Times, Times-Picayune 
1995 Australian Financial Review, Buffalo News, Business Times, Christian Science 
Monitor, Columbus Dispatch, Courier-Mail, Daily Yomiuri, Evening Post, 
Financial Times, Herald, Herald Sun, Independent, Journal of Commerce, New 
Straits Times, South China Morning Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, St. Petersburg 
Times, Straits Times, Times 
1996 Advertiser, Age, Australian, Australian Financial Review, Buffalo News, 
Business Times, Christian Science Monitor, Courier Mail, Daily Yomiuri, 
Dominion, Financial Times, Gazeta Mercantil Online, Gazette, Guardian, Herald, 
Independent, Journal of Commerce, New Straits Times, Observer, Ottawa 
Citizen, Press, South China Morning Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Straits Times, 
Tampa Tribune, Times-Picayune 
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 Major Papers (continued) 
1997 Australian, Bangkok Post, Buffalo News, Business Times, Dominion, Evening 
Post, Financial Times, Gazeta Mercantil Online, Guardian, Herald, Hindu, 
Independent, Irish Times, Journal of Commerce, New Straits Times, New York 
Times, Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, Seattle Times, South China Morning Post, Straits 
Times, Sunday Times, Tampa Tribune, Toronto Star, Toronto Sun, Wall Street 
Journal, Weekend Australian 
1998 Advertiser, Age, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Australian, Bangkok Post, Boston 
Globe, Boston Herald, Buffalo News, Business Times, Christian Science 
Monitor, Courier Mail, Daily Yomiuri, Evening Post, Financial Times, Gazeta 
Mercantil Online, Guardian, Herald, Hindu, Hobart Mercury, Houston Chronicle, 
Independent, Irish Times, Jakarta Post, Journal of Commerce, New Straits Times, 
Observer, Omaha World Herald, Seattle Times, South China Morning Post, St. 
Louis Post-Dispatch, Straits Times, Sydney Morning Herald, Times, Toronto 
Star, USA Today, Washington Post, Weekend Australian 
1999 Age, Asian Wall Street Journal, Atlanta Journal-Constitution, Australian, 
Australian Financial Review, Bangkok Post, Buffalo News, Business Times, 
Christian Science Monitor, Columbus Dispatch, Courier Mail, Denver Rocky 
Mountain News, Dominion, Financial Times, Gazeta Mercantil Online, Guardian, 
Herald, Hindu, Independent, Irish Times, Jakarta Post, Journal of Commerce, 
New Straits Times, New York Times, Omaha World Herald, Oregonian, Ottawa 
Citizen, Press, San Francisco Chronicle, Scotland on Sunday, Scotsman, Seattle 
Times, South China Morning Post, St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Straits Times, 
Sunday Age, Sunday Mail, Sydney Morning Herald, Times, Times-Picayune, 
Toronto Star 
 General News Magazines-Journals (Forestry) 
1997 Forestry & British Timber, Timber Trades Journal 
1998 Farmers Weekly, Farming News, Forestry & British Timber, Timber Trades 
Journal 
1999 Farmers Weekly, Forestry & British Timber 
2000 Forestry & British Timber 
2001 Forestry & British Timber 
2002 Farmers Weekly, Forestry & British Timber 
2003 Forestry & British Timber 
2004 Forestry & British Timber 
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  General News Magazines-Journals (Manufacturing) 
1997 Builders Merchants Journal, Building Design, Cabinet Maker, Contract Journal, 
International Manufacturing Review, Printing World, What's new in Building 
1998 Builders Merchants Journal, Building Design, Cabinet Maker, Intermountain 
Contractor, International Manufacturing Review, Printing World, What's new in 
Building, Wood Based Panels International 
1999 Builders Merchants Journal, Building Design, Contract Journal, Global Design 
News, International Manufacturing Review, Printing World, Wood Based Panels 
International 
2000  Building Design, Global Design News, International Manufacturing Review, 
New York Construction, Printing World 
2001  Building Design, Cabinet Maker, Global Design News, New York Construction, 
Northwest Construction, Presstime, Printing World, What's new in Building 
2002  Building Design, Building Design and Construction, Cabinet Maker, Contract 
Flooring Journal, Latin Trade, Printing World, What's new in Building 
2003  Building Design, Building Design and Construction, Cabinet Maker, Colorado 
Construction, Contract, Contract Flooring Journal, Contract Journal, Contract 
Magazine, Direct, Northwest Construction, Printing World, What's new in 
Industry 
2004 Contract Flooring Journal, Contract Journal, New York Construction, Printing 
World, What's new in Building, What's new in Industry 
 General News Magazines-Journals (Retail) 
1995 Marketing News TM 
1996 Marketing News TM 
1997 DIY Week, Marketing News TM 
1999 DIY Week, Purchasing Magazine 
 General News Magazines-Journals (Academic) 
1995 The Washington Quarterly 
2002 Global Environmental Politics 
2004 Global Environmental Politics 
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 General News Newsletters (Academic / Legal) 
1995 Georgia Environmental Law Letter, Louisiana Environmental Compliance 
Update, New York Environmental Compliance Update 
1996 Environmental Compliance & Litigation Strategy, Georgia Environmental Law 
Letter, Illinois Environmental Law Letter, Louisiana Environmental Compliance 
Update, Maryland Environmental Law Letter, Minnesota Environmental 
Compliance Update, Missouri Environmental Compliance Update, North 
Carolina Environmental Law Letter, Ohio Environmental Law Letter, 
Pennsylvania Environmental Compliance Update, Tennessee Environmental Law 
Letter, Texas Environmental Compliance Update 
1997 Michigan Environmental Compliance Update 
1998 Georgia Environmental Law Letter 
2000 Michigan Environmental Compliance Update 
 General News Magazins -Journals (General) 
1996 Business Week, The Economist 
1997 Nation's Business 
1998 The Economist 
1999 Business Week 
2000 Business Week 
2001 The Economist 
2003 Business Week, The Economist, The Spectator 
 Spanish Language News  
2002 Agence France Presse -- Spanish, Deutsche Presse-Agentur, El Comercio (Peru), 
El Mercurio (Chile), El Pais (Uruguay), Expansion (Madrid), La Nacion 
(Argentina) Comercio Exterior, NoticiasFinancieras, Portafolio (Colombia), 
Spanish Newswire Services 
2003 CompanynewsGroupe, El Mercurio (Chile), Expansion (Madrid), 
NoticiasFinancieras, Spanish Newswire Services, Xinhua News Agency – 
Spanish 
2004 El Mercurio (Chile), Spanish Newswire Services, UPI Chile 
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APPENDIX VI: CERTIFIED FMU AND COC COMPANIES IN CHILE 
Certified Forest Management Units 
NSMD Company Hectares Wood sources 
FSC Anchile 61,069 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
CFC Arauco 926,900 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
FSC Basauri Forestal 2,014 Plantation (Pine) 
FSC Bio Bio SA 66,555 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
FSC Bosques Cautin 15,194 Plantation (Eucalyptus) 
CFC Bosques de Chile 25,240 Plantation (Pine) 
FSC CAF El Alamo 3,501 Plantation (Eucalyptus, poplar, pine) 
FSC Degenfeld 9,607 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine, beech) 
FSC Dicerfa–Astex 820 Plantation (Eucalyptus) 
FSC FAMASA 60,290 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
CFC  59,514  
FSC Los Lagos SA 16,065 Plantation (Eucalyptus) 
CFC Mininco 540,766 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
FSC ProBosque 5,983 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
FSC PROCER 1,522 Plantation (Eucalyptus, pine) 
FSC Rio Cruces SA 3,588 Natural forest 
FSC Terranova 120,237 Plantation (Pine) 
FSC Tierra Chilena 12,753 Plantation (Eucalyptus) 
FSC Tornagaleones 44,355 Semi-natural and mixed plantation, natural 
forest) 




NSMD Company Products 
FSC Astillas Exportaciones Ltda – Astex Wood chips 
FSC Bagaro Logs, boards 
FSC Bosques Cautín SA Logs, wood chips, pulp 
CFC CMPC Cellulosa Wood pulp 
FSC Comercial Canta Rana Ltda Lumber, molding, paneling, furniture 
and toy components, fencing 
FSC Compañía Chilena de Fósforos SA Chopsticks, paddles, matches, splints 
FSC Forestal Austral Lumber 
FSC Forestal Calle-Calle SA Wood chips 
FSC Forestal del Sur SA Wood chips 
FSC Forestal Diguillín SA Wood chips, boards, blocks 
FSC Forestal Sofoagro Ltda Wood chips 
FSC FAMASA Logs 
 FAMASA - Planta Astillado Coronel Logs, wood chips 
FSC FTG Veneer Veneers 
FSC Inber SA Kitchen furniture, boards 
FSC Maderas Anchile Ltda Logs, wood chips 
FSC Masisa SA - División Madera Sólida Sawn timber, molding, doors, wood 
chips 
FSC Masonite Chile SA Doors, veneers 
FSC Norwood SA Lumber, millwork, laminated beams, 
molding, wood chips, bark, sawdust 
FSC Novaland SA Lumber, flooring, furniture and 
construction components 
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NSMD Company Products 
FSC Pablo Esquerre Teulade - Cabanes Wood chips 
FSC 
CFC 
PROMASA Doors, moldings, posts 
FSC Sociedad Agrícola y forestal Pozo y 
Reyes Ltda 
Logs, wood chips 
FSC Sociedad de Productores y 
Exportadores 
Lumber, molding, paneling, furniture 
and toy components, fencing 
FSC TEMSA Chopsticks, paddles, sticks 
 TEMSA - Los Lagos Mousetraps, paddles 
FSC Tulsa SA Veneer, plywood 




APPENDIX VII: SPANISH SEARCH TERMS 
Terms derived from FSC and CertFor Principals:  
ECONOMICS mercad! or eficien! or product! or rentabl! or servic! 
ENVIRONMENT biodivers! or biolog! or conserv! or ecolog! or ecosiste! or 
ambient! or natural! 
SOCIAL comunida! or equida! or just! or indigen! or vecin! or 
segurida! or soci! or obrer! or trabaj! 
PROCEDURAL 1 respons! or certific! or custodia or ejecut! or monitor! 
PROCEDURAL 2 “primer part!” or “segundo part!” or “tercer part!” or “1a 
part!” or “2a part!” or “3a part!” or “tercero independente” 
PROCEDURAL 3 participa! or represent! or delega! 
Additional categories:  
CHILE Chile or Chilen** 
BOYCOTT boicot! 
SHAREHOLDER accionist! 
STAKEHOLDER stakeholder! or “partes interesadas” or “grupos de interés” 
GOVERNMENT gobierno or gubernament! 
GOVERNANCE governance 
REGULATION regla! or regula! 
PUBLIC público 
PRIVATE privad! 
FSC  FSC or “Forest Stewardship Council” 
ICEFI ICEFI or “Iniciativa Chilena de Certificación Forestal 




Additional categories (continued) 
ICEFI Stakeholders “Agrupación de Ingenieros Forestales por el Bosque Nativo” 
or AIFBN or “Comité Nacional Pro Defensa de la Fauna y 
Flora” or CODEFF or “Departamento de Acción Social” or 
DAS or “Federación Nacional de Sindicatos de CONAF” or 
FENASIC or “Red Nacional de Acción Ecológica” or 
RENACE 
ICEFI / FSC FMUs “Rio Cruces” or “Bosques Cautin” or Anchile or “Los 
Lagos” or “Tierra Chilena” or “Forestales Regionales” or 
“CAF El Alamo” or Procer or “Sociedad Agrícola y Forestal 
Degenfeld” 
CERTFOR (CFC) CertFor or “Estandar Nacional de Certificación Forest!” 
CFC Stakeholders “Fundación Chile” or INFOR or “Instituto Forestal” 
CFC FMUs CELCO or “Forestal Valdivia” 
PEFC PEFC or "Pan European Forest Certification" or “the 
Endorsement of Forest Certification” or paneuropeo 
“ISO 14!” (ISO) “ISO 14!” or “International Organization for 
Standardization” or “Organización Internacional para la 
Estandarización” 
ISO FMUs Licancel or Quilpolemu or “Cementos Bío Bío” or “Bosques 
SA” 
ISO Stakeholders “Instituto Nacional de Normalización” 
FSC/ISO FMUs “Bío Bío” or Tornagaleones or Millalemu or Terranova 
CFC/ISO FMUs MININCO or “Bosques de Chile” or Arauco 
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